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The Strategic Chain 
Linking Pakistan, India, China, and the United 
States
Robert Einhorn, Project Co-Chair
W.P.S. Sidhu, Project Co-Chair
About the Project 
The 15-month Brookings Institution project fo-cused on the “strategic chain” linking Pakistan, 
India, China, and the United States—a series of re-
lationships that are resulting in some of the most 
active nuclear weapons, missile, and missile defense 
programs anywhere in the world today. The project’s 
main goal was to identify policies and measures that 
could promote stability and reduce incentives for 
arms build-ups between key pairs of protagonists, 
regionally, and globally, while also contributing to 
a better understanding of the various strategic in-
terconnections among these four nuclear-armed 
powers. 
The study was based on research conducted by 
Brookings and foreign experts and drew on the re-
sults of consultations with former senior officials 
and scholars from each of the four countries in the 
strategic chain. The contributions of participants in 
these consultations reflected their personal views and 
not necessarily the positions of their governments. 
This report provides analysis of the “strategic chain,” 
and recommendations for promoting stability and 
moderating competition, whether between pairs of 
“strategic chain” countries, on a region-wide basis, 
and even globally.
Rationale and Goals of the Project
Considerable policy analysis has been devoted to bi-
lateral strategic relationships between Pakistan and 
India, India and China, and China and the United 
States. But the strategic dynamics among these four 
nuclear powers cannot be understood or effectively 
addressed on a strictly bilateral basis. While Pakistan 
responds strategically to India, India responds both 
to Pakistan and China, which in turn responds both 
to India and the United States.
There are many reasons for the lack of success in pro-
moting strategic restraint among these four nucle-
ar-armed states, whether on a unilateral, bilateral, or 
plurilateral basis. Among the reasons are long-stand-
ing conflicts, varying conceptions of the national 
interest and its requirements, widespread mistrust 
among the key powers, domestic pressures, and re-
sentment toward foreign interference (primarily di-
rected at the United States). But one factor that has 
not been adequately examined is the strategic chain 
linking Pakistan to India, India to China, and China 
to the United States. Without Indian restraint, Pa-
kistan is unlikely to constrain its programs unilat-
erally. Without Chinese restraint, India will be very 
reluctant to limit its programs unilaterally or engage 
in bilateral controls with Pakistan that, according to 
India, would limit its options vis-à-vis China. And 
without U.S. constraints on capabilities of concern 
to China, Beijing may continue to resist curbing its 
strategic modernization efforts. 
Moreover, India and the United States have ex-
pressed concern about longstanding China-Pakistan 
cooperation in important areas, and Pakistan has 
expressed concern about Indian-U.S. cooperation 
in important areas, especially in the wake of the 
U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.
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The project’s focus on these four countries is not meant 
to suggest that their strategic links to other nuclear 
powers are not consequential. Russia, in particular, 
might well have been included as an additional link 
in the chain. However, for reasons of manageability, 
as well as the desire to avoid complicating the proj-
ect by bringing into it the difficult issues surrounding 
the current U.S.-Russia relationship, the decision was 
made to confine the effort to the four.
The project aimed to identify policies and measures 
that could promote stability and reduce incentives 
for arms build-ups between key protagonists, among 
these four nuclear powers more generally, and even 
globally, while also contributing to a better under-
standing of the various strategic interconnections 
among these four nuclear-armed powers. 
A critical research objective of the project was to ex-
amine how and the extent to which this chain serves 
as an obstacle to strategic restraint—and then to 
consider whether and how a better understanding 
of these strategic linkages can be used to devise more 
effective approaches to reducing incentives for nu-
clear and missile build-ups in southern Asia.  
Among the questions that the project sought to ad-
dress were:
  What are the strategic perspectives and doctrines 
of the four powers? Are they evolving and, if so, 
how? Do doctrinal asymmetries among the four 
contribute to instabilities and arms competitions?
  What developments in the strategic programs 
of the four states (e.g., nuclear weapons, nucle-
ar-armed ballistic and cruise missiles, tactical 
nuclear systems, missile defenses, conventional-
ly-armed long-range missiles) are likely to have 
stabilizing or destabilizing effects among these 
four nuclear powers?
  To what extent are prospects for bilateral mea-
sures of restraint (e.g., Indo-Pakistan, Sino-In-
dia) actually inhibited by strategic linkages to 
third countries—rather than inhibited by other 
factors having little to do with linkages to third 
countries?
  Given linkages of bilateral strategic relationships 
to third countries, must those third countries 
be involved in some fashion in any bilateral re-
straint arrangements? If so, how? Should those 
third countries adopt the same constraints as 
the other two parties or can they better partici-
pate by adopting supportive collateral or confi-
dence-building measures? 
  Are there areas where the strategic interests of 
Pakistan, India, China, and the United States 
coincide, and where the four countries might be 
prepared to adopt identical or similar measures 
(e.g., nuclear security, anti-smuggling, export 
controls, missile defense)?
Review of the Project Proceedings 
Three meetings were held in Beijing, Doha, and 
Washington, D.C. to discuss the abovementioned 
issues. At the first meeting held March 7-9, 2016 in 
Beijing, the national strategic perspectives of China, 
India, Pakistan, and the United States, which were 
drafted by scholars from each of the four countries, 
were discussed. A Brookings background paper on the 
nuclear and other strategic forces of the four countries 
was also discussed in Beijing. For the second meeting 
held in Doha May 20-21, 2016, papers from China, 
India, Pakistan, and the United States with new ideas 
and proposals to further enhance stability among the 
strategic chain countries were circulated for consider-
ation by the group. In addition, Brookings prepared a 
background paper on the existing unilateral, bilateral, 
plurilateral, and global measures undertaken by the 
four countries to enhance stability. The third and final 
meeting held October 26-28, 2016 in Washington, 
D.C. had a focused discussion on a draft outline for 
the final report of the project, including possible ad-
ditional measures to enhance stability, and an assess-
ment of the utility and benefits of the strategic chain 
concept for the participating experts. The papers pre-
sented at the Beijing and Doha meetings are annexed 
to this report.  
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Summary of National Strategic 
Perspectives 
Asia is becoming the locus of great power polit-ical interaction, and the strategic interrelation-
ships between the nuclear powers in this region, in 
particular, China, India, Pakistan, and the United 
States, are proving to be much more complicated 
than the relatively simple, bipolar nuclear order of 
the Cold War. In order for these nations to ensure 
their security, and to maintain strategic stability, it is 
important to better understand this “strategic chain” 
of relations between these four nuclear powers. To 
do so effectively, however, it is crucial to understand 
the strategic environment and doctrines of each 
country. 
This section addresses the security environment, 
threat perceptions, and defense doctrine of each 
country, and the strategy for achieving its security 
objectives, with a special emphasis on the role that 
nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities play 
in promoting its interests. 
A scholar from each country was commissioned to 
write a paper on his own country’s strategic envi-
ronment and doctrine. This section summarizes the 
authors’ papers without additional commentary 
or analysis and using the authors’ own words to 
the greatest extent possible. The full set of original 
papers is annexed to this report.
China1 
Strategic Environment 
China is facing a challenging strategic security envi-
ronment. It believes the United States has adopted a 
containment strategy to check the growth of China’s 
power and influence. China also believes the United 
States is not acting alone, but is enhancing its alli-
ance system in the Asia-Pacific region and encourag-
ing neutral countries to side with the United States 
against China.
1  This section summarizes a paper on China’s strategic environment and doctrine authored by Zhao Tong of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for 
International Policy, Beijing.  
China has long seen relations with the United States 
as its most important bilateral relationship. Since 
the 1990s, this relationship has focused on mutual 
economic interest, but major differences have led to 
different understandings on a wide range of political 
and security issues. Seeing a power transition, en-
hancing Beijing’s power relative to that of Washing-
ton, as likely in the mid- to long-term future, China 
worries that the United States will resist this transi-
tion. Such concern has led Beijing to suspect that 
Washington is implementing a systematic strategy to 
contain China. 
China privately acknowledges that the U.S. alliance 
system in Asia has successfully prevented its allies 
from developing nuclear weapons, but China still 
views the U.S. alliance system as representing a grave 
threat to China’s security. From Beijing’s point of 
view, the “rebalance” to Asia is the most recent effort 
by Washington to reinforce the alliance against a 
rising China.
Beijing sees Washington’s hand behind almost every 
regional confrontation, including over the disputed 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the South China Sea, and 
the independence movement in Taiwan. Beijing 
believes that U.S. meddling has exacerbated recent 
tensions in the region. The Sino-Japanese relation-
ship also continues to worsen, and China is deeply 
worried that Tokyo is moving to revise the pacifist 
constitution in place since the end of World War II 
and will work with Washington to check China’s in-
fluence in the region.
Against this backdrop, China sees itself as fighting an 
uphill battle to maintain strategic stability with the 
United States—its primary rival—and to deal with 
other new nuclear challenges. Various statements 
from U.S. officials and nongovernmental efforts 
have led Beijing to fear that the United States seeks 
a first-strike capability against China. In addition, 
the emergence of various non-nuclear military tech-
nologies poses an unprecedented threat to China’s 
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confidence in the survivability and credibility of its 
nuclear deterrent. Among these non-nuclear tech-
nologies, missile defense and conventional prompt 
global strike capacity are of foremost concern to 
China, and the possibility of disarming cyberattacks 
are not far behind. 
In addition, many Chinese strategists and experts 
are concerned that Japan and South Korea (Repub-
lic of Korea, or ROK) are pursuing technical hedg-
ing strategies that will allow them to build nuclear 
weapons in the future. China also suspects that 
South Korea has decided to side more firmly with 
the United States by choosing to deploy the Termi-
nal High Altitude Area Defense (or THAAD) mis-
sile defense system.
On the Korean Peninsula, China worries about 
North Korea’s nuclear capacity, as well as the insta-
bility that military actions by the United States and 
ROK may cause on the Peninsula, due to the fact 
that nuclear threat, refugee flow, and political chaos 
all endanger China’s near- and long-term interests. 
However, China has always believed that upholding 
nuclear non-proliferation principles is in the ulti-
mate interest of China and the international com-
munity.
In South Asia, China has traditionally not paid 
much attention to the nuclear competition between 
India and Pakistan, but this may change as the nu-
clear gap between China and India has narrowed 
through India’s rapid development of long-range 
ballistic missiles, the development of multiple inde-
pendently targetable re-entry vehicles (or MIRVs) 
on ballistic missiles, submarine-based nuclear weap-
ons, missile defense systems, and outer space capa-
bilities. China also fears that the widening nuclear 
and conventional military gaps between India and 
Pakistan may threaten regional stability. 
Strategic Doctrine
China does not publish an official nuclear strategy, 
but scholars believe China adheres to a strategy of 
minimum nuclear deterrence. China has for decades 
maintained a relatively small nuclear arsenal. Beijing 
also has a No First Use (NFU) doctrine, stating that 
China will not be the first state to use nuclear weap-
ons in a conflict and would only use nuclear weap-
ons in retaliation to an enemy nuclear strike. 
China is taking steps to gradually expand and mod-
ernize its nuclear forces. Some Chinese experts be-
lieve that China’s nuclear deterrent has in the past 
been based on “uncertain retaliation”—a capability 
that is not sufficient to guarantee retaliation, but 
enough to plant doubt in an enemy’s mind that 
it can completely destroy China’s arsenal in a first 
strike. As China’s economy grows and it has greater 
resources to spend on military modernization, how-
ever, China is moving toward achieving an assured 
nuclear retaliation capability. Moreover, concerns 
about U.S. missile defense and conventional prompt 
strike weapons have also been driving Beijing’s in-
vestment in nuclear modernization programs. Addi-
tionally, China has been following in the steps of the 
other major nuclear powers in developing new nu-
clear technologies, sometimes for the sake of simply 
mastering these technologies rather than actually 
deploying them. After going through the so-called 
“hundred years of foreign invasion and national hu-
miliation,” Chinese leaders have developed a belief 
that China cannot afford to lag behind other major 
powers on important defense technologies.
For all these reasons, China has achieved major 
breakthroughs in nuclear capabilities in recent de-
cades. China has deployed advanced road-mobile 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 
is reportedly developing another more powerful 
road-mobile ICBM with a longer range. China 
has recently deployed MIRVed silo-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles, which could improve 
China’s capability to penetrate U.S. missile defense 
systems. In addition to land-based nuclear weapon 
systems, China has built a relatively modern strate-
gic submarine ballistic nuclear (SSBN) fleet, which 
is armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
China’s 094 class SSBN has reportedly conducted 
its first patrol this year, and China’s engineers are 
constantly working to improve their quietness and 
survivability.
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With a changing geostrategic environment and im-
proving nuclear capabilities, there is internal debate 
in China about future nuclear posture. As China 
becomes increasingly concerned about the threat of 
U.S. conventional strikes against Chinese nuclear 
forces, some scholars argue that China should add 
conditions to its NFU policy, or adopt a launch on 
warning or launch under attack posture. The Chi-
nese government has rejected any such changes, but 
it shows that China’s nuclear thinking is increasingly 
influenced by Western doctrines and forces, and that 
China’s nuclear posture could deviate from its tradi-
tional practice in the future.
With regard to North Korea, China is willing to apply 
the strictest export control and economic sanctions 
that directly target Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile 
programs. China fundamentally disagrees with the 
United States and others, however, that North Korea 
is solely to blame for the impasse in diplomatic talks, 
or that tougher sanctions will bring North Korea to 
change its position. Beijing, therefore, sees Western 
demands for China to impose sweeping sanctions 
against North Korea as unfair and risky for China. 
Ultimately, how China chooses to deal with North 
Korea will depend on the U.S.-China relationship. 
If Beijing believes that Washington is doing every-
thing possible to contain China, Beijing will have 
less incentive to cooperate. 
India2
Strategic Environment
Over the last two decades, India has emerged as a 
more powerful player in global politics. Its arrival 
as an overt nuclear-armed state has boosted India’s 
status still further. But India continues to be beset 
with multiple internal and external security threats.
India has faced internal security challenges since 
the 1950s. Various ethnic communities in north-
east India such as the Nagas, the Mizos, and others 
have sought to secede from the Indian Union. In 
2  This section summarizes a paper on India’s strategic environment and doctrine authored by Rajesh Rajagopalan of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New 
Delhi. 
addition, in the northwest, India has faced serious 
rebellions in Punjab, Jammu, and Kashmir. Kash-
mir continues to face a low-intensity insurgency, 
and some sections of the valley continue to demon-
strate intense anti-India feelings. Further, the rural 
“Maoist” or “Naxalite” insurgency has also afflicted 
many parts of the country, especially where the fruits 
of India’s economic development have not fully fil-
tered down. Overall, while India continues to face 
a number of internal rebellions, none are presently 
considered serious, though they require continuous 
monitoring.  
India’s international security environment is a re-
flection of both global politics and more immedi-
ate security threats. India’s decisionmakers have 
argued that growing multipolarity is a welcome 
development and that, in a classic hedging strategy, 
India should pursue multiple cooperative relation-
ships. In recent years, India’s relationships with the 
United States, Japan, Australia, and Russia have all 
improved. Relations between India and China have 
been more complicated. They cooperate through 
international trade and in various multilateral fora, 
but they also have unresolved border issues and Chi-
na’s strategic relationship with Pakistan is a consid-
erable irritant for India. 
India does not officially identify external threats to 
itself, but the Indian defense secretary did recently 
state that the Indian military’s “Operational Direc-
tive” requires the domination of one country in case 
of war and the deterrence of another. There can be 
little doubt that he was referring to Pakistan and 
China, respectively. Despite nuclearization, the pos-
sibility of another war with Pakistan cannot be ruled 
out, due to Pakistan’s revisionist objective in Kash-
mir. The primary challenge that India faces from 
Pakistan is not a conventional military threat, but 
Pakistan sponsoring terrorism from under the cover 
of its nuclear capability. China is a more capable mil-
itary power, but it is generally seen as a longer-term 
threat and a more responsible state than Pakistan. 
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Key concerns include an unresolved border dispute, 
China’s recent aggressiveness, as in the South China 
Sea, and China’s military modernization. China and 
Pakistan’s long-standing, tacit military partnership is 
a further problem. Such close collaboration has led 
Indian officials to begin considering the possibility 
that the two countries might collaborate in active 
hostilities, leading India to face the possibility of a 
two-front war.  
Strategic Doctrine
India does not produce an official strategy document, 
but some outlines of strategy can be discerned. In-
dia’s response to the above threats is largely reactive 
and defensive, with diplomacy playing an import-
ant role in both countering threats and in enhanc-
ing Indian capacities through strategic partnerships. 
Nuclear weapons play a very limited role, which is 
in deterring the threat posed by other countries’ nu-
clear weapons.  
India’s response to domestic insurgencies has been 
mostly successful and India will likely continue its 
existing policies, which consist of some military 
pressure and a substantial focus on political and eco-
nomic policies to reduce the underlying causes of 
rebellions.
On Pakistan and terrorism, Indian diplomacy has 
achieved the world’s support and sympathy, but this 
has brought little by way of direct sanctioning of 
Pakistan’s behavior by the international community. 
India’s military approaches have not fared much 
better. The Indian army proposed what came to be 
dubbed the “Cold Start” doctrine that suggested a 
rapid military attack as a response to terrorist out-
rages. But this doctrine never had the needed po-
litical support and led to significant international 
concerns about the possibility of nuclear escalation, 
and the Indian government has formally disavowed 
it. Neither has India come up with a response to Pa-
kistan’s move to introduce tactical nuclear weapons, 
although there has been a significant debate in the 
Indian strategic community about how to respond. 
In sum, India’s strategy toward Pakistan is reactive 
and defensive, with diplomacy playing a central role. 
It should be noted, however, that over the last few 
months, India has responded much more robustly 
to Pakistan’s alleged terrorist provocations, including 
by conducting what New Delhi characterized as a 
“surgical strike” on terrorists within Pakistan-con-
trolled territory. Whether this represents a new para-
digm in Indian policy remains to be seen.
To deal with any threat from China, India has sought 
to build strategic relationships with many countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region that also feel pressured by 
China’s recent behavior, including the United States, 
Japan, Australia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
These relationships are best understood as a form 
of “soft-balancing,” not formal military alliances. 
India’s military strategy for China is defensive, pri-
marily focused on holding existing positions, rather 
than attempting to recapture its claimed territory 
occupied by China. To this end, India is attempting 
to strengthen its border defenses and air force.  
Turning to strategic matters, India has been a reluc-
tant nuclear power, unwilling to go down the nuclear 
path until its hands were forced by Pakistan’s nuclear 
developments in the 1980s. Since becoming an overt 
nuclear power in 1998, India has begun focusing 
more attention on Beijing. India does not yet have 
missiles with sufficient range to target all of China 
from southern India. Similarly, although India has 
begun work on the sea-based leg of its triad, it is a 
long way from acquiring a true sea-based deterrent. 
Thus, India can be expected to continue to develop its 
capabilities for at least a couple more decades. These 
enhancements, however, will be gradual and do not 
suggest a rapid increase in the size of India’s arsenal.  
Nuclear weapons play a very limited role in India’s 
strategy. India’s nuclear strategy can be broadly char-
acterized as “assured retaliation,” and it seeks to use 
nuclear weapons purely for retaliation and hence 
emphasizes minimal, credible, and survivable nu-
clear forces. This strategic view of nuclear weapons 
is one reason why India has not responded to Pa-
kistan’s development of Theater Nuclear Weapons 
(TNWs) or responded to the pace of Pakistan’s nu-
clear warhead development.  
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India has a declared nuclear doctrine. Its central ele-
ment is the No First Use (NFU) pledge. The NFU is 
controversial, and there has been significant opposi-
tion to it among a vocal minority in the Indian stra-
tegic community, but there is little indication that the 
Indian government will consider changing it. India 
also emphasizes civilian control over nuclear weap-
ons and employs a relaxed command and control 
arrangement, with weapons held in a de-alerted and 
de-mated posture, which increases both the safety and 
the security of these weapons. In addition, despite not 
being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT, India continues its unblemished record on nu-
clear non-proliferation and has reiterated a continued 
commitment to nuclear disarmament. 
Pakistan3
Strategic Environment 
Pakistan’s current security environment is shaped 
by a combination of political, economic, diplo-
matic, technological, and military trends, as well 
as by events and actors at the global, regional, and 
national levels. There is a visible and continuous 
shift in the global economic and industrial base and 
Western military capabilities from the Atlantic to-
wards the Asia-Pacific. Pakistan believes that India, 
in pursuit of great power status, is excessively spend-
ing to build and advance its conventional and stra-
tegic forces, way beyond its regional security needs. 
Furthermore, the world’s major nuclear powers con-
tinue to maintain and enhance the effectiveness of 
their nuclear arsenals. In addition, the development 
of ballistic missile defense systems, hypersonic cruise 
missiles, armed and stealthy drones, space militariza-
tion, evolution of non-kinetic capabilities, and cyber 
warfare, pose new challenges to the international 
and regional security environment. These global 
trends have negatively affected the regional balance 
of power, threatened strategic stability, and reduced 
the prospects for peaceful conflict resolution within 
the complex, conflict-prone, and nuclear-armed 
South Asian region.
3  This section summarizes a paper on Pakistan’s strategic environment and doctrine authored by Syed Muhammad Ali, Center for International 
Strategic Studies, Islamabad. 
Pakistan’s security threat comes from India. The 
longstanding unresolved Kashmir dispute, despite 
various U.N. resolutions, lies at the heart of ten-
sions between India and Pakistan. India’s politi-
cal elite, with its growing economy, is pursuing an 
ambitious and destabilizing military build-up, to 
become a global power and regional hegemon. New 
Delhi, emboldened by a Western-supported military 
build-up, is less willing to pursue a negotiated and 
peaceful resolution of the historic Kashmir dispute, 
while the Kashmiri people continue to struggle for 
their U.N.-recognized right of self-determination. 
The absence of a meaningful, sustainable, and re-
sult-driven dialogue and the growing strategic part-
nership between India and the United States are 
matters of grave concern for Pakistan. 
In 1998, 24 years after testing its first nuclear 
weapon, India spent four times more on defense 
than Pakistan. Today, 42 years after its first nuclear 
test, New Delhi spends almost seven times more 
on its military than Islamabad. Moreover, India’s 
growing conventional and strategic capabilities are 
overwhelmingly poised against Pakistan. The Indian 
“Cold Start” doctrine aims to rapidly launch shal-
low thrusts inside Pakistani territory in order to cap-
ture and use it for coercing Pakistan. The large-scale 
Indian development of highly-mobile and armored 
mechanized formations, artillery, rapid airlift capa-
bilities, forward displacement of troops and garri-
sons, supporting communication infrastructure, and 
massive spending provide compelling evidence of 
operationalization of the “Cold Start” doctrine, de-
spite Indian official reluctance to formally accept it. 
India has the oldest, largest, and fastest-growing, 
unsafeguarded nuclear program of all non-Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty states and the entire developing 
world. The most advanced, accurate, and operation-
ally-ready Indian missiles can be employed against 
Pakistan more effectively than against China. Fur-
thermore, Pakistan does not trust the declared 
Indian nuclear doctrine, owing to growing incon-
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sistencies with its actual force posture and technical 
developments.
 In addition, India is actively supporting terrorist and 
insurgent movements in Pakistan. Some Pakistani 
analysts also find it peculiar that significant terrorist 
incidents inside India or its held territories tend to 
occur whenever there is a high-level political or dip-
lomatic engagement between Pakistan and India to 
reduce tensions or resolve disputes. Such incidents 
only allow India to blame Pakistan and are obviously 
neither in Islamabad’s interest nor help the dialogue 
process, which is Pakistan’s main demand. Lastly, 
the growing Indian security role within Afghanistan; 
expanding military cooperation with Iran, Central 
Asia, and Saudi Arabia; and the nuclearization of 
the Indian Ocean are additional developments of 
increasing concern to Pakistan. 
Strategic Doctrine
All of Pakistan’s civilian nuclear reactors, unlike 
India, have remained under perpetual safeguards. 
Pakistan developed its nuclear deterrence in re-
sponse to India’s nuclear weapon test in 1974. Paki-
stan’s military program is thus reactive and defensive 
in nature. In 1998, in response to the Indian nuclear 
tests, Pakistan overtly established the credibility of 
its deterrence to leave no room for tragic miscalcula-
tion. An overt deterrence was essential in the interest 
of regional peace.
The purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear program is to deter 
all forms of external aggression and to defend its 
sovereignty and vital national interests. The nuclear 
program is a guarantor of regional peace and com-
plements national progress and prosperity. Pakistan 
does not have any extra-regional strategic ambitions, 
and it adheres to the principle of credible minimum 
deterrence. “Full spectrum deterrence” is a corollary 
of that principle, which involves development of a 
variety of nuclear weapons of different types and 
ranges to credibly deter India. Exercising minimal-
ism, both high- and low-yield, short- and long-range 
nuclear weapons have been developed that are ca-
pable of penetrating all known types of active and 
passive missile defenses. This policy of maintaining 
strategic balance and requisite force posture is meant 
to credibly ensure that no part of Indian territory or 
military remains invulnerable.
In order to dissuade, deter, and defeat these threats, 
Pakistan has taken various measures, developing 
and employing the full spectrum of military capa-
bilities with a combination of both conventional 
and strategic measures. Pakistan has conducted 
the Azm-e-Nau series of military exercises, which 
helped develop a comprehensive and integrated re-
sponse to emerging threat scenarios, such as India’s 
“Cold Start” doctrine. The introduction of the Nasr 
short-range ballistic missile indicates that Pakistan’s 
defense doctrine is based on an integrated and com-
prehensive concept in which both conventional and 
nuclear weapons have specific, but synergized roles. 
Therefore, Pakistan’s defense doctrine should not be 
understood in terms of merely conventional capa-
bilities or the deterrent role of its nuclear weapons 
alone, since both are available to the national lead-
ership for appropriate employment in accordance 
with the nature, type, or level of the threat to the 
country’s national security. 
The growing economic and conventional asymme-
try between India and Pakistan compels Pakistan to 
increasingly rely on its nuclear deterrent as a cost-ef-
fective factor of stability and a durable instrument of 
peace in the subcontinent. It is unlikely that Pakistan 
will depart from its longstanding posture of credible 
minimum deterrence, which is not only regionally 
sufficient but is also nationally desirable and afford-
able. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is relatively modest 
in quantitative terms, but qualitatively-modern and 
sophisticated.
Pakistan ensures the credibility of its deterrence by 
maintaining opacity about the targeting, numbers, 
and alert status of its nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s 
robust command, control, and communication ar-
chitecture ensures positive and negative control over 
all types of nuclear warheads, at all times. Pakistan’s 
nuclear arsenal is reported to be widely dispersed 
in numerous secure and secret locations across the 
country. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is constantly se-
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cured by a highly-trained, motivated, and special-
ized force, deployed in accordance with an elaborate, 
multi-layered, in-depth defense concept. It has de-
veloped an extensive and fool-proof personnel reli-
ability program to guard against all forms of insider 
or other threats. This system is constantly reviewed 
for improved quality and greater vigilance.
Pakistan strictly adheres to the ideals of equitable 
arms control and non-proliferation and actively en-
gages with the international community to promote 
nuclear security and improve international best 
practices. Pakistan firmly adheres to global non-pro-
liferation principles and supports a criteria-based 
approach towards the further expansion of multi-
lateral strategic export control regime and considers 




Today, Washington’s security environment is much 
less benign than it was just a few short years ago. 
In a notable speech in Prague, Czech Republic, in 
2009, U.S. President Barack Obama vowed that the 
United States would “seek the peace and security of 
a world without nuclear weapons.” At the time of 
this statement, the international order was stable and 
conditions seemed to allow for a reduction in U.S. 
strategic forces and an overall de-emphasis of nuclear 
weapons in national security strategy. Since that time, 
however, new threats to U.S. security have emerged.
The most troublesome of these challenges comes 
from Russia, which has quickly transformed from 
a potential strategic partner into a clear adversary. 
Since 2014, Russia has invaded Ukraine and inter-
vened militarily in the Syrian civil war. These moves 
are of even greater concern because of what they 
might reveal about Russia’s broader intentions and 
because Moscow has backstopped these steps with 
an increased emphasis on nuclear forces. 
4  This section summarizes a paper on the United States’ strategic environment and doctrine authored by Matthew Kroenig of Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C. 
The United States also faces new challenges in East 
Asia. North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities 
continue to expand, threatening U.S. allies in the 
region and potentially putting the U.S. homeland 
at risk. The U.S. relationship with China has also 
become more competitive. While Washington con-
tinues to seek a cooperative relationship with Bei-
jing, it is also concerned about China’s activity in 
cyberspace, clashes with U.S. treaty-ally Japan, and 
its land-reclamation project in the South China Sea. 
U.S. interests in the Middle East are threatened by 
renewed turmoil in the region. Most troubling for 
U.S. interests is Islamic State (ISIS), arguably the best 
organized and financed terror group in history. The 
greatest potential strategic threat in the Middle East, 
however, is Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Now 
that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better 
known as the Iran nuclear deal, has gone into effect, 
Iran’s nuclear program no longer poses an immedi-
ate challenge. But if the internationally agreed-upon 
limits to Iran’s nuclear program were to be violated for 
any reason, the Iranian nuclear issue could once again 
become the subject of serious international attention. 
Strategic Doctrine
According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR), U.S. strategic goals include: preventing nu-
clear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; reducing the 
role of U.S. nuclear weapons; maintaining strategic 
deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 
strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. 
allies and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear arsenal. The Donald J. Trump ad-
ministration may take nuclear policy in new direc-
tions, and the deteriorating security environment has 
opened up debates in Washington about whether the 
United States needs to take additional steps to rein-
force deterrence. Still, much of U.S. strategic doctrine 
will likely remain constant.
Perhaps the most important of the above goals is 
the U.S. desire to maintain strategic deterrence and 
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stability with Russia and China. Washington would 
like to deter attacks against the United States and its 
allies, reassure Moscow and Beijing that Washington 
is not seeking to undermine their nuclear deterrents, 
and also avoid costly and potentially destabilizing 
arms races. 
While President Obama looked forward to a “world 
without nuclear weapons” in the aforementioned 
Prague speech, he also recognized that this goal will 
not be achieved in the near future. For this reason, 
the NPR states that so long as nuclear weapons exist, 
the United States will sustain a “safe, secure, and ef-
fective nuclear arsenal.” The United States has com-
mitted to retaining and modernizing all three legs 
of its strategic nuclear triad and to maintaining a 
small number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In 
addition, U.S. strategic posture includes regional 
and homeland missile defenses and the development 
of conventional prompt global strike capabilities. It 
must be emphasized that these capabilities contrib-
ute to regional deterrence and are not aimed at, nor 
will they meaningfully affect, the strategic balance 
between the United States and Russia or China.
To “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
national security strategy,” Washington remains 
open to further negotiated nuclear reductions with 
Russia. In addition, Washington has, among other 
steps, strengthened its negative security assurances 
and bolstered conventional capabilities as a means of 
deterring nonnuclear attack. To prevent nuclear pro-
liferation and nuclear terrorism, Washington seeks 
to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
reverse North Korea and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 
secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, and 
pursue other related arms control efforts.
Turning specifically to Asia, the United States does 
not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state 
and its stated policy is to use multilateral diplomacy, 
backed by pressure, to cap and then roll back North 
Korea’s nuclear capability. As long as North Korea 
maintains nuclear weapons, however, Washington 
must take steps to defend itself and its allies. 
Another important U.S. priority in Asia concerns 
reassuring regional allies. The United States main-
tains longstanding, formal defense pacts with several 
states in Asia. Washington seeks to assure Japan and 
South Korea, in particular, that their security is ade-
quately provided for through their alliance with the 
United States and also to dissuade these states from 
developing independent nuclear capabilities. 
With regard to China, the United States continues 
to seek a stable strategic relationship. The United 
States understands that China will take whatever 
steps necessary to maintain an assured retaliatory ca-
pability, and Washington does not believe that U.S. 
programs, current or planned, would pose a threat 
to China’s nuclear deterrent. Washington does see 
potential dangers, however, as China expands and 
modernizes its nuclear arsenal. The only stable stra-
tegic equilibrium going forward, therefore, may be 
one in which China possesses a secure, second-strike 
capability (and Washington does not seek to under-
mine that capability) while the United States main-
tains a quantitative nuclear advantage (that China 
does not contest).
Unlike in East Asia, the United States lacks formal 
allies and potential competitors in South Asia. 
Washington does not feel threatened by India or 
Pakistan or their strategic capabilities. At the same 
time, Washington wants to help prevent these South 
Asian powers from engaging in military conflict, to 
encourage strategic restraint in what appears to be 
a growing arms competition, and to ensure strong 
nuclear export controls and high nuclear security 
standards to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear 
technology to state or non-state actors.
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Areas of Convergence and 
Divergence 
Drawing on the papers on national strategic per-spectives as well as discussions in Beijing and 
Doha, this section identifies areas of convergence 
and divergence among the four countries—not on 
specific issues but rather on broad principles, goals, 
and strategic postures.  
Areas of Convergence 
Participants believe that all four countries aspire to 
the following goals:
  Avoid war, especially nuclear war.
  Avoid terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism.
  Enhance nuclear security, to avoid “loose nukes” 
and thwart non-state actors from gaining nu-
clear weapons capabilities.
  Prevent inadvertent or accidental nuclear use.
  Reduce incentives for strategic arms competi-
tions, especially by addressing causes.
  Promote strategic stability and strategic equilib-
rium.
  Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons ca-
pabilities to additional countries.
  Adopt strong and effective national export con-
trols on nuclear materials and technology.
  Maintain nuclear forces at lowest levels consis-
tent with national security, often described as 
credible minimum deterrence.
  Support the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons.
Areas of Divergence
The four countries also have differences in some 
areas: 
  China and India maintain a nuclear No First 
Use policy, while Pakistan and the United States 
do not. 
  The countries currently maintain their arsenals 
at different alert levels, including with regard to 
the practice of de-mating.
  The countries have different force postures and 
force levels.
  China and the United States are NPT member 
states, while India and Pakistan are not.
  China and the United States are permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council, while 
India and Pakistan are not.
  India and the United States believe that missile 
defense systems can be stabilizing, while China 
and Pakistan believe missile defense to be desta-
bilizing. 
  The countries differ in the number of nucle-
ar-armed adversaries they potentially face.
  The United States has treaty obligations that in-
clude extending nuclear deterrence to its allies.
  Only the United States has a history of nuclear 
arms control agreements, particularly with the 
Soviet Union/Russia.
  The countries differ on the implications of 
transparency for security, with the United States 
more supportive of transparency than the others.
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Proposals for Strengthening 
Stability 
This section contains proposals for strengthening sta-bility that the group, by consensus, recommends as 
meriting consideration by their national governments. 
The proposals presented below were taken from the 
papers submitted by scholars from each country as well 
as from the discussion in Doha and Washington, D.C. 
The section is divided into two parts. The first lists quad-
ripartite measures involving the four countries and, in 
some cases, other additional countries, and the second 
enumerates proposals applicable at the bilateral level. 
Quadripartite U.S.-China-India-Pakistan 
Measures 
  Pursue a dialogue on preventing further nuclear 
proliferation to additional countries.
  Initiate a track-two or track-one dialogue, in-
volving China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, on 
stability, confidence building, and arms control.
  Pursue a dialogue on nuclear security and shar-
ing of best practices.
  Explore a common position on the use of nu-
clear weapons and, in the meantime, declare 
that, at a minimum, all four countries would 
only consider using nuclear weapons in extreme 
circumstances and would not use nuclear weap-
ons against non-nuclear weapon states.
  Undertake a joint political commitment, in-
volving China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, not 
to carry out nuclear weapons tests to strengthen 
existing moratoria.
  Agree not to attack declared nuclear facilities, 
expanding on the 1991 non-attack agreement 
between India and Pakistan in which both 
countries annually exchange a list of nuclear fa-
cilities that would not be subject to attack.
  Agree not to conduct cyberattacks against crit-
ical infrastructure during peacetime and not to 
knowingly engage in cyber espionage for com-
mercial gain, building on the 2015 agreement 
between the United States and China.
  Consider not to conduct cyberattacks against 
nuclear command and control.
  Agree to notify each other in the event that they 
suffer a cyberattack against critical infrastructure 
with serious consequences during peacetime.
  Agree to notify each other of nuclear accidents 
that may result in international, trans-boundary 
radiation release or have security implications, 
building on the 2007 India-Pakistan agreement.
  Study the broadening of existing missile test 
pre-notification arrangements to cover addi-
tional categories of missile tests in a step-by-step 
manner. 
  Consider means of strengthening informal co-
operation for interdicting illicit nuclear transfers 
in order to implement United Nations Security 
Council resolution 1540 and related resolutions. 
  Agree to cooperate to prevent state support of 
terrorism.
  Agree to consider a step-by-step approach to-
wards greater openness and transparency on 
strategic forces, consistent with national secu-
rity requirements. 
  Agree to notify each other in the event of a nu-
clear accident at sea.
  Agree to support an international dialogue on 
the code of conduct for outer space, including 
protection of space-based assets.
  Agree to participate in a dialogue on the impli-
cations of new technology on strategic stability. 
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Bilateral U.S.-China Measures
  Agree to a strategic equilibrium in which Wash-
ington does not attempt to negate China’s 
nuclear deterrent and China will not seek quan-
titative parity with the United States.
  Agree to an institutionalized bilateral strategic 
stability dialogue to discuss the various compo-
nents of strategic stability, including strategic 
offensive forces, missile defenses, space, cyber, 
and conventional prompt global strike capabil-
ities.
  Participate in discussion of nuclear-related crisis 
management scenarios at the official or track 1.5 
level. 
  Consider expanding crisis communication 
mechanisms. 
  Engage in dialogue on their respective ap-
proaches to civil nuclear cooperation with third 
countries to consider greater commonality in 
their nuclear export policies. 
  Agree to joint exercises for maritime search and 
rescue.
  Agree to visits to U.S. missile defense installa-
tions, including radars.
  Agree that China would participate in practice 
inspections for the New START Treaty between 
the United States and Russia.
  Consider a dialogue on negative security assur-
ances.
Bilateral China-India Measures
  Agree to a dialogue or exercises on maritime se-
curity.
  Agree to a dialogue on humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief.
  Agree to consider notification of any tests of bal-
listic missiles. 
  Engage in dialogue on their respective ap-
proaches to civil nuclear cooperation.
  Expand security related dialogue and confi-
dence-building measures (CBMs).
Bilateral India-Pakistan Measures
  Agree to resume comprehensive dialogue and 
institutionalize it so that it is insulated from bi-
lateral tensions.
  Consider the modalities and functions of 
risk-reduction centers.
  Agree not to weaponize space.
  Consider expanding existing CBMs to include 
an “incidents at sea” agreement.
  Consider measures for restraint and confidence 
building, where feasible. 
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Conclusions: Value of the 
“Strategic Chain” Concept 
The Strategic Chain project—bringing together prominent Pakistanis, Indians, Chinese, and 
Americans to discuss the strategic interrelationships 
among their four countries—was an experiment. 
While pairs of these countries have previously met 
bilaterally at official and unofficial levels to address 
strategic matters, they have rarely, if ever, come to-
gether in a four-party format. The project sought to 
find out whether four-party discussions of arms con-
trol, non-proliferation, and other strategic questions 
would produce useful insights and practical policy 
recommendations for improving strategic stability.
The timing of the project was fortuitous given the 
growing geopolitical tensions among the four coun-
tries represented in the project. These tensions, some 
of which were discussed by the group, also impinge 
on the strategic and nuclear outlook of the four 
countries. To that extent, the project served as a 
useful platform to discuss differences.
Not surprisingly, the three rounds of in-depth dis-
cussions organized by the project did not resolve 
profound, underlying differences that in the past 
have fuelled tensions and impeded strategic re-
straint. Nonetheless, participants believed that the 
chain concept proved worthwhile for several reasons.
Discussions of bilateral strategic issues were often seen 
as having relevance and providing useful insights to the 
other participants. For example, U.S.-Chinese discus-
sions about missile defense or crisis stability had instruc-
tive implications for India and Pakistan, and vice versa. 
Participants indicated that four-party interactions gave 
them a better appreciation of nuclear dynamics operat-
ing outside their own particular strategic contexts.
An objective of the strategic chain concept was to ex-
amine the degree to which actions taken with regard 
to one country might have unintended second- or 
third-order effects on other countries in the chain. 
It became clear in the course of the workshops that 
actions taken at one end of the chain may have an 
impact at the other end. For example, participants 
noted that developments in U.S. strategic posture, 
such as missile defense and conventional prompt 
global strike, could lead to reactions in China, coun-
tervailing or imitative, which could produce corre-
sponding reactions in India, which in turn could 
impact Pakistan’s strategic choices. Thus, it was sug-
gested that restraint by the United States and China 
might be a necessary precondition for the adoption 
of certain types of restraints by India and Pakistan.
A tangible indication of the value of the strategic chain 
concept is the list of consensus recommendations, most 
of them regarding measures applicable to all four coun-
tries. One of the benefits of the project is that it called 
on participants to focus on bilateral measures already 
in place and then asked them to consider whether these 
bilateral arrangements could be expanded to cover all 
four countries. Several of the quadripartite recommen-
dations were produced in this manner.
People often vote with their feet and the fact that 
high-level participants from all four countries chose 
to commit their limited time participating in three 
workshops on three separate continents demon-
strates that they viewed these meetings as worthy of 
their time and effort. The participants believed the 
discussions were of high quality and indicated that 
they are inclined to introduce the strategic chain 
concept in their future academic and policy work on 
nuclear strategy and arms control.   
Finally, the project provided the platform to estab-
lish a web of interpersonal connections among the 
participants, many of whom had not met previously. 
Indeed, these connections are already resulting in in-
ternational collaboration on related projects. 
Looking ahead, participants believed that there 
would be value to continuing the discussion and 
perhaps including experts from additional countries 
in any future meetings. Additions might include 
other nuclear powers linked to the chain, particu-
larly Russia, and nonnuclear states, such as Japan 
and South Korea, that—through alliance or other 
relationships—bear on nuclear dynamics.
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Robert Einhorn, Project Co-Chair
Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow at the Brookings 
Institution. During his career at the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, he served as Assistant Secretary for 
Nonproliferation in the Bill Clinton Administration 
and as the Secretary’s Special Advisor for Nonpro-
liferation and Arms Control in the Barack Obama 
Administration.
W.P.S. Sidhu, Project Co-Chair
W.P.S. Sidhu is a visiting professor at New York 
University’s Center for Global Affairs and a non-
resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 
Earlier he served in senior positions at the EastWest 
Institute and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. 
Sidhu has over 25 years of experience in the field 
of international security, confidence-building mea-
sures, disarmament, arms control, and non-prolif-
eration. He also served as a consultant to all three 
United Nations Panels of Governmental Experts on 
Missiles.
General John Allen
General John Allen is a senior fellow and co-director 
of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelli-
gence at the Brookings Institution. General Allen is 
the former commander of the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan and served as special 
presidential envoy to the global coalition to counter 
ISIS.
Air Marshal Ajit Bhavnani
A pioneer of India’s nuclear forces, Air Marshal Ajit 
Bhavnani headed the Strategic Forces Command 
during its early years of inception. Bhavnani re-
tired from the Indian air force as the vice chief and 
has served as a distinguished fellow at the Centre 
for Air Power Studies in New Delhi specializing in 
nuclear strategies. He has been an active partici-
5  Retired Chinese diplomat Ambassador Wu Jianmin participated in two sessions of the group before his tragic death. Retired Pakistani diplomat 
Ambassador Masood Khan also participated in two sessions of the group before his election as President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
pant in forums on nuclear strategy. Currently, he is 
a member of Global Zero on nuclear disarmament 
and is a member of the Indo-U.S. dialogue under 
the RAND Corporation.
Li Bin
Li Bin is a senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua 
Center for Global Policy and a professor at Tsinghua 
University’s Department of International Relations. 
Previously, he was the director of the Arms Control 
Division and executive deputy director of the Pro-
gram for Science and National Security Studies at 
the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational 
Mathematics (IAPCM) in the China Academy of 
Engineering Physics. He was a research fellow at 
IAPCM and was awarded a post-doctoral fellowship 
by the Social Science Research Council/MacAr-
thur Foundation, which he spent at the Defense 
and Arms Control Studies Program (now Security 
Studies Program) at theMassachusetts Institute of 
Technology and at the Center for Energy and En-
vironmental Studies at Princeton University. Li is 
on the editorial boards of Science and Global Secu-
rity, Nonproliferation Review, and on the boards of 
Pugwash Conferences, and the China Arms Control 
and Disarmament Association.
Ambassador William Burns
Bill Burns is president of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace. He was a career diplomat for 
33 years, including service as U.S. deputy secretary 
of state.
Ambassador Riaz Khan
Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan is a former dip-
lomat who served as Pakistan’s foreign secretary and 
as ambassador to China, the European Union, Bel-
gium, and Kazakhstan. In his capacity as additional 
secretary at the Pakistan Foreign Office from 1998 
to 2002, he dealt with disarmament and non-prolif-
eration issues.
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Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai
Lieutenant Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai has served as 
Pakistan’s pioneering Director General of the Strate-
gic Plans Division for over 15 years. He is currently 
advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority.
Matthew Kroenig
Matthew Kroenig is an associate professor in the De-
partment of Government and School of Foreign Ser-
vice at Georgetown University and a senior fellow in 
the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Secu-
rity at the Atlantic Council. He previously served in 
the U.S. Department of Defense and the Central In-
telligence Agency. Kroenig is a former fellow at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard University, 
and Stanford University. 
Rajesh Rajagopalan
Rajesh Rajagopalan is a professor of international poli-
tics at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Pre-
viously, he was a senior fellow at the Observer Research 
Foundation, New Delhi and research fellow at the In-
stitute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. 
He also served as deputy secretary at the National Se-
curity Council Secretariat of the Government of India.
Ambassador Rakesh Sood
Ambassador Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat and 
served as ambassador and permanent representative to 
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and am-
bassador to Afghanistan, Nepal, and France. In Delhi, 
he led the Disarmament and International Security 
Affairs Division for nine years dealing with multilat-
eral negotiations and bilateral security and CBM-re-
lated dialogues with the United States, Pakistan, 
China, and France. After retiring, he was appointed 
as the prime minister’s special envoy for disarmament 
and non-proliferation. He is currently a distinguished 
fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi.
Muhammad Ali Syed
Syed Muhammad Ali is a senior research fellow at 
the Center for International Strategic Studies, Islam-
abad. He has served on the faculty of the National 
Defence University and the Foreign Service Acad-
emy of Pakistan and as a director and board member 
of the Center for Pakistan and Gulf Studies.  
Major General Yao Yunzhu
Yao Yunzhu is an army major general (retired), the 
director emeritus of the Center on China-American 
Defense Relations, and a member of the Academic 
Committee, National Think Tank Project, the Acad-
emy of Military Science (AMS), and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). She served in the PLA since 
1970 as a member of the enlisted ranks, a staff offi-
cer, an instructor, a researcher, deputy director and 
director of research offices, and director of a research 
center. She has published books, translated books, 
articles, and papers on international military and se-
curity issues, U.S. military affairs, nuclear weapon 
policy, and arms control, Asia-Pacific security issues, 
etc. She was a member of 10th National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China from 
2002 to 2007, and a member of the 17th Chinese 
Communist Party Congress from 2007 to 2012.
Zhao Tong 
Zhao Tong is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
based in Beijing at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center 
for Global Policy. He was previously a Stanton Nu-
clear Security Fellow with the Managing the Atom 
Project and the International Security Program at 
the Belfer Center for Science and International Af-
fairs at Harvard University.
Ambassador Sha Zukang
Ambassador Sha Zukang was the United Nations 
undersecretary general for economic and social af-
fairs. Before that, he was the permanent represen-
tative and ambassador of the Permanent Mission of 
the People’s Republic of China to the United Na-
tions Office at Geneva and Other International Or-
ganizations. He also established the Department of 
Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
China and served as its first director-general.
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Annex A. China’s Strategic 
Environment and Doctrine
Zhao Tong, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global 
Policy
External Security Environment
U.S. as the Primary Security Concern
China has long seen the United States as the coun-
try that can seriously affect China’s security interests 
and has seen the U.S.-China relationship as its most 
important bilateral relationship. China believes that 
regional stability depends on a solid relationship 
between the two countries. Since the 1990s, this 
bilateral relationship has been more about mutual 
economic interests than other issues. China and the 
United States have shared interests in promoting 
bilateral trade and investment, maintaining a stable 
international financial system, and promoting a 
strong and open global economy. However, major 
differences in ideology, political system, culture, 
and history have led the two countries to possessing 
quite different views and understandings on a wide 
range of political and security issues. 
Although China is a major beneficiary of the U.S.-led 
global economic system, rapid economic growth has 
narrowed the power gap between Beijing and Wash-
ington, which contributes to the so-called “structural 
problem” between the top two economies in the 
world.6 Seeing a power transition between Washing-
ton and Beijing very likely in the mid- to long-term 
future, China worries that the deep ideological and 
political differences between the two countries will 
drive the United States to do everything to resist and 
prevent this power transition from happening. Such 
concern has led Beijing to suspect that Washington is 
implementing a systematic strategy to contain China. 
For example, the “rebalance to Asia” strategy of the 
Obama administration is, according to Chinese, a 
strategic move that primarily aims to use economic, 
diplomatic, and military means to contain the growth 
of Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. ef-
forts to strengthen its alliance network in the region 
add to Chinese concerns.
U.S. Security Alliance
China acknowledges the fact that, through the secu-
rity alliance system, the United States has prevented 
its allies such as South Korea and Japan from develop-
ing nuclear weapons. The U.S. security assurance to 
Japan, as part of the post-World War II arrangements, 
has also reduced the necessity for Japan to develop a 
“full-blown,” independent arms force. However, from 
the Chinese perspective, the U.S. security alliance 
system in the Asia-Pacific region—despite the positive 
impact—represents a grave threat to China’s security 
at the end of the day. China believes the United States 
has been using its alliance system for the purpose of 
containing China and undermining China’s regional 
interests. From Beijing’s view, the rebalance to Asia is 
the most recent effort by Washington to reinforce the 
alliance against a rising China.
China sees Washington’s hand behind almost every 
regional confrontation involving China. Despite the 
stated U.S. policy of not having official positions on 
territorial disputes in the region, President Obama 
and senior administration officials repeatedly and 
openly stated that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between the United States and Japan 
covers the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, and 
the United States would be obliged to defend them 
jointly with Japan. Similarly, the United States openly 
challenges China’s territorial claim in the South 
China Sea, which from the perspective of China also 
contradicts the U.S. pledge of having no position on 
territorial disputes. The United States providing mil-
itary equipment assistance to other South China Sea 
claimants and encouraging them to join forces and 
fight the Chinese claims together are additional in-
dicators—from Beijing’s view—of hypocrisy and ill 
intentions toward China. Without U.S. meddling, 
Beijing believes that tensions over the territorial dis-
putes in the South China Sea and East China Sea 
would not be as high as they have become.
6  Jisi (王缉思) Wang, “Rising U.S.-China Structural Problem; Inevitable Strategic Competition (中美结构性矛盾上升，战略较量难以避免),” 
(Peking University, Beijing: International and Strategic Studies Report (国际战略研究简报), July 23, 2010).
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Beijing also suspects Washington has been support-
ive of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) in Taiwan. With the DPP Chairwoman 
Tsai Ing-wen becoming the new president in Taiwan, 
Beijing worries that Washington’s accommodating 
attitude toward Tsai will embolden her to take more 
defiant acts against Beijing’s goal of promoting reuni-
fication. According to public polls in Taiwan, 13.6 
percent of respondents identified themselves as Tai-
wanese rather than Chinese in 1991. The number has 
risen to 80 percent in 2016.7 The continuous shift 
of public perception and the coming into power of 
the new pro-independence government of DPP have 
made Beijing extremely concerned about the future 
of the cross-Strait relationship and the role that 
Washington might play to exacerbate the problem. 
The decision by then-President-elect Donald Trump 
to take the congratulatory phone call from Tsai on 
December 2, 2016 broke a 35-year diplomatic pro-
tocol between Beijing and Washington and signalled 
a possible departure from the One China policy by 
the United States. The Chinese government and the 
general public reacted very strongly to Trump’s sur-
prising rhetoric about Taiwan that could greatly un-
dermine the bilateral relationship.
Increasing Mutual Hostility between China and 
Japan
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Sino-Jap-
anese relationship continues to turn worse. In recent 
years, the relationship has deteriorated so quickly that 
it has undone decades of diplomatic efforts to build 
ties. History is certainly one major problem between 
the two, but increasingly intensive territorial disputes 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China 
Sea have risen to be a more serious challenge. Since 
the nationalization of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands by Japan in 2012, China started to vehe-
mently challenge Japan’s de facto control over the 
islands by sending coastguard ships and airplanes to 
conduct regular patrols in nearby water and airspace. 
China’s establishment of an air defense identification 
zone over part of the East China Sea in 2013 was 
strongly protested by Japan and the United States. 
This perceived Chinese aggression further instigates 
nationalist sentiment among the Japanese public and 
elite. Tokyo responded with measures to raise the 
status and role of its armed forces and to accelerate 
military development and deployment programs. 
Leaders from the conservative ruling party in Tokyo 
seem to have lost faith in seeking a normal relation-
ship with Beijing and appear determined to conduct 
value-oriented diplomacy, striving for a “coalition of 
democracies” to counter China. With Washington 
showing a green light, the Abe government embraces 
rights for collective self-defense, relaxes restrictions 
on weapons export, and puts in place new security 
laws to allow the self-defense force to play a bigger 
role in regional and international security contingen-
cies. Given this trend, China is deeply worried that 
Tokyo is moving to revise the pacifist constitution 
in place since the end of World War II. In the long 
run, China is concerned that Washington and Tokyo 
will increasingly use their strengthened alliance and 
forward-deployed military capabilities to interfere in 
territorial disputes in East and South China Seas and 
to check China’s influence in the region.
Southeast Asia and the South China Sea
Southeast Asia is another region where China be-
lieves the United States is deliberately stirring up 
tensions to forge a coalition against China. Contrary 
to the Western portrait of China as pursuing expan-
sionist objectives in the South China Sea, China 
firmly believes it is merely defending its long-held 
positions. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) in-
herited the territorial claims over the South China 
Sea from the Republic of China (ROC) government 
after the latter retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and never 
expanded its claims in the decades after. In fact, the 
Taiwanese government today sticks to the same ter-
ritorial claims in the South China Sea as the PRC 
government does but is rarely criticized by Western 
countries as having “expansionist” ambitions. This 
confirms Chinese suspicion that the West is acting 
against the PRC for geopolitical reasons.
7  James Griffiths, “What’s in a Name? Anger in Taiwan over ‘Chinese Taipei’ Olympics Moniker,” CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/05/sport/
taiwan-olympics-chinese-taipei/.
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From the Chinese perspective, the U.S. government 
supported the ROC government’s claims over the 
South China Sea after the end of World War II and 
other Southeast Asian countries never opposed Chi-
na’s claims until the 1970s. In the Vietnamese case, 
it was the official policy of the communist Vietnam-
ese government that China has sovereign right over 
the Spratlys and Paracels until Vietnam changed its 
position later. Over the last few decades, it was the 
other claimants that had built and expanded arti-
ficial structures on the land features they occupied 
and station troops on them, and China was the re-
straining one. As a result, Beijing views its recent 
land reclamation projects as a long delayed response 
in order to stop the status quo from being further 
changed to the favor of other claimants.
In addition, Western countries have suspicions 
about the Chinese call for direct negotiations with 
other claimant countries, preferably on a bilateral 
basis. They believe this is a tactic by China to coerce 
its weaker negotiating partner to compromise in an 
asymmetric negotiation. However, the facts are that 
China has not employed such tactics in its previ-
ous territorial negotiations with either stronger or 
weaker neighbors. In fact, with the exception of 
India, China has successfully settled all land territo-
rial disputes with its neighbors, and in many of such 
negotiations, China was willing to make bigger com-
promises to accommodate its smaller negotiating 
partners. It was due to this experience that Beijing 
believes that direct negotiation between disputed 
parties is the most effective way to resolve territorial 
disputes, especially when the disputes are extremely 
complex in the South China Sea, and having mul-
tiple players all at the table at the same time would 
only increase the difficulty. Therefore, China views 
the Western call for all the other claimant countries 
or even all ASEAN countries to work together to 
pursue negotiations with China as at least not a sin-
cere effort to help resolve differences.
More seriously, the United States has stepped up 
its freedom of navigation operations in the South 
China Sea, and it continues to do so even in peri-
ods when tensions have somewhat reduced among 
the direct claimants. This convinces China that the 
United States is not promoting any peaceful reso-
lution but instead is aiming at stirring up tensions, 
playing a leading role to counter China directly. 
Facing this perceived threat, the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) has increasingly talked about being 
ready for military crises, contingencies, and even 
wars. Top PLA officials have inspected the newly 
established Southern Theater Command and the 
South Sea Fleet. Unprecedented large scale joint 
military exercises were held in the South China Sea, 
and domestic public support for standing up against 
perceived U.S. intervention is at a historical high.
Nuclear Threat
Against the backdrop of increasing geostrategic con-
tentions surrounding China, China also sees itself 
fighting an uphill battle to maintain strategic stabil-
ity with the United States—its primary rival—and 
to deal with other new nuclear challenges.
New Nuclear Challenges from Non-Nuclear 
Technologies
For the past few decades, China was willing to 
maintain a small nuclear arsenal, partly because 
nuclear weapons were vulnerable almost only to 
nuclear strikes. However, the emergence of various 
non-nuclear military technologies poses an unprec-
edented threat to nuclear weapons and is seriously 
undermining Chinese confidence in the survivabil-
ity and credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Among 
these non-nuclear technologies, missile defense and 
conventional prompt strike weapons are of most 
concern to China. Among the 200 or so Chinese 
nuclear weapons, only a fraction of them are inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are ca-
pable of striking the continental United States.8 If 
the United States launched a preemptive first strike 
against China, potentially very few such ICBMs 
could survive and be available for a retaliatory second 
strike against the United States. In this case, even a 
8  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 4 (2015).
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small-scale U.S. missile defense system might be suf-
ficient to shoot down all remaining Chinese ICBMs 
and therefore be capable of completely neutralizing 
China’s nuclear deterrent. Regarding conventional 
prompt strike weapons, the Chinese concern is that 
these weapons could be used to target and destroy 
China’s road-mobile, nuclear missile transport-
er-erecter-launchers (TELs). The U.S. conventional 
prompt global strike (CPGS) systems, for example, 
are extremely accurate weapons and can adjust their 
trajectories during flight to target moving vehicles. 
Given that China is putting an increasingly higher 
proportion of its nuclear weapons on road-mobile 
missiles, conventional prompt strike weapons pose a 
considerable challenge for China to maintain a sur-
vivable nuclear deterrent.
There are other new technologies under develop-
ment that can threaten China’s second strike ca-
pabilities in the future. For instance, senior U.S. 
officials are openly talking about the possibility of 
using cyber strikes to interfere with and disable an 
enemy’s nuclear command and control system, in 
order to prevent the enemy from launching nuclear 
missiles. This so-called “Left-of-Launch” operation 
can bolster the U.S. missile defense capability by 
preventing the enemy from launching their missiles 
in the first place. Such new technologies are heavily 
drawing Chinese concern.
Maintaining Strategic Stability with the United 
States
The primary goals of China’s nuclear forces have 
been to deter the United States from launching a 
nuclear first strike against China and to maintain 
strategic stability with the United States. Given the 
considerable asymmetry of the two countries’ nu-
clear capabilities, China has been worrying that the 
United States could launch a first strike to disarm 
China’s entire nuclear arsenal. The leaked Nuclear 
Posture Review report of the George W. Bush ad-
ministration identified China as one of the nuclear 
target countries. Under the Obama administration, 
it has been reassuring to China that the 2010 Nu-
clear Posture Review report and the subsequent Bal-
listic Missile Defense Review report both commit 
the White House to maintaining a strategic stability 
relationship with China for the first time. During 
Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogues, American officials 
acknowledged that Washington is willing to accept a 
mutual vulnerability relationship with China. Some 
former senior officials also admit that mutual vul-
nerability with China is already a fact to face rather 
than a choice to make. With that said, some Ameri-
can experts continue to challenge such statements by 
claiming that the United States possesses the capa-
bility to conduct a nuclear first strike against China 
and argue that maintaining nuclear primacy over 
China and other countries better serves U.S. secu-
rity interests.9 At the operational level, U.S. Navy 
officials have expressed interest in maintaining a ca-
pability to constantly track and hold Chinese nu-
clear ballistic missile submarines at risk.10 All these 
statements and operations undermine Chinese con-
fidence about U.S. sincerity in maintaining strategic 
stability with China.
Japan and South Korea’s Nuclear Potential
Although it is difficult to measure to what extent 
the Chinese government is really concerned about 
Japan’s capability to build nuclear weapons, it seems 
many Chinese strategists and experts are genuinely 
concerned.11 Despite the fact that the huge pluto-
nium stockpile that Japan possesses is reactor-grade 
plutonium and not ideal for building nuclear weap-
ons, Chinese experts argue that Japan’s advanced en-
gineering and industrial capability makes it easy for 
Japan to overcome any technical difficulty in turn-
ing reactor grade plutonium into nuclear bombs. 
Japan also possesses advanced rocket technology 
  9  Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009); “U.S. Nuclear 
Primacy and the Future of the Chinese Deterrent,” China Security, no. Winter (2007).
10 David S. Cloud, “Aboard a U.S. Nuclear Sub, a Cat-and-Mouse Game with Phantom Foes,” Los Angeles Times September 25, 2015.
11  Wansheng (徐万胜) Xu and Zhengnan (付征南) Fu, “The Tendency of Japan’s Nuclear Policy (日本核政策动向),” Contemporary International 
Relations (现代国际关系) 4 (2008); Kesheng (吴克生) Wu and Desheng (文德盛) Wen, “The Direction of Japan’s Nuclear Weapons Policy (日
本核武器政策取向),” Contemporary World (当代世界), no. 7 (2004); Xiangli (孙向丽) Sun, Jun (伍钧) Wu, and Side (胡思得) Hu, “Japan’s 
Plutonium Issue and International Concern (日本钚问题及其国际关切),” Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系), no. 3 (2006).
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and the capability to retrieve satellites—the capa-
bility that China believes could have been used to 
understand the technology for building warhead 
re-entry vehicles for long-range ballistic missiles. 
Looking at all of these technologies, China believes 
that Japan is at least interested in obtaining a nuclear 
hedge capability—meaning Japan does not need to 
go as far as building actual nuclear weapons, but it 
gives itself the option of quickly doing so if/when it 
is necessary. Within Japan, conservative right wing 
politicians call for Japan’s own nuclear deterrent ca-
pability; and outside Japan, conservative scholars 
from the United States, Australia, and other coun-
tries have also openly advocated for Japan to develop 
its independent nuclear weapon capability.12 All of 
these developments concern China.
Besides Japan’s own nuclear potential, China also 
worries that Japan is actively contributing to the U.S. 
efforts to threaten China’s nuclear deterrent capabil-
ity. For instance, Japan has been the most important 
and active partner of the United States in the Asia-Pa-
cific region in conducting anti-submarine-warfare 
(ASW) operations. As China’s nuclear ballistic mis-
sile submarines (SSBNs) become an important part 
of China’s survivable nuclear second strike capability, 
Japan’s cooperation with the United States to track 
and threaten China’s SSBNs draws Chinese concern. 
In addition, Japan is an important partner in the de-
velopment and deployment of U.S. missile defense 
systems. Japan contributes to the development of 
the U.S. SM-3 missile defense system, the most ad-
vanced version of which will be deployed on Japan’s 
Aegis-capable vessels. Japan has also deployed two 
AN/TPY-2 X-band radars on its territory while ex-
pressing interest in deploying other advanced missile 
defense assets, such as the Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense system (THAAD) or the Aegis-ashore 
system, in Japan in the near future. China views Ja-
pan’s active participation in the U.S. missile defense 
network in the region as at least partially intended to 
undermine Chinese security interests.
Similarly, China also worries that South Korea se-
cretly embraces a nuclear hedge strategy by seeking 
to possess the capability to develop nuclear weapons 
through the development of full nuclear fuel cycle 
capability. China also suspects that South Korea 
has decided to side more firmly with the United 
States by choosing to join the U.S. missile defense 
network and to deploy the THAAD system on 
its territory. The recent dispute over THAAD has 
quickly become a major political problem between 
Beijing and Seoul and has greatly undermined the 
Sino-ROK relationship.
Instability on the Korean Peninsula and the 
South Asia Subcontinent
On the Korean Peninsula, China worries about 
North Korea’s nuclear capacity, as well as the in-
stability that military actions by the United States 
and ROK may cause, due to the fact that nuclear 
security threat, refugee flow, and political chaos all 
endanger China’s near- and long-term interests. At 
the same time, China believes that upholding nu-
clear nonproliferation principles is in the ultimate 
interests of China and the international community 
writ large, and China is willing to apply the strict-
est export control and economic sanction measures 
that directly target North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
programs. With that said, China fundamentally dis-
agrees with the United States and others that North 
Korea is the only one to be blamed for choosing the 
nuclear path and for the existing impasse in diplo-
matic talks. China also does not believe that more 
economic sanctions targeted generally at North Ko-
rea’s civilian trade and economy can bring North 
Korea to change its position. Western pressure on 
China to cut off North Korea’s economic lifeline—if 
China complies—would inevitably turn China into 
North Korea’s enemy. Therefore, Beijing sees the 
Western demand for China to impose “sweeping” 
sanctions against North Korea as very unfair and 
risky for China.
12  Doug Bandow, “Let Them Make Nukes: The Case for “Friendly” Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
japan/2016-07-26/let-them-make-nukes; Harvey M. Sapolsky and Christine M. Leah, “Let Asia Go Nuclear,” The National Interest (April 14, 
2014).
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How China chooses to deal with North Korea also 
depends on the overall U.S.-China relationship. If 
Beijing believes that Washington is doing everything 
possible to contain China by, for example, insti-
gating tensions in South China Sea and deploying 
missile defense network in the region, Beijing will 
have less incentive to cooperate with Washington 
over North Korea. If that becomes the case, the risk 
of a new Cold War emerging in the region between 
Russia, China, and North Korea on one side and 
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and maybe 
others on the other side will be greater.
Over South Asia, China for a long time has not paid 
much attention to the nuclear competition between 
India and Pakistan. This may change in the future. 
India has been measuring its nuclear and strategic 
military capabilities against China, and the nuclear 
gap between China and India seems to have been 
narrowing over the past decades. In particular, the 
rapid development of India’s long-range ballistic 
missiles, the development of multiple independently 
targetable re-entry vehicles (or MIRVs) on ballistic 
missiles, submarine-based nuclear weapons, missile 
defense systems, and outer space capabilities have 
begun to draw increasing Chinese attention and 
concern. China also fears that the widening nuclear 
and conventional military gaps between India and 
Pakistan may also exacerbate regional imbalance and 
threaten stability. As China significantly increases its 
investments in the region, through the China-Paki-
stan Economic Corridor and other investment proj-
ects, China has begun to hold much greater stakes 
in the overall stability of the region. The combina-
tion of terrorism and the nuclear security threat has 
drawn increasing Chinese concern as well.
Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy and 
Policy
China never officially names its nuclear strategy, 
although most scholars believe China adheres to a 
strategy of minimum nuclear deterrent because of 
the fact that China has maintained a very small nu-
clear arsenal for decades and that Chinese top lead-
ers have repeatedly indicated that China only wants 
a small nuclear arsenal to deter others from using 
nuclear weapons against China.13
Some Chinese experts believe that China’s nuclear 
deterrent has been based on uncertain retaliation—a 
capability that is not sufficient to guarantee a nu-
clear retaliation but also plants serious doubt in an 
enemy’s mind that it can absolutely destroy all Chi-
nese nuclear weapons in a first strike.14 Such ex-
perts argue that, for decades, China was satisfied 
with its uncertain retaliation capability because no 
one would ever risk the catastrophic consequences 
of even an uncertain nuclear retaliation to launch a 
nuclear first strike against China. However, as Chi-
na’s economy grows and China has much greater re-
sources to spend on military modernization, China 
is heading toward achieving an assured nuclear retal-
iation capability. This is a major driving force behind 
China’s nuclear modernization programs in recent 
decades.
Besides, China believes that new non-nuclear mili-
tary technologies are posing serious threats to Chi-
na’s existing nuclear deterrent capability. Concerns 
about U.S. missile defense and conventional prompt 
strike weapons have been driving Beijing’s invest-
ment into its nuclear modernization programs. 
Additionally, China has been following in the steps 
of the other major nuclear powers in developing 
new nuclear technologies, sometimes for the sake of 
mastering these technologies themselves rather than 
actually deploying them. After going through the 
so-called “hundred years of foreign invasion and na-
tional humiliation,” Chinese leaders have developed 
this belief that China cannot afford to lag behind 
other major powers on important defense technol-
ogies, and China needs to always master the same 
13  Li (王莉) Wang, “Factors Behind the Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy During the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Era (毛泽东与邓小平
时代的中国核战略演进动因分析)” (Foreign Affairs University, 2011); Jiayu (张家裕) Zhang, “An Analysis of the Nuclear Strategic Thinking of 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (试论毛泽东、周恩来的核战略思想),” Military History Research (军事历史研究), no. 02 (1989).
14 Riqiang Wu, “Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (2013).
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military technologies as the other big powers simply 
in case some of these technologies showed the po-
tential to dramatically shift the existing military bal-
ance that could leave China once again at a major 
disadvantage.15
For all these reasons, China has achieved major 
breakthroughs in nuclear capabilities in recent de-
cades. China has deployed advanced road-mobile 
ICBMs DF-31s and DF-31As and is reportedly de-
veloping another more power road-mobile ICBM 
DF-41 with a longer range. China has recently de-
ployed MIRVed silo-based ICBMs DF-5Bs, which 
could improve China’s capability to penetrate U.S. 
missile defense systems. In addition to land-based 
nuclear weapon systems, China has built a relatively 
modern SSBN fleet, which is armed with JL-2 sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles. China’s 094 class 
SSBN has reportedly conducted its first patrol this 
year, and China’s engineers are constantly working 
on updating each subsequent boat they build to im-
prove their quietness and survivability.
With a changing geostrategic environment and im-
proving nuclear capabilities, there is internal debate 
in China about future nuclear postures. For ex-
ample, as China becomes increasingly concerned 
about the threat of U.S. conventional strikes against 
Chinese nuclear forces, some scholars argue that 
China should adopt a more flexible nuclear posture 
by adding conditionality to its categorical No First 
Use policy.16 The Chinese government has rejected 
any change to its unconditional No First Use, but 
domestic debates have already drawn international 
attention. Similarly, some PLA scholars have started 
pointing to the U.S. and Russian practice of keeping 
nuclear weapons on constant alert and arguing that 
China should improve the rapid response capabil-
ity of its nuclear forces. They contend that China 
should also develop a strategic early warning system 
and, if necessary, shift to the Launch Under Attack 
or Launch On Warning posture to increase the cred-
ibility of its nuclear deterrent.17 Such thinking has 
not become national policy but it shows that China’s 
nuclear thinking is increasingly influenced by West-
ern writings and doctrines. Some of this new think-
ing could cause China’s nuclear posture to deviate 
considerably from its traditional practice that once 
emphasized low alert levels and moderate postures.
Conclusion
In sum, China sees itself facing a more challeng-
ing strategic security environment. It believes the 
United States adopts a containment strategy to 
check the growth of China’s capability and regional 
influence. From Beijing’s perspective, the United 
States is doing so not only by itself but also through 
enhancing its alliance system in the Asia-Pacific and 
encouraging neutral countries in the region to side 
with the United States against China. Maintaining 
strategic stability with the United States becomes 
ever more difficult. Japan, South Korea, North 
Korea, and South Asia also all present various nu-
clear challenges for Beijing. Such geostrategic threats 
and new non-nuclear technologies are all driving 
China’s nuclear modernization program. China is 
facing challenging tasks to safeguard its nuclear de-
terrent and also to avoid adopting destabilizing pos-
tures that could undermine its own interests.
15 Li Bin, “Chinese Thinking on Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today 45, no. 10 (2015).
16  Yunzhu Yao, “China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy,” (China-US Focus, Apr 22, 2013); Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, “不首先使用核武
器：中美核对话的困境与出路 (Nfu in Sino-U.S. Nuclear Dialogue: Dilemma and Way out),” 外交评论 (Foreign Affairs Review) 29, no. 5 (2012).
17 Gregory Kulacki, “The Chinese Military Updates China’s Nuclear Strategy,” (Boston, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2015).
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Annex B. India’s National Security 
Perspectives and Nuclear 
Weapons
Rajesh Rajagopalan, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Over the last two decades, India’s economy has grown much faster and it has thus emerged as a 
much richer and more powerful state in global pol-
itics. India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and its emergence 
as an overt nuclear-armed state boosted India’s status 
further. But India’s rise has not necessarily reduced 
its insecurity: India continues to be beset with mul-
tiple internal and external security threats that its 
increased power and capability have not been able 
to fully meet. India’s approach to dealing with these 
security threats has not changed much either, reflect-
ing some of the enduring dilemmas of India’s secu-
rity problems as well as India’s institutional capacity 
to meet these threats. 
In this brief paper, I first outline India’s national 
security environment, which encompasses internal 
security concerns, the broad international political 
conditions that India faces, and external military 
threats that India faces. In the subsequent section, I 
outline India’s defense doctrine and strategy before 
elaborating on the role that nuclear weapons play in 
India’s security policy. 
India’s Internal Security Concerns
India has faced internal security challenges since the 
1950s. Various ethnic communities in Northeast India 
such as the Nagas, the Mizos, and others have sought 
to secede from the Indian Union. None of these have 
been successful: India has used a combination of mil-
itary and political measures to deal with such threats. 
Militarily, India sought to defeat the insurgents with 
a strategy that emphasized limited use of force that 
isolated the militants from the population. Politically, 
the Indian government gave a number of concessions 
that reduced the salience of the demands made by 
the separatists, including the creation of new states, 
greater political autonomy, increased developmental 
funds, and locally elected leadership. Many of these 
insurgencies continue, though at a fairly low inten-
sity. None of these insurgencies are today considered 
serious threats to Indian integrity, though they require 
continued security monitoring. 
In addition to the Northeast, India has also faced 
serious rebellions in Punjab, and in Jammu and 
Kashmir. Again, neither represent serious threats to 
India today. The Punjab rebellion ended in the early 
1990s, and the state appears to be largely quiet today, 
though there have been some indications of attempts 
at restarting the rebellion. Kashmir continues to face 
a low-intensity insurgency and some sections of the 
Valley continue to demonstrate intense anti-India 
feelings. Though India continues to deploy a large 
number of troops in the region, the situation has 
vastly improved from even a few years ago.  
Another serious internal security threat that emerged 
over the last two decades is rural “Maoist” or “Nax-
alite” insurgency that afflicted many parts of the 
country, especially where the fruits of India’s eco-
nomic development have not fully filtered down. 
The Maoist insurgency is not a secessionist move-
ment but rather seeks to overthrow the Indian state 
with a radical left-wing popular rebellion. At one 
point, Indian leaders such as then-Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh characterized this as the most se-
rious internal security challenge the country faced.18 
However, the appeal of this movement was always 
limited to the rural areas, and its capacity to grow 
was limited. In addition, an Indian police response 
(the army was not used to respond to this rebellion), 
accelerated economic and infrastructural develop-
ments as well as internal disputes within the Maoist 
groups have significantly weakened it. The Maoists 
are no longer considered a serious threat, though the 
movement itself continues. 
Overall, then, though India continues to face a 
number of internal rebellions, none are presently 
considered very serious, though they require contin-
uous monitoring. 
18  “Naxalism biggest threat to internal security: Manmohan,” The Hindu, May 24, 2010
Th e ST raT eg i c ch a i n:  Linking Pakistan,  India,  China,  and the United States 
FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS   •   ar m S co n T ro l a n d no n-Pro l i f e raT i o n Se r i eS
26
India’s International Strategic Environment
India’s security environment is a reflection both of 
the general conditions of global politics and the 
more immediate security threats that India faces 
from across its own borders. India’s strategic deci-
sion-makers have argued that growing multipolar-
ity is a welcome development and that given India’s 
position, “simultaneous pursuit of multiple relation-
ships creates a virtuous cycle where each can drive 
the other higher.”19 This is classic hedging strategy, 
but in reality, India’s relationship with the United 
States has progressed much farther and it is now 
much deeper than at any time before. India man-
aged to use American power to modify global rules 
in such a way as to allow it to participate in nuclear 
commerce despite the fact that it is a nuclear-armed 
power that is not a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) signatory. The United States is now one of 
the largest arms suppliers to India in terms of value, 
and India conducts more military exercises with the 
United States than with any other country. The re-
lationship has cooled somewhat at the political level 
during the Obama administration compared to the 
Bush administration, but still India and the United 
States now see eye-to-eye on many crucial areas, 
especially in areas such as maritime security, free-
dom of navigation, and over-flights in the Asia-Pa-
cific, and both sides have opposed the threat or use 
of force to settle disputes in the region, a not very 
subtle signal about the South China Sea dispute.  
Despite this close relationship with the United 
States, India has also managed to maintain a very 
robust security and political relationship with 
Russia. There is a natural strategic comfort in this 
relationship that belies the many minor irritants, 
including disputes over contractual negotiations in 
arms supplies. Though officially India is very com-
fortable with the state of this relationship, it is pos-
sible that there are some difficulties ahead as Russia 
gets increasingly close to China. India has yet to 
grapple with the implications of these new develop-
ments, possibly hoping that these are temporary de-
velopments, making it unclear as to what impact it 
might have on India’s strategic policy. If continuing 
tensions between Russia and the West drives Russia 
closer to China, it could have serious implications 
for India. 
India’s relationship with other key countries in 
the Asia-Pacific has also improved significantly. 
Throughout the Cold War period India maintained 
a correct but cool relationship with countries like 
Japan and Australia, seeing them as part of the U.S. 
alliance structure in the region. Relationships with 
these countries suffered in the immediate after-
math of the 1998 nuclear tests, when both coun-
tries took a harsh line on the Indian nuclear test, 
much harsher than even the United States. But as 
India’s relationship with the United States improved, 
it had a positive effect also on India’s ties with Japan 
and Australia. To some extent, increasing anxiety in 
Tokyo and Canberra about China’s rise also played 
a role in the improvement of ties. Officially, India 
has expressed caution about creating any kind of 
anti-China front in the region. Indeed, after China 
objected to India’s 2007 multilateral naval exercises, 
India was careful not to hold naval exercises that in-
cluded the United States along with multiple Asian 
countries. India did hold another Malabar naval ex-
ercise in October 2015 which included Japan and 
the United States. India has also held a number of 
bilateral military exercises with various countries, in-
cluding with Australia in September 2015. If China’s 
behavior in the region continues to be aggressive, In-
dia’s relationship with other Asia-Pacific powers can 
be expected to intensify. 
Perhaps India’s most crucial and complicated re-
lationship over the medium term is the one with 
China. India and China share a very robust and im-
proving trade relationship and they are partners in 
various multilateral fora such as the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization (SCO), BRICS (Brazil-Russia-In-
dia-China-South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil-South 
Africa-India-China), and India has joined the Asian 
19  Ministry of External Affairs, “Remarks by Foreign Secretary at the release of Dr. C. Raja Mohan’s book ‘Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of 
Influence’,” July 17, 2015. 
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Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a Chinese ini-
tiative. The two countries also exchanged state visits, 
with President Xi Jinping visiting in 2014 and Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi returning the visit in 2015. 
But there are also significant challenges facing the two 
countries: India and China have unresolved border 
issues which periodically lead to confrontations be-
tween troops on both sides. In addition, China’s “all 
weather” strategic relationship with Pakistan is a con-
siderable irritant for India, while India’s increasing 
closeness to the United States is a source of concern 
in Beijing. India views some Chinese initiatives, such 
as One Belt, One Road (OBOR), with some suspi-
cion, just as China looks askance at India’s evolving 
relationship with Japan, Australia, and the South-
east Asian region. India finds the China relationship 
“more nuanced, more complex” and one in which im-
provements can take place only if both sides “showed 
respect and sensitivity to each others’ concerns, inter-
ests and aspiration.”20 
Broadly, therefore, India faces an Asian balance that 
is in an unusual flux that makes it difficult to define 
exactly where India’s interests lie, necessitating what 
is essentially a hedging strategy. Still, despite Indian 
protestations, there is little doubt that India worries 
more about China than the United States, and that 
this imbalance of concern drives India into a much 
closer relationship with the United States as well as 
with a number of other powers in the Asia-Pacific. 
External Security Threats
The external security threats that India faces are es-
sentially two: Pakistan and China, and—at least in 
the short-term—in that order. The relative weight to 
be given to these threats has been an unresolved issue 
in Indian strategic planning since independence. 
Like many countries, and for obvious reasons, India 
does not officially or explicitly identify external 
threats to India. But the Indian defense secretary did 
recently state that the Indian military’s “Operational 
Directive” requires the military to dominate one 
country in case of war and deter another.21 In the 
context of India’s strategic circumstances, there can 
be little doubt that he was referring to Pakistan and 
China, respectively. 
India fought three major wars with Pakistan, in 
1947-48, 1965, and 1971, and a border skirmish in 
1999 that lasted six weeks. Despite nuclearization, 
the possibility of another war with Pakistan cannot 
be ruled out because of Pakistan’s revisionist and 
irredentist strategic objective in Kashmir. But it is 
not just the nuclear equation that India has to worry 
about: though Indian conventional forces are larger 
than what Pakistan can muster, the Indian con-
ventional military superiority over Pakistan is not 
substantial.22 According to some assessments, the 
Indian military superiority is not sufficient for India 
to conduct any effective offensive against Pakistan, 
even in the context of possible Pakistani sponsorship 
of further terrorist attacks on India.23 Continued 
delays in India’s arms procurement ensures that the 
situation will not improve in the short-term future. 
It should be reiterated, however, that this refers to 
Indian capability in an offensive war against Paki-
stan: current Indian military capability is more than 
adequate for any open conventional threat that Pa-
kistan might pose. 
But the challenge that India faces from Pakistan is 
not so much a possible conventional military threat 
as much as Pakistan sponsoring terrorism from under 
the cover of its nuclear capability. The Ministry of 
Defense’s Annual Report identified “the expanding 
footprints of extremist and terrorist organisations in 
Pakistan and their linkages with terrorist activities 
in J&K [Jammu and Kashmir, as India refers to the 
Kashmir region] and rest (sic) of India” as a “major 
20  Ministry of External Affairs, “IISS Fullerton Lecture by Dr. S. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary in Singapore,” July 20, 2015. 
21  Standing Committee on Defense, 16th Lok Sabha, Second Report: Demands for Grants (2014–2015): General Defense Budget (New Delhi, December 
2014), 19. 
22  Christopher Clary, “What might an India-Pakistan war look like?” Precis, Spring 2012, http://web.mit.edu/cis/precis/2012spring/india_pakistan.
html#.Vsci1Wduk2w.
23 Walter C. Ladwig III, “Indian military modernization and conventional deterrence in South Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2015).
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security challenge to India.”24 After both countries 
became openly nuclear-armed in 1998, New Delhi 
has appeared constrained in responding militarily to 
such provocations, though it did undertake an un-
precedented full-scale mobilization after a terrorist 
attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. 
Thus the key strategic challenge that India faces is 
the combination of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and 
its support of terrorists targeting India. Though Pa-
kistan’s nuclear program began as a response to the 
strategic imbalance in the region, since acquiring 
the nuclear capability, Pakistan has sought to lever-
age this capability—and the worries of the global 
community about a potential nuclear escalation in 
the region—to put pressure upon and gain conces-
sions from India. This has been a somewhat effective 
strategy, at least in so far as India has found it dif-
ficult to respond to this combination of terrorism 
and the threat of nuclear escalation. Though India 
responded effectively and with force when Pakistani 
forces attempted to change the territorial status quo 
in Kargil in 1999, even in this case of a direct inva-
sion, India limited its response to its own side of the 
Line of Control. But fear of nuclear escalation pre-
vented India from responding to subsequent terror 
attacks on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly, 
on the Indian Parliament, on Indian military estab-
lishments, and on Mumbai, as well as many other 
less serious attacks. 
The logic of Pakistan’s terrorism strategy is unclear 
because it has not and cannot have either the po-
tential to weaken India or force India to concede to 
Pakistan’s demands on Kashmir. These attacks have 
had little impact on India’s economic growth, the 
basis for Indian power. To the extent that the tra-
jectory of India’s economic growth rates is adversely 
affected, it is more by the inadequacies and prob-
lems of India’s economic policies rather than by the 
various terrorist attacks that India has suffered. And 
clearly, it has had little effect on reducing and dimin-
ishing India’s military capabilities. The other alterna-
tive is that Pakistan hopes that terrorism, by holding 
out the threat of nuclear escalation, will likely force 
international intervention on the Kashmir issue. But 
this has also repeatedly shown to be ineffective. The 
truth is that even if there is international pressure, 
India is unlikely to succumb on an issue as crucial 
as Kashmir. But even the likelihood of international 
pressure are near zero because Pakistan’s fingerprints 
on terrorism is so clear that key foreign governments 
have blamed Pakistan for the crises that resulted.25 
If anything, India has repeatedly garnered inter-
national support because it is seen as the victim of 
terrorism. In an international climate in which ter-
rorism is seen as a serious global threat, there is little 
sympathy for such actions, especially when these 
are done with state support. And to the extent that 
any international pressure might exist, it is likely to 
be limited to preventing a war or limiting one if it 
has already started (as happened in the Kargil case) 
rather than in resolving the Kashmir issue. 
Thus, the strategic logic of Pakistan’s support for ter-
rorism against India remains unclear. We are forced 
to conclude that there might indeed be no great 
strategic logic at work here: rather, key elements of 
Pakistan’s security establishment might be support-
ing such terrorism more for the psychic satisfaction 
it brings rather than because of any great strategic 
logic. At best, Pakistani terrorism demonstrates the 
inadequacies and incompetence of the Indian state 
in defending its territory and citizens but while this 
may embarrass the Indian state in the eyes of its 
citizens, it hardly brings much benefit to Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s defense against accusations of terror-spon-
sorship is that it suffers more from terrorism than 
India does. This is both true and irrelevant: the 
damage that terrorism causes to Pakistan is not the 
consequence of Indian support for terrorism in Pa-
kistan, unlike the reverse. Moreover, domestic Paki-
stani terrorism is the direct result of Pakistan’s own 
support of various terrorist groups that have now 
escaped state control and metastasized into a threat 
24 Ministry of Defense, Annual Report 2014–2015 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015), p. 6. 
25  See, for example, the detailed New York Times reporting about the intelligence information on the Mumbai terror attacks in James Glanz, Sebastian 
Rotella and David E. Sanger, “In 2008 Mumbai attacks, piles of spy data, but an uncompleted puzzle,” The New York Times, December 21, 2014. 
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to Pakistan itself. In short, then, Pakistan represents 
the most pressing external security threat that India 
faces, though it is the lesser of the two major external 
threats that India faces. 
The second major external military threat that India 
faces is from China. Though China represents a 
more serious threat because it is a much more ca-
pable military power, it is generally seen as a lon-
ger-term threat than Pakistan, an assessment that 
has remained unchanged for decades. Moreover, 
China is seen as a much more responsible state than 
Pakistan, making the India-China nuclear equation 
appear somewhat more stable and less fearsome than 
the India-Pakistan relationship. The Ministry of De-
fense identifies the key problem with China as the 
unresolved border dispute, “a major factor in India’s 
security calculus,” continuing on to say that “India 
remains conscious and watchful of the implications 
of China’s increasing military profile in our imme-
diate and extended neighbourhood, as well as the 
development of strategic infrastructure by China in 
the border areas.”26 Part of India’s worry also has to 
do with China’s general behavior, in particular its in-
creasing aggressiveness as demonstrated in areas far 
from India such as the South China Sea. The Vice 
Chief of Army Staff told the Standing Committee 
on Defense in the Indian Parliament (in the con-
text of questions about raising a new Army Corps 
for the Chinese border) that considering the way 
China has been behaving in the South China Sea, 
India needs to be fully prepared if China decides 
to “raise the ante and get more aggressive.”27 India 
particularly worries about the changing military bal-
ance between the two countries as China continues 
its rapid military modernization. India historically 
had a much more technologically advanced air force 
because China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF), though much larger, was based on re-
verse-engineered 1950s Soviet combat jets. This is no 
longer true, as the PLAAFs modernization proceeds 
apace and China’s technological capacity to build 
advanced platforms increases, while India’s combat 
squadron strength has fallen to 35, well below the 
42 that it has been sanctioned and the 45 the IAF 
believes it needs. Yet another worry for India is the 
state of infrastructure on the India-China border, 
where there has been dramatic improvement on the 
Chinese side but very little on the Indian side. 
The fact that Pakistan and China have a long-stand-
ing but tacit military partnership is a further prob-
lem for India. The Sino-Pakistan relationship clearly 
includes a strong military and strategic component 
that includes Chinese diplomatic support for Paki-
stan on a variety of India-Pakistan issues including 
on Kashmir, terrorism, and nuclear rules and re-
gimes. China’s support includes direct military sales 
as well as technology collaboration and transfers. 
China has also provided Pakistan with nuclear weap-
ons technology, specifically nuclear warhead design, 
signifying a relationship that is unprecedented in 
the history of nuclear weapons development. Such 
close collaboration has led Indian officials recently 
to begin even considering the possibility that the 
two countries might collaborate in active hostilities 
leading to India facing the possibility of a two-front 
war.28 
India’s Defense Doctrine and Strategic 
Response
India does not produce any official strategy docu-
ment that describes how it plans to deal with the 
threats that it faces. It did produce a brief statement 
in 2003 about India’s nuclear doctrine and various 
military services have produced their own military 
doctrinal statements but these do not appear to form 
a coherent whole in terms of strategy. Nevertheless, 
some outlines of strategy can be discerned. On inter-
nal security, India is likely to continue with existing 
policy. With both Pakistan and China, Indian strate-
26 Ministry of Defense, Annual Report 2014–2015 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015), p. 6.
27  Standing Committee on Defense, 16th Lok Sabha, Seventh Report: Demands for Grants (2015–16): Army (New Delhi, April 2015), 23. Note that 
the name of the country is redacted in the document but there can be little doubt that it refers to China both because of the reference to the South 
China Sea and because the issue under discussion related to the raising of a new Army Corps for the border with China. 
28 “NSA Ajit Doval: India Must Prepare for a Two-front War,” Hindustan Times, November 25, 2014. 
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gic response includes elements of diplomacy as well 
as military means. 
Internal Security
Despite some problems, India’s response to domes-
tic insurgencies have been successful and India will 
likely continue its existing policies. This includes 
some military pressure where warranted but also sub-
stantial focus on political and economic policies that 
work to reduce the underlying causes of rebellions 
to “restore normalcy.” India’s strategy is based on the 
understanding that there are no military solutions to 
domestic rebellions and what is required is political 
compromise (which includes almost anything short 
of actual secession) and patience. India has tweaked 
this strategy (raising new types of military forces for 
example) but it is overall unlikely to change. 
Pakistan
On Pakistan and the terrorism challenge, diplomat-
ically, India has had a fairly easy case to make be-
cause, as stated earlier, there has been little doubt 
about the complicity of the Pakistani state in these 
attacks. But while India has the world’s support 
and sympathy as the victim, this has not been par-
ticularly beneficial because there is little by way of 
direct sanctioning of Pakistan’s behavior by the in-
ternational community. In particular, Pakistan has 
been able to leverage American geostrategic needs of 
the Afghan war in order to escape any serious con-
sequence. More importantly, international appro-
bation has not induced Pakistan—or at least those 
elements engaging in such behavior, the Pakistan 
Army and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)—to 
change its behavior. India has also repeatedly tried 
to negotiate its differences with Pakistan but this has 
not been successful. 
If India has not found much satisfaction with di-
plomacy, it has not fared much better with military 
means either. India has not been able to develop an 
appropriate military response to Pakistan’s combi-
nation of state support for terrorism and the threat 
of nuclear escalation. Since 1998, India has consid-
ered at least two different military responses to this 
quandry. In the immediate aftermath of the Kargil 
war, Indian leaders—including both Defense Minis-
ter George Fernandes and Army Chief General V.P. 
Malik—argued that despite nuclearization, there 
was sufficient space below the nuclear threshold for 
India to fight a conventional war. This suggested 
that India will not let the threat of nuclear escalation 
constrain it from bringing its military force to bear 
on Pakistan. Still, such statements were not followed 
up by any indication of actual military planning or 
preparation. They were, in all likelihood, attempts at 
deterrence through bluff. 
A more serious innovation came as a consequence of 
the military mobilization crisis caused by a Pakistani 
terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. The Indian 
army proposed what came to be dubbed the “Cold 
Start” doctrine that suggested a rapid military attack 
as a response to terrorist outrages. Such attacks would 
be broad, across many sectors of the border, thus pre-
venting Pakistan from concentrating its defenses, but 
also shallow, as a way of capturing limited amount of 
Pakistani territory so as not to cross Pakistan’s nuclear 
threshold. It would also employ already deployed mil-
itary units to begin the assault so that any assault could 
be launched rapidly, before Pakistan had a chance to 
mobilize and before the international community 
had any chance to step in to save Pakistan. India con-
ducted a number of military exercises especially in 
order to test jointness between the air force and the 
army in conducting such military operations. But it 
was never clear that this doctrine had the needed po-
litical support. In any case, the doctrine led to signif-
icant international concerns about the possibility of 
nuclear escalation and the Indian government has for-
mally disavowed it.29 Pakistan has sought to further 
complicate Indian calculations by developing tactical 
nuclear weapons (TNWs), which lowers the nuclear 
threshold. India has not come up with a response to 
Pakistan’s move to introduce TNWs, though there 
has been a significant debate in the Indian strategic 
29 Manu Pubby, “No ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, India tells US,” Indian Express, September 9, 2010.
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community about how to respond to it. Overall then, 
India’s strategy is broadly reactive and defensive, with 
diplomacy playing an important role. It should be, 
however, noted that over the last few months, India 
has responded much more robustly to Pakistan’s al-
leged terrorist provocations, including by conducting 
what New Delhi characterized as a “surgical strike” 
on terrorists within Pakistan-controlled territory. 
Whether this represents a new paradigm in Indian 
policy remains to be seen.
China
To deal with any threat from China, on the diplo-
matic side, India has sought to build strategic rela-
tionships with many of the other countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region that also feel pressured by China’s 
recent behavior. India has built a significant strategic 
relationship with the United States, which includes 
military exercises and arms transfers, and India has 
also sought to build much closer strategic ties to 
others such as Japan, Australia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam. This is radically new for India, which 
through the Cold War shunned Asian states that 
were tied to US military alliance structures in the 
region. India has also become much more vocal 
about the South China Sea problem and the threat 
to freedom of navigation in the region, with Prime 
Minister Modi himself stating at the recent East 
Asia Summit that “India hopes that all parties to the 
disputes in the South China Sea will abide by the 
Declaration on the Conduct on South China Sea 
and the guidelines on the implementation.”30 These 
new relationships do not yet represent military alli-
ances but they are a form of “soft-balancing” China, 
which has the potential to become a hard-balancing 
alliance relationship should the strategic situation 
worsen further in the future. Still, it is difficult to 
see any significant military alliance against China 
developing among Asian powers, for the simple 
reason that they are each much weaker than China, 
and both history (Japan’s imperial past) and geogra-
phy (the distance separating key alliance partners) 
will constrain any such alliance. If any such alliance 
is to develop, it will have to depend on the United 
States to anchor it. Considering the increasing sense 
of isolationism within the U.S. political culture, this 
approach does face some challenges. 
Militarily, India’s strategy appears to be a defensive 
one that is primarily focused on holding what it al-
ready has than in attempting to recapture territory 
that it claims that China occupies. This defensive 
strategy, or “defense by denial,” is based on both de-
terring China from attacking and, should deterrence 
fail, defeating any Chinese attack. India is attempting 
to strengthen its defenses along the Chinese border, 
especially in terms of upgrading India’s rather poor 
border infrastructure. India deploys about a dozen 
light mountain divisions for the Chinese border, 
though some of them also double as counterinsur-
gency forces. India has plans to raise a new strike 
corps for the Chinese border, the 17 Corps, which 
will be India’s first mountain strike corps. The enor-
mous cost of raising this had led to some comments 
by the Indian Defense Minister about rethinking 
this initiative, but it does appear that the formation 
of the 17 Corps is proceeding and it will be fully 
functional by 2021.31 The Indian Air Force is also 
strengthening its capabilities, deploying two SU-30 
MKI squadrons, the most advanced combat planes 
in the IAF, to the region. 
Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategy
India has been a reluctant nuclear power, unwilling to 
go down the nuclear path until its hands were forced 
by Pakistan’s nuclear developments in the 1980s. 
Though India’s original nuclear weaponization pro-
gram was a response to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program, after becoming an overt nuclear power in 
1998, India has started paying much more attention 
to China, developing long-range missiles that will 
be able to target all of China. India’s capabilities are 
30  Ministry of External Affairs, “Remarks by the Prime Minister at the 10th East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur (November 22, 2015), http://
www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/26053/Remarks_by_Prime_Minister_at_the_10th_East_Asia_Summit_in_Kuala_Lumpur_
November_22_2015.
31 Sushant Singh, “War game quells doubts on new corps,” Indian Express, February 8, 2016. 
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still inadequate because it still does not have missiles 
or other strategic delivery capabilities with sufficient 
range to target all of China from southern India. Sim-
ilarly, though India has begun work on the sea-based 
leg of its triad, it is a long way from acquiring a true 
sea-based deterrent. India has, as of yet, only one mis-
sile submarine, and its missiles do not have the range 
to target China from the Bay of Bengal. Thus India 
can be expected to continue to develop its capabilities 
for at least a couple of decades more. On the other 
hand, these increases in capabilities should not sug-
gest a rapid increase in the size of the arsenal: India’s 
warhead count has grown very slowly, at the rate of 
about three to four per year, and there is nothing to 
indicate that this momentum will accelerate. 
Nevertheless, nuclear weapons play only a very lim-
ited role in India’s military strategy. India has essen-
tially viewed nuclear weapons as political weapons 
rather than militarily useful tools. In other words, 
India’s focus is on deterrence rather than war-fight-
ing with its nuclear weapons. India sees little direct 
military utility in nuclear weapons other than in 
preventing a nuclear attack on itself, an attitude that 
is very similar to China but somewhat different from 
that of Pakistan. This is an attitude that grew out of 
Indian criticisms of the nuclear arms race between 
the United States and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War, but it provides India significant advan-
tages too. India’s nuclear strategy can be broadly 
characterized as “assured retaliation,” which seeks to 
use nuclear weapons purely for retaliation and hence 
emphasizes minimal, credible and survivable nuclear 
forces. This strategic and political view of nuclear 
weapons is one reason why India has not consid-
ered additional roles for nuclear weapons and why 
India has not responded to Pakistan’s development 
of TNWs or responded to the pace of Pakistan’s nu-
clear warhead development. 
India has a declared nuclear doctrine, which was first 
outlined by the semi-official National Security Ad-
visory Board (NSAB) in August 1999. This was not 
formally accepted by the government as its nuclear 
doctrine, though many key elements of the NSAB’s 
doctrine stuck to policy elements that the government 
had declared officially both in parliament and outside 
after the 1998 nuclear tests. The official doctrine, or 
at least some key points from it, were released in Jan-
uary 2003 as a press statement. This official doctrine 
reiterated the key points from the NSAB’s nuclear 
doctrine, but also added additional—and somewhat 
controversial—elements to it. The central element 
of the Indian doctrine is the No First Use (NFU) 
pledge. The NFU is controversial and there has been 
significant opposition to it among a vocal minority 
in the Indian strategic community. Still, there is little 
indication that the Indian government will consider 
changing it. Indeed, though the 2014 Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) Election Manifesto promised to 
revise and update the nuclear doctrine, BJP leaders 
quickly disclaimed any intention to change NFU 
and despite winning the election, have not made any 
move to change the doctrine. 
The Indian doctrine also emphasizes civilian con-
trol over nuclear weapons, which is by definition 
risk-resistant. India also employs a relatively relaxed 
command and control arrangement, with weapons 
held in a de-alerted and de-mated posture, which 
increases both the safety and the security of these 
weapons. In addition, despite not being a party to 
the NPT, India continues its unblemished record on 
nuclear non-proliferation and has reiterated a con-
tinued commitment to nuclear disarmament. 
Conclusion
India’s security environment continues to be chal-
lenging, with India facing threats ranging from do-
mestic insurgencies to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism 
and all the way to full-scale conventional war threats 
from both Pakistan and China. India’s response to 
these threats are varied but it is largely reactive and 
defensive, with diplomacy playing an important role 
in both countering some threats and in enhancing 
Indian capacities through strategic partnerships. 
Nuclear weapons play a very limited role, which 
is in deterring the threat from other nuclear weap-
ons. Though India’s strategic environment is getting 
more challenging, its responses are likely to remain 
stable and it is unlikely to shift radically. 
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Annex C. Security Environment: 
Pakistan’s Perspective
Syed Muhammad Ali, Center for International Strate-
gic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
Introduction 
The world in the 21st century has become more complex, interdependent, and dynamic than ever 
before. The rapid advancement of computer, com-
munication, space, and other technologies is creating 
new opportunities and challenges for our individual 
and collective wealth, security, and identities. There-
fore, in order to ensure global and regional security, 
stability, and progress, constant multilateral and 
multi-dimensional efforts are vital to resolve disputes 
and build mutual convergences between States. 
Today, the shifting balance of economic power from 
the West to the East invokes both hopes and fears, 
and challenges the traditional ways of preserving 
our individual and collective national wealth, secu-
rity, identities, relations, and environment. Unfor-
tunately, during the last three centuries, the nature 
of relations and approach towards statecraft between 
the developed and developing nations have gener-
ated more apprehension than hope. 
The 21st century presents an unprecedented, in-
terdependent environment to the entire world to 
gradually and collectively evolve a fair, equitable, 
and transparent paradigm, which enables all nations 
to mutually benefit by peaceful and negotiated set-
tlement of disputes, mutual cooperation, and fair 
sharing of wealth, resources, and opportunities. This 
approach alone will lead to equal and undimin-
ished security for all. The growing threat of global 
and transnational terrorism is in some ways a con-
sequence of ignoring this international security im-
perative and our collective and national obligations. 
Pakistan’s security environment is shaped by a com-
bination of political, economic, diplomatic, tech-
nological, and military trends, events and actors at 
the global, regional, and national levels. This paper 
assesses the complex traditional and non-traditional 
security challenges and the role Pakistan’s nuclear 
deterrent plays in coping with these at the global 
and regional levels. 
Global Security Environment
Despite the stresses of an anarchical structure, the 
world is drifting towards interdependence amid 
regression in economic growth, spiking military 
spending, growing defense industries, and advancing 
capabilities to wage wars. This complex admixture 
indicates that while the world is economically and 
culturally getting more and more interconnected 
and interdependent, major global and regional 
powers continue to qualitatively and quantitatively 
enhance their individual military capabilities. This 
enhances their relative hard and coercive powers, 
reduces the prospects of global arms control, and 
threatens international and regional peace. 
According to the latest Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates, the 
American share of the world’s total defense spend-
ing is approximately 40 percent, while Asia has 
overtaken Europe by spending almost 25 percent 
of the world’s total military spending, in contrast to 
roughly 22 percent by Europe. This trend is likely 
to continue with the visible shift in the world’s eco-
nomic and industrial base from the Atlantic towards 
the Asia-Pacific region. The shifting sands have led 
various major Western powers to reorient and deploy 
their military and strategic capabilities more towards 
the Asia-Pacific and less towards other regions. Not 
only it has created new divergences between the ex-
isting and rising major powers but also put major 
international institutions and alliances under new 
stresses, constraining their ability to develop consen-
sus or make any substantial progress towards conflict 
resolution, arms control, and disarmament. 
Some of the rising regional powers are spending 
more of their wealth towards building and advanc-
ing their conventional and strategic forces. In 1998, 
Indian defense spending was four times that of Paki-
stan while today, despite the introduction of nuclear 
deterrence, New Delhi spends approximately seven 
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times more on its military than Islamabad. This 
growing economic and conventional asymmetry, 
amidst the inability of the international community 
and international institutions to peacefully resolve 
disputes between Pakistan and India, compels Pa-
kistan to increasingly rely on its nuclear deterrent 
as a cost-effective factor of stability and a durable 
instrument of peace in the subcontinent.
Furthermore, the world’s existing, emerging, and 
resurgent powers, without any direct conflict with 
each other for decades, have continued to maintain, 
deploy, and improve the size, alert levels, accuracy, 
effectiveness, and lethality of their nuclear arsenals. 
Fast-paced technological advancements in both ki-
netic and non-kinetic domains are rapidly eroding the 
traditional distinction between war and peace. Devel-
opment of new, more numerous, accurate, destruc-
tive, and long-range ballistic missiles, ballistic missile 
defense systems, hypersonic cruise missiles, ballistic 
missile nuclear submarines, mating of warheads with 
diverse delivery systems into a ready-arsenal, higher 
alert levels, space militarization and weaponization, 
and deployment of the latest generation of fighters 
and bombers is underway in various states. 
In addition, the evolution of armed and stealth 
drones and robots, improving non-kinetic capabil-
ities, particularly the prospect of cyber warfare, have 
transformed both the international security canvas 
as well as modern warfare in a manner that achiev-
ing strategic stability appears distant for the global 
south. These trends provide states possessing a high-
tech defense industry and growing economies with 
significant strategic advantages, making the mainte-
nance of balance of power between industrialized na-
tions and developing nations increasingly difficult. 
Such destabilizing trends have been further exacer-
bated by the regional geopolitical and geostrategic 
preferences of major industrialized nations to mo-
nopolize the knowledge economy, modernize, and 
rapidly build up their new allies against the rising 
powers. These vicissitudes of the international 
system have exacerbated the power imbalance, raised 
the political cost of diplomacy, weakened forums 
like the Conference on Disarmament, foiled various 
strategic and nuclear confidence building measures, 
and made conflict resolution less likely. Within 
South Asia, these global trends have negatively af-
fected the regional balance of power, threatened stra-
tegic stability, and reduced the prospects of conflict 
resolution.
Pakistan’s Regional Threat Perception
By virtue of its unique geography, size, history, de-
mography, and economy, Pakistan offers immense 
opportunities to make a substantive contribution 
towards regional progress and global prosperity. In 
1971, Pakistan played the pivotal role in bringing 
the United States and China close to each other. For-
ty-five years later, Pakistan firmly believes that the 
Asian economic resurgence offers immense oppor-
tunities, which can mutually benefit not only South 
Asia but also Asia at large. Such a regional effort can 
build interdependence between America and China 
through peaceful cooperation for collective and 
common gains. Pakistan is convinced that the net 
gain of conflict resolution and international cooper-
ation will far outweigh any perceived or actual gains, 
which may or may not arise out of an alternative 
investment in hard power and coercive capabilities. 
Such an effort will invariably impact positively on 
South Asian strategic stability and provide lasting 
benefits to the “strategic chain.”
The identity of both nations is historically con-
structed but besides history and geography, economy 
also poses profound challenges to the contemporary 
South Asian security architecture. Despite its com-
mitment to the U.N., Kashmiri people, and the 
international community in 1948, the Indian re-
luctance to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir; the forced 
separation of East Pakistan as a direct consequence 
of New Delhi’s military intervention and active sup-
port for the Bengali insurgency, and Indian military 
occupation of Siachen glacier are deeply rooted in 
Pakistani national psyche. The Indian Army’s large 
scale Brasstacks exercise during the 1980s and the ex-
tended military stand-off of 2001-2002 indicate that 
geographical contiguity makes crises more frequent 
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and escalation more likely in South Asia whenever 
there is a large Indian military deployment or exer-
cise near the Pakistan-India border. However, for Pa-
kistan, its robust nuclear deterrent has worked and 
helped in the management of various crises. More-
over, the Indian economic rise has not only exacer-
bated the traditional conventional asymmetry; it has 
also increased the political cost of conflict resolution 
and made New Delhi less willing to negotiate with 
Pakistan as a sovereign equal. Politically, in the ab-
sence of a meaningful, result-oriented, and sustain-
able dialogue aimed at a peaceful conflict resolution 
between India and Pakistan, U.S. support for Indian 
permanent membership in the U.N. Security Coun-
cil, the growing strategic partnership between India 
and the United States, exceptional and without-cri-
teria advanced military and technological coopera-
tion, and access to New Delhi, is a matter of grave 
security concern for Pakistan and a serious, destabi-
lizing trend in South Asia. 
The notion that a growing Indian military might 
help the United States counter-balance China is not 
supported by empirical evidence and ground re-
alities. The type, nature, location, and size of most 
conventional and strategic capabilities that India is 
swiftly acquiring, developing, and inducting are over-
whelmingly poised against Pakistan. According to an 
assessment, during the last 12 years, India has spent 
over $185 billion on weapons, infrastructure, instal-
lations, and capabilities, most of which are arrayed 
against Pakistan. The posture of Indian offensive and 
defensive conventional and strategic forces as well as 
their training, exercises, stationing, and deployment 
pattern is also increasingly Pakistan-specific. 
The Indian Cold Start Doctrine aims to rapidly 
launch shallow thrusts inside Pakistani territory in 
order to capture it and use it for pressurizing Paki-
stan into accepting New Delhi’s demands, before the 
international community could defuse the conflict. 
The Indian emphasis is on speed and mobility in 
order to prevent both Pakistan and the international 
community from defusing the crisis and using it as 
a strategic opportunity. The large-scale Indian devel-
opment and exponential growth of highly mobile 
armored, mechanized, and artillery formations and 
rapid airlift capabilities—which are far more suitable 
to operate in an environment, climate, and condi-
tions associated with Pakistan than China—provide 
compelling evidences of the operationalization of 
the Cold Start Doctrine. 
As a result, Pakistan has developed Full Spectrum 
Deterrence in order to ensure that India is deterred 
from imposing a limited conventional war on Pa-
kistan, under New Delhi’s dangerous perception of 
a possible Pakistani nuclear threshold. Full Spec-
trum Deterrence is based on developing a variety 
of nuclear weapons of different types and ranges to 
credibly deter all possible types, scale, and ranges of 
threats, which Pakistan perceives from the growing 
Indian conventional and strategic capabilities. So far 
it seems to have worked and played a positive role in 
furthering strategic stability in South Asia—and, by 
extension, in the strategic chain.
India has the largest, oldest, and fastest growing un-
safeguarded nuclear program of all non-NPT states. 
According to George Perkovich’s famous book In-
dia’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Prolifera-
tion, India started its nuclear program much before 
its independence, with Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha’s 
efforts and private funding. India successfully 
achieved its nuclear weapon capability much before 
Pakistan by separating plutonium from its Phoenix 
reprocessing plant even before the 1965 Indo-Paki-
stan War. New Delhi carried out its nuclear tests in 
1974 and 1998 without any provocation, prevailing 
crisis, conflict escalation, or direct threat from either 
China or Pakistan. Both its unsafeguarded pluto-
nium production and highly enriched uranium pro-
grams are exponentially much larger than not only 
Pakistan’s but all the non-NPT states’. Despite de-
veloping long-range nuclear delivery vehicles, the 
oldest, most advanced, accurate, and operationally 
ready Indian missiles are those that can be employed 
against Pakistan more effectively than against China.
In addition, Indian Defense Minister Manohar Par-
rikar has openly supported waging sub-conventional 
warfare against Pakistan. Former U.S. Secretary of 
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Defense Chuck Hagel has also expressed concern at 
the Indian involvement inside Pakistan. Numerous 
Pakistani officials and military officers have repeat-
edly stated that India is actively supporting terrorist 
and insurgent movements in different areas of Pa-
kistan. Some Pakistani analysts also find it peculiar 
that some significant terrorist incidents inside India 
or its held territories tend to occur whenever there 
is a high-level engagement between Pakistan and 
India, aimed at resuming the Composite Dialogue 
process and improving mutual ties in recent years. 
Such incidents allow India to blame Pakistan and 
are obviously not in the interest of Pakistan. These 
incidents only harm the prospects of resumption 
of a sustainable, substantive, and result-oriented 
dialogue, which is Pakistan’s longstanding core 
demand, particularly on the Kashmir issue. There-
fore, terrorist incidents inside India are not in Pa-
kistan’s national interest. That is why Pakistan has 
provided significant cooperation to India in inves-
tigating the Pathankot incident. The United States 
also appreciated this cooperation in the recent 
U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue. Furthermore, the 
growing Indian security role within Afghanistan and 
New Delhi’s expanding military cooperation with 
Iran, Central Asia, and Saudi Arabia, as well as nu-
clearization of the Indian Ocean are also causes of 
increasing concern for Pakistan. 
Another development, which could radically trans-
form the contemporary Asian security dynamic, 
is the rapidly growing economic interdependence 
between China and India. In the future, India and 
China, the world’s two most populous neighbors, 
are expected to form one of the world’s biggest bi-
lateral trade relations. Even at the current level, the 
Indo-Chinese bilateral trade volume is worth far 
more than what New Delhi annually spends on its 
defense. This indicates that the Sino-Indian mutual 
stake in geoeconomic cooperation will gradually 
outgrow their limited geopolitical and geostrategic 
divergences. A large, wealthy, and powerful India 
will be less likely to subordinate its own regional 
geoeconomic interests to the U.S. global geostrate-
gic interests. These facts represent an Indian behav-
ior, commensurate with a rising global power, which 
aspires for a worldwide role in its own right, rather 
than that of a developing country, willing to follow a 
superpower’s diktats. Based on the longstanding as-
pirations of its political elite, growing economy, and 
huge military build-up, India seems determined to 
become an anti-status quo power at the global level.
In addition, the de-hyphenation of South Asia by the 
U.S. military into Central and Pacific Commands 
has further accentuated the regional security chal-
lenges for South Asia. Washington expects India to 
play a greater strategic role within the Pacific Com-
mand’s area of responsibility and expects Pakistan to 
orient its security considerations more towards Af-
ghanistan and Middle East. This U.S. expectation, 
in contrast to the regional, historic, geographical 
and strategic realities, is harmful to the maintenance 
of strategic stability and durable peace and security 
in South Asia. This unnatural U.S. de-hyphenation 
of South Asia into Central and Pacific Commands 
further reduces the prospects of arms control and 
disarmament at the global and particularly at the re-
gional level. 
Pakistan’s Defense Doctrine
Pakistan faces five major types of security threats 
from India. First, the threat of a limited conventional 
war. Second, the threat of low-intensity conflict and 
state-sponsored terrorism to destabilize it internally. 
Third, the threat of a nuclear war. Fourth, attempts to 
harm Pakistan’s water and economic security. Fifth, 
cyber- and space-based threats. Pakistan’s nuclear 
deterrent plays a pivotal role in guarding Pakistan’s 
national security interests in multiple dimensions. 
In order to dissuade, deter, and defeat these threats 
Pakistan has taken various elaborate measures by de-
veloping and employing the full spectrum of mili-
tary capabilities in a network centric environment.32 
The National Command Authority (NCA) state-
ment issued after its sixteenth meeting held on Janu-
32  ISPR, Press Release, PR 193/2010-ISPR dated May 14, 2010.
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ary 10, 2010, mentioned that “The NCA took serious 
note of recent Indian statements about its capability to 
conduct conventional military strikes under a nuclear 
umbrella.”33 Pakistan has planned to deal with the 
threat of limited conventional war with a combina-
tion of both conventional and strategic measures. 
Pakistan conducted the Azm-e-Nau series of military 
exercises, which enabled it to develop a comprehen-
sive and integrated response to emerging threat sce-
narios,34 perhaps primarily referring to the Indian 
Cold Start Doctrine. According to Pakistan’s Inter 
Services Public Relations (ISPR), these exercises, 
spread over four years, involved various corps, and 
aimed to review and validate operational plans in 
accordance with the threat spectrum.35 Azm-e-Nau 
exercises allowed the Pakistani Army to improve its 
mobilization time and put into practice a new con-
cept of war fighting against full spectrum of threat, 
be it direct or indirect, and overt and covert.36 
The introduction of the Nasr short-range ballistic 
missile through its first test on April 19, 2011 also 
coincides with the timeframe during which these 
exercises were held. This indicates that Pakistan’s 
defense doctrine is based on an integrated and com-
prehensive concept in which both conventional and 
nuclear weapons have their specific but synergized 
roles, to cater to different scenarios, nature, type, and 
extent of threats. Therefore, Pakistan’s defense doc-
trine should not be understood in terms of merely 
conventional capabilities or the deterrence role of 
its nuclear capabilities alone, since both capabilities 
are available in synergy and coordination, to the na-
tional leadership for appropriate employment, in ac-
cordance with the situation, nature, type, and extent 
of threat to the country’s national security. Which 
specific weapon or capability Pakistan will employ in 
a given operational scenario depends upon the par-
ticular situation and the level of threat to its national 
security. However, a full spectrum of diverse conven-
tional and strategic capabilities is available to the Pa-
kistani national leadership to choose from, in order 
to protect national security during peace, crises, or 
conflict, provide national leadership diverse range of 
strategic options, and make other states factor in all 
these capabilities and options, available to Pakistan 
to protect its national security. In a conversation at 
the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Confer-
ence 2015, Advisor NCA Lt. General (Ret.) Khalid 
Ahmed Kidwai confirmed this view in his statement 
that “[n]uclear strategy integrates the land operations of 
the conventional forces….So it is one integrated whole.”
Pakistan is currently engaged in a large-scale and 
active military operation known as Zarb-e-Azb, 
against terrorists. The arrest of Indian Navy Com-
mander Kulbhushan Yadev from Baluchistan gives 
serious credence to Pakistan’s insistence the Indian 
intelligence Agency RAW is involved in destabiliz-
ing Pakistan and the multi-billion-dollar China-Pa-
kistan Economic Corridor.37 Pakistani Army and Air 
Force’s current commitments towards the ongoing 
unprecedented counter-terrorism operation further 
enhances the role of the nuclear deterrent in ensur-
ing that peace prevails on the borders.38 
Since Pakistan’s Strategic Doctrine aims only at de-
terring Indian aggression, therefore, it has developed 
nuclear delivery systems of diverse ranges to meet 
threats in all spectrums. Shaheen III, with a range 
of 2,750 km, ensures that no part of Indian terri-
tory, including its most distant islands, is outside 
the reach of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, whereas at 
the shortest range SRBM Nasr forecloses the Indian 
option of imposing a limited conventional war upon 
Pakistan by commencing operations at the tactical 
level within 72 to 96 hours, as per the Cold Start 
Doctrine. Besides these two delivery systems, which 
represent the two extremes of Full Spectrum Deter-
rence, there are various additional strategic deliv-
33 ISPR, Press Release, PR 11/2010-ISPR dated January 13, 2010.
34 ISPR, Press Release, PR 63/2010-ISPR dated February 10, 2010.
35 ISPR, Press Release, PR 196/2012-ISPR dated September 12, 2012.
36 ISPR, Press Release, PR2/2013 –ISPR dated January 8, 2013.
37 Syed Ali Shah, “RAW involved in destabilizing Pakistan, says General Raheel,” Dawn, April 12, 2016.
38 Michael Krepon, “The Limits of Influence: US-Pakistani Nuclear Relations,” The Non-Proliferation Review 18, no. 1(March 2011): p. 95.
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ery systems in between, including surface and air 
launched cruise missiles, to ensure that Pakistan is 
ready to deter the entire spectrum of threats. Paki-
stan possesses a credible but minimum deterrence in 
the form of both high and low yield, short and long-
range nuclear weapons, capable of penetrating all 
known types of active and passive missile defenses. 
In the same conversation with Dr. Peter Lavoy at 
Carnegie, Lt. General (Ret.) Kidwai unequivocally 
stated that there is no need for Pakistan to develop 
longer ranged nuclear delivery systems.39 This un-
ambiguous statement reflects that Pakistan’s solitary 
strategic objective is to maintain strategic stability in 
South Asia and it does not have any extra-regional 
strategic ambitions. It is also evidence of Islamabad’s 
consistent policy of nuclear responsibility and re-
straint. Pakistan has a consistent policy of ambiguity 
regarding the size, nature, and location of its nuclear 
arsenals, which, according to Lt. General (Ret.) 
Kidwai, is unlikely to be altered by any government.
Besides the risks associated with conventional, 
sub-conventional, and nuclear conflicts, new threats 
of complex dimensions are emerging in the region, 
which makes Pakistan-India relations more con-
flict-prone. Pakistan is a water-stressed agricultural 
country whose economic, human, and energy secu-
rity are heavily dependent upon the regular and sub-
stantial availability of water from rivers, which flow 
from Indian-occupied Kashmir, Indian Punjab, and 
Afghanistan. India has been consistently building 
large number of projects and dams on rivers flow-
ing into Pakistan, in violation of the Indus Water 
Treaty. More recently, New Delhi also helped Af-
ghanistan build a dam. These projects pose increas-
ing challenges to Pakistan, which, being the lower 
riparian state has internationally recognized rights 
over regular and substantial water supply. Pakistan, 
with its growing economy, population, and improv-
ing lifestyle, is finding it increasingly difficult to 
meet its human, economic, agricultural, and energy 
needs. In the future, in the absence of timely, eq-
uitable, and lasting resolution of the growing water 
dispute, the possibility of conflict between Pakistan 
and India on this account alone cannot be ruled out. 
India is also developing a large cyber force, which 
can also have an offensive role. This could introduce 
a new dimension of threat and a greater challenge to 
strategic stability in South Asia, which merits timely 
consideration of substantive measures to prevent es-
calation during crises and conflicts. 
In 1998, after the nuclear tests by New Delhi and 
Islamabad, Pakistan’s strategic planners hoped that 
nuclear weapons would not only make wars between 
the two neighbors less likely, but instil a greater re-
alization in both states of the urgent need to resolve 
disputes—which cause not only crises and conflicts, 
but have also led to the introduction of nuclear 
weapons. Unfortunately, this has not happened. 
The strategic dialogue has been repeatedly stalled by 
India on various pretexts, which makes strategic sta-
bility tenuous.
Nuclear Weapons: Rationale, Role, and 
Purpose
The purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear program is to deter 
all forms of external aggression in order to promote 
regional peace and contribute towards national 
progress and prosperity. Pakistan was not the first 
in South Asia to develop, introduce, or test nuclear 
weapons. Since its inception in the early 1950s, 
under the Atoms for Peace program, Pakistan’s nu-
clear program was completely peaceful for almost 
two decades, and it also proposed a nuclear weapons 
free zone in South Asia. However, in the absence of 
a positive and reciprocal response from India, which 
had already developed nuclear weapons by using 
U.S.-supplied heavy water from a Canadian reactor, 
Pakistan was compelled to follow suit. Islamabad’s 
decision to develop a nuclear deterrent was entirely 
driven by its own security compulsions, in the ab-
sence of any international security guarantees and in 
order to ensure its own survival and national security, 
particularly after 1971, when it became a victim of a 
direct military aggression by its large eastern neigh-
bor in erstwhile East Pakistan. The need for interna-
39 “A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 23, 2015
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tional guarantees has been overtaken by history. The 
reality of the anarchical global system exposed the 
failure of international institutions, community, and 
treaties to protect Pakistan’s national security, terri-
torial integrity, and sovereignty. Islamabad naturally 
responded by developing an indigenous nuclear de-
terrent to prevent any such future eventuality. 
Among all nuclear-armed neighboring states, the 
conventional asymmetry between India and Pa-
kistan is the more pronounced. The size, nature, 
configuration, capabilities, location, and behavior 
of Indian conventional forces represent a real and 
present danger to Pakistan’s national security. 
The economic asymmetry at the regional level be-
tween nuclear-armed India and Pakistan is greater 
than the asymmetry between the United States and 
China or China vis-à-vis India. Therefore, engaging 
in an arms race is neither feasible nor desirable for 
Pakistan. Islamabad believes in credibly meeting its 
national security needs through minimal use of its 
resources and does not seek revision of global order. 
Pakistan’s sole national security purpose is to pro-
tect its people, territory, wealth, and independence. 
Nuclear deterrence plays a key role in complement-
ing this national security imperative. Pakistan’s nu-
clear program represents a sacred national trust and 
enjoys a deep national consensus. It represents Pa-
kistan’s collective national resolve to safeguard and 
protect its territory, population, resources, and inde-
pendence against external threats, at all costs. 
Since 9/11, Pakistan’s fifteen years-long engagement 
in counterterrorism operations and large military 
deployments on its western borders has affected and 
accentuated the conventional asymmetry between 
Pakistan and India on the eastern borders. As a 
result, the role of the nuclear deterrent has become 
more pronounced in crisis prevention and conflict 
management in South Asia than ever before. Fur-
thermore, considering the cumulative impact of In-
dia’s pre-emptive Cold Start Doctrine, the evolution 
of a large blue water navy, armed with aircraft carri-
ers, ballistic missiles, and nuclear attack submarines, 
the development of 13 different types of nuclear 
capable missiles of varying ranges, development of 
Ballistic Missile Defense, are strategic developments 
no policy planner, strategic thinker, or decision 
maker in Pakistan can afford to ignore.
Indian doctrinal and force posture developments 
continually vitiate the threat spectrum for Pakistan. 
Consequently, Pakistan maintains its longstand-
ing principle of credible minimum deterrence, and 
through full-spectrum deterrence, adjusts to the dy-
namics of threats. Such policy and posture ensures 
that no part of Indian territory or military, either 
close or far, remains invulnerable to Pakistan’s nu-
clear weapons. India’s developing ballistic missile 
defense system is dangerous and destabilizing not 
because it can reduce the credibility of Pakistan’s 
nuclear deterrent but because it can give the Indian 
leadership a false sense of security. This misplaced 
confidence could be very dangerous in a nuclearized 
South Asia and could encourage the Indian leader-
ship to take the dangerous and incorrect decision of 
testing our resolve by attempting a swift and limited 
attack on Pakistan from land, sea, or air. 
It is worth noting that Pakistan’s nuclear delivery 
systems are diverse, highly accurate, very sophisti-
cated, and fully capable of defeating and penetrating 
all known forms of active and passive missile defense 
systems. Any attempt to test the credibility of Pa-
kistan’s nuclear deterrent could risk large-scale de-
struction in South Asia, whose effects will be global. 
While Pakistan has developed multiple types of 
nuclear warheads and delivery means of different 
weight, size, and ranges—which can be launched 
from land, air, or sea—Pakistan ensures the credi-
bility of its deterrence by maintaining opacity about 
the targeting and alert status of its nuclear weapons. 
Presumably, Pakistan’s targeting policy would be 
guided by considerations such as the type, nature, 
location, and size of threat and desired physical and 
psychological effects. Likewise, Pakistan’s decisions 
regarding the size of arsenal and yields of warheads 
are also expected to be based on rational strategic 
considerations, and not by a desire to engage in an 
arms race. The public assessments about the latter 
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two aspects are at best estimates that appear politi-
cally motivated. 
The myth that Pakistan has the largest growing fis-
sile material program seems aimed at attempting to 
divert international attention from the reality of the 
world’s largest, oldest unsafeguarded nuclear pro-
gram among all the non-NPT states that India pos-
sesses, which it is rapidly expanding and advancing 
with active help from a dozen other states, including 
the United States. 
Pakistan’s robust command, control, and communi-
cation architecture is balanced to overcome the ten-
sions of the always-never dilemma, which is designed 
to ensure that nuclear weapons are always available 
once needed and are never used inadvertently or 
when not authorized. Various effective nuclear com-
mand and control measures ensure positive and neg-
ative controls over all types of nuclear warheads, at 
all times. Compared to the huge size of the nuclear 
arsenals of major powers that have been developed 
over the past six or seven decades, Pakistan’s nuclear 
arsenal is relatively modest in quantitative terms, but 
qualitatively modern and sophisticated. 
Nevertheless, despite its relatively smaller size, Pa-
kistan’s nuclear arsenal is reported to be widely 
dispersed in numerous secure and secret locations, 
across the country. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is prob-
ably one of the most well-guarded, and is constantly 
secured by one of the world’s largest nuclear security 
apparatuses, consisting of a highly trained, moti-
vated, and specialized force, deployed in accordance 
with an elaborate, multi-layered, defense in depth 
concept.
Pakistan strictly adheres to the ideals of equitable 
arms control and non-proliferation and actively en-
gages with the international community to promote 
nuclear security and improve international best 
practices. It has developed an extensive and fool-
proof personnel reliability program, to guard against 
all forms of insider threats. This system is constantly 
reviewed for improved quality and greater vigilance. 
Conclusion
Pakistan is a rational, peace-loving, moderate, dem-
ocratically-led, developing nation. Islamabad was 
compelled to develop nuclear weapons to ensure 
Pakistan’s security. The sole purpose of its nuclear 
deterrent is to deter aggression and maintain peace, 
security, and strategic stability within South Asia 
and prevent any form of regional conflict. 
Global factors—such as the growing divergences be-
tween the interests of major powers, reduced role of 
international institutions and community in conflict 
resolution, constant improvements in nuclear weap-
onry, and reduced prospects of disarmament—indi-
cate that nuclear weapons will continue to play an 
important role in international security in the fore-
seeable future. 
Regionally, the growing U.S-Indian strategic part-
nership, increasing conventional asymmetry be-
tween India and Pakistan, rapid modernization of 
Indian conventional and nuclear forces, evolution 
of aggressive doctrines, and induction of offensive 
and destabilizing weapon systems—both of which 
seem Pakistan-specific—reflect long-term emerg-
ing trends. Over time, these destabilizing regional 
trends, in contrast to the hopes of strategic restraint 
which Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests had tempo-
rarily raised, have actually increased the vital role of 
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, as a cost-effective factor 
of stability, perhaps more than ever before. None-
theless, due to multiple international, regional, and 
domestic factors and considerations—and despite 
evolving a credible and dynamic Full Spectrum 
Deterrence strategy to cater to changes in its threat 
matrix—it is unlikely that Pakistan will depart from 
its longstanding posture of credible minimum deter-
rence, which is not only regionally sufficient but is 
also nationally affordable.
Pakistan’s deterrent capability also makes peace more 
durable and conflict less likely in the increasingly in-
secure South Asia and amidst an international secu-
rity environment, which seem increasingly complex, 
dynamic, and uncertain. Perhaps, this is the reason 
Th e ST raT eg i c ch a i n:  Linking Pakistan,  India,  China,  and the United States 
FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS   •   ar m S co n T ro l a n d no n-Pro l i f e raT i o n Se r i eS
41
why major powers, despite their lack of engagement 
in any large, inter-state conflict, directly threaten-
ing their national security, for over quarter of a cen-
tury and growing economic constraints, continue to 
maintain and improve their nuclear arsenals. Almost 
30 NPT non-nuclear weapons signatory states in 
both Europe and Asia continue to depend on nu-
clear weapons for their national security without 
physically possessing, owning, or developing them. 
Their national NPT obligations do not reduce their 
ability to benefit from the security, which the nu-
clear umbrellas of nuclear weapon states offer them. 
In contrast, Pakistan faces clear, present, and grow-
ing regional dangers amidst a resource constrained 
environment, for which a nuclear deterrent offers 
the most cost-effective guarantee of peace, until the 
time the international community changes its ap-
proach towards South Asia from conflict manage-
ment to conflict resolution, and Pakistan and India 
can peacefully and amicably resolve all of their out-
standing mutual disputes in a just, equitable, and 
honorable manner.
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Annex D. United States National 
Paper
Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University, Washing-
ton, D.C.
With the end of the Cold War, great power competition—and with it, issues of strategic 
deterrence and stability—temporarily receded into 
the background of international policy discussions. 
Increasingly, however, Asia is becoming a new locus 
of great power political interaction and the strategic 
interrelationships between the nuclear powers in this 
region (in particular, China, India, Pakistan, and the 
United States) are proving to be much more com-
plicated than the relatively simple, bipolar nuclear 
order of the Cold War. In order for these nations to 
ensure their security and maintain strategic stability, 
it is important to better understand this “strategic 
chain” of relations between these four Asian nuclear 
powers. To do so effectively, however, we must first 
ground our discussion with a solid comprehension 
of the strategic environment and doctrines of each. 
This paper will provide this perspective from the 
point of view of the United States. It addresses Wash-
ington’s security environment, its threat perceptions, 
its defense doctrine, and its strategy for achieving its 
security objectives, with a special emphasis on the 
role that nuclear weapons and other strategic capa-
bilities play in promoting its interests. The paper will 
continue in three parts. The first section discusses 
the U.S. strategic environment. Second, the paper 
will move on to analyze U.S. strategic doctrine. Fi-
nally, it reviews Washington’s strategic policy in Asia. 
Current Strategic Environment
Today, Washington’s security environment is much 
less benign than it was just a few short years ago. In 
a notable speech in Prague in 2009, U.S. President 
Barack Obama vowed that the United States would 
“seek the peace and security of a world without 
nuclear weapons.”40 At the time of this statement, 
the international order was stable and conditions 
seemed to allow for a reduction in U.S. strategic 
forces and an overall de-emphasis of nuclear weap-
ons in national security strategy. Since that time, 
however, new threats to U.S. security have emerged.
The most troublesome of these new challenges comes 
from Russia, which has quickly transformed from a 
potential strategic partner for the West into a clear 
adversary. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, flouting 
international norms and contravening past promises 
to uphold Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity. Moscow annexed Crimea and continues to 
engage in military action, both directly and through 
proxy, in eastern Ukraine. In addition, Russia has 
asserted a presence in the Middle East for the first 
time since the end of the Cold War, intervening mil-
itarily in the Syrian civil war, where it has clashed 
with America’s NATO ally Turkey and has directly 
targeted U.S.-supported groups. These interventions 
are troubling in and of themselves, but also for what 
they might reveal about Russia’s broader strategic 
intentions. Many in Washington fear that Russian 
President Vladimir Putin may attempt a similar 
intervention in the Baltics, which could lead to a 
direct military conflict between Russia and NATO. 
These interventions are also troubling from a strate-
gic perspective because Russia has backstopped its 
newly assertive foreign policy with an increased em-
phasis on its nuclear forces.41 Throughout the crisis 
in Ukraine, President Putin has made explicit nu-
clear threats and brandished nuclear forces at levels 
we have not seen since the end of the Cold War. This 
is consistent with a Russian doctrine that has, over 
the past decade, moved nuclear weapons more to the 
center of its military and national security strategy. 
Russia is supporting this nuclear-centric strategy with 
a modernization of all three legs of its nuclear triad. 
In addition, Moscow has retained an arsenal of sev-
eral thousand nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Finally, 
Russia has violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range 
40  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered,” April 5, 2009.
41  See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, 
February 2016.
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Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the only arms control 
treaty in history to eliminate an entire class of nu-
clear weapons, by testing a new intermediate-range, 
ground-launched cruise missile. All of these develop-
ments have prompted a serious debate in the West 
about how best to respond in order to deter Russian 
aggression without provoking a new Cold War.
The United States also faces new challenges in East 
Asia. North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities 
continue to expand, threatening U.S. allies in the 
region and potentially putting the U.S. homeland 
at risk. In early 2016, North Korea conducted its 
fourth nuclear test and outside analysts estimate 
that Pyongyang may have enough nuclear material 
for up to around 30 nuclear warheads.42 In addition, 
North Korea has expanded its missile delivery ca-
pability, testing a “satellite” in early 2016 that was 
widely seen as a cover for a ballistic missile test. This 
launch builds on a string of tests in recent years de-
signed to help Pyongyang develop longer-range mis-
siles, including a sea-launch capability. The head of 
U.S. Northern Command, Admiral William Gort-
ney, has publicly assessed that North Korea now has 
the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and put 
it on a missile capable of ranging the continental 
United States.43
The U.S. relationship with China has also become 
more competitive in recent years. While Washing-
ton continues to seek a cooperative relationship with 
Beijing, it is also concerned about Chinese chal-
lenges to U.S. interests. Chinese cyberattacks and 
cyber espionage against U.S. targets have led to U.S. 
retaliation against Chinese entities, straining the 
bilateral relationship. As former U.S. national secu-
rity adviser Susan Rice has said, Chinese cyberespi-
onage is not “a mild irritation, it’s an economic and 
national security concern to the United States.”44 
China has tangled with U.S. treaty-ally Japan over 
the disputed Diayou/Senkaku islands, including a 
clash in 2012, which many believe narrowly avoided 
escalation to military conflict. In addition, China’s 
land reclamation project in the South China Sea ap-
pears to be a Chinese attempt to settle the status of 
the disputed islands by confronting other claimants 
with a fait accompli. Washington maintains that the 
competing claims must be resolved through nego-
tiations, not coercion, and has conducted freedom 
of navigation operations to challenge China’s claims 
of sovereignty over the islands. More broadly, Chi-
na’s military modernization and its Anti-Access Area 
Denial (A2AD) strategy and capabilities challenges 
the U.S. position in Asia; Washington is responding 
with enhancements to its own defense strategy and 
posture to ensure that it has the ability to defend its 
treaty allies in Asia.
U.S. interests in the Middle East are also threat-
ened by renewed turmoil in the region. Beginning 
in 2011, the Arab uprisings unseated several long-
standing governments, creating vacuums of power 
in key states and unleashing regional instability. At 
present, civil wars rage in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and 
Libya. Regional powers, most notably Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, vie for influence in these conflicts through 
direct intervention and support to proxies. More 
troubling still for U.S. interests is ISIS, arguably the 
best organized and financed terror group in history, 
which has emerged in the ungoverned spaces of east-
ern Syria, western Iraq, and Libya, and has inspired 
terror attacks against Paris and California. 
The greatest potential strategic threat in the Middle 
East, however, is Iran’s uranium enrichment pro-
gram. A nuclear-armed Iran could upset the re-
gional balance of power and pose a direct threat to 
the United States and its allies and partners in the 
region. As President Obama has argued repeatedly, 
the United States will do “whatever it takes” to pre-
vent Iran from building nuclear weapons.45 Now 
that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better 
42  David Albright and Christina Walrond, “North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium,” Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS), 2012, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/dprk_fissile_material_production_16Aug2012.pdf.
43  ADM William Gortney, “Protecting the Homeland,” Speech at The Atlantic Council, Washington DC, October 7, 2015.
44 “U.S. to China: Quit Cyber Spying,” Reuters, September 22, 2015.
45 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama’s Crystal Clear Promise to Stop Iran from Getting a Nuclear Weapon,” The Atlantic, October 2, 2012. 
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known as the Iran nuclear deal, has gone into effect, 
Iran’s nuclear program no longer poses an immedi-
ate challenge. But if the internationally agreed-upon 
limits to Iran’s nuclear program were to be violated 
for any reason, the Iranian nuclear issue could once 
again become the subject of serious international 
attention. Moreover, with the expiration of key nu-
clear restraints after 10 and 15 years, uncertainty 
will remain about future Iranian intentions and ca-
pabilities.
U.S. Strategic Doctrine
What is the U.S. approach for dealing with these 
strategic challenges? America’s strategic doctrine was 
last articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR).46 While the U.S. strategic environment 
has been greatly altered in subsequent years as the 
above discussion makes clear, at the broadest level, 
the ends and means of U.S. doctrine remain largely 
unchanged. This section will begin with a discussion 
of the constants and conclude with a consideration 
of the current debate in Washington about possible 
adjustments to its strategic posture to address new 
challenges. 
According to the NPR, U.S. strategic goals include: 
preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear ter-
rorism; reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons; 
maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at re-
duced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional 
deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; 
and sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear 
arsenal. 
Perhaps the most important of these goals for the 
strategic chain project is the U.S. desire to main-
tain strategic deterrence and stability with Russia 
and China. Washington would like to deter attacks 
against the United States and its allies, reassure 
Moscow and Beijing that Washington is not seek-
ing to undermine their nuclear deterrents, and also 
avoid costly and potentially destabilizing arms races. 
The United States is also committed to pursuing 
high-level, bilateral dialogues with Russia and China 
aimed at promoting more stable, resilient, and trans-
parent strategic relationships.
While President Obama looked forward to a “world 
without nuclear weapons” in the aforementioned 
Prague speech, he also recognized that this goal will 
not be achieved in the near future. For this reason, 
the NPR states that so long as nuclear weapons exist, 
the United States will sustain a “safe, secure, and ef-
fective nuclear arsenal.” The United States has com-
mitted to retaining and modernizing all three legs 
of its nuclear triad, including ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
strategic bombers. It also keeps a small number of 
forward deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 
Europe, and another small stockpile of nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons in the United States, for possible 
deployment in support of extended deterrence to 
allies and partners elsewhere.
The Obama administration remains open to fur-
ther negotiated nuclear reductions with Russia, and 
has indicated that it is prepared, in tandem with 
Moscow, to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads to one-third below the New START level. 
At present, however, Moscow does not appear inter-
ested in additional arms control measures and insists 
that further reductions in strategic nuclear forces be 
accompanied by limits on what it regards as non-nu-
clear strategic capabilities, such as missile defenses. 
And given Moscow’s recent behavior, there are ques-
tions about its willingness to engage in related nego-
tiations in the future.
To “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. na-
tional security strategy,” Washington, among other 
steps, has strengthened its negative security assur-
ances. Unlike China and India, the United States 
does not maintain a “no first use” policy (NFU). 
The United States does vow, however, not to use, 
or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nu-
clear weapons states that are party to the NPT and 
in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation 
obligations. In other words, Washington will only 
46 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010.
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consider the use, or threats to use, nuclear weap-
ons against other nuclear-armed states, or against 
non-nuclear weapons states in violation of their 
NPT commitments. In addition, the NPR states 
that Washington will “only consider the use of nu-
clear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend 
the vital interests of the United States or its allies 
and partners.” To further reduce reliance on nuclear 
weapons, the United States promised to strengthen 
conventional capabilities as a means of deterring 
non-nuclear attack, with the eventual goal of making 
deterrence of a nuclear attack the sole purpose of 
America’s nuclear weapons.
In addition to its nuclear forces, U.S. strategic posture 
also includes regional and homeland missile defenses 
and the development of conventional prompt global 
strike (CPGS) capabilities. It must be emphasized 
that these capabilities are intended to contribute to 
the regional deterrence architecture to address emerg-
ing threats, such as those posed by North Korea and 
Iran. They are not aimed at, nor will they meaning-
fully affect, the strategic balance between the United 
States and Russia or China. Missile defense intercep-
tors are deployed in small numbers and are intended 
to deter a limited attack from North Korea (or in the 
future, potentially Iran). U.S. missile defenses could 
not meaningfully blunt a large-scale Russian or Chi-
nese nuclear attack. Similarly, CPGS will play only a 
niche role in regional conflicts, such as in counterter-
rorism operations. The United States is not acquiring 
them in large numbers and they will not be able to 
hold at risk Russia or China’s nuclear deterrent.
U.S. nuclear and conventional forces are enabled by 
cyber and space capabilities and the United States 
will ensure the resiliency of these networks and deter 
and, if necessary, respond to attacks against them.
To prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear ter-
rorism, Washington seeks to strengthen the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, reverse North Korea and 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, secure vulnerable nuclear 
materials worldwide, and pursue other related arms 
control efforts.
While much of U.S. strategic doctrine has remained 
constant, the deteriorating security environment has 
opened up debates in Washington about whether 
the United States needs to take steps to reinforce 
deterrence. There is a growing recognition that the 
United States and NATO must adapt NATO’s nu-
clear deterrence policy and posture to meet the Rus-
sian nuclear threat, such as publically reaffirming the 
important role of nuclear weapons in the NATO Al-
liance. The United States is also considering options 
for responding to Russia’s INF violations, which, 
according to testimony from Department of De-
fense officials, include active defenses, counterforce 
capabilities, and countervailing strike capabilities.47 
Finally, while the Obama administration believes 
that current plans to modernize the European-based 
nuclear deterrent are sufficient, some outside ana-
lysts and former government officials have recom-
mended changes to U.S. nuclear posture to provide 
the United States with more flexible options for 
dealing with threatened Russian “de-escalatory” nu-
clear strikes.48 
U.S. Strategic Policy in Asia
The previous section reviewed U.S. strategic doc-
trine broadly, but how do these concepts apply in 
the Asian context? It is to this subject to which we 
will now turn.
While not part of this “strategic chain” project, 
Russia bears on strategic issues in Asia as two of the 
major nuclear powers in Asia, the United States and 
to a lesser extent China, view Russia as a strategic 
competitor and this could affect strategic dynamics 
in Asia in a number of ways. Developments in Rus-
sia’s strategic doctrine or posture could directly affect 
the security of the United States and China. More-
47  Statement of Brian P. McKeon, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
December 10, 2014. 
48  Statement of Evelyn N. Farkas. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, House Armed Services Committee, 
February 10, 2016.
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over, steps Washington or Beijing take to address the 
threat posed by Moscow could in turn affect Asian 
security dynamics. Capabilities these states develop 
to counter the Russian threat, for example, may 
serve to threaten, or reassure, other nations in Asia. 
Similarly, U.S. credibility as revealed in the Euro-
pean theater may send signals about U.S. resolve to 
deter potential adversaries and defend allies in Asia. 
Noting the possible impact of Russia on U.S. policy 
in Asia, this section will begin with a discussion of 
the most worrisome near-term threat to U.S. inter-
ests in Asia: North Korea. As highlighted above, 
Pyongyang’s expanding nuclear and missile program 
poses a direct threat to the United States and its allies 
and, as U.S. forces and its homeland become more 
vulnerable, these capabilities challenge Washington’s 
willingness and ability to defend its regional allies 
against the North Korean threat. The United States 
does not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed 
state and its stated policy is aimed at capping and 
then rolling back North Korea’s nuclear capability 
and creating a “denuclearized” Korean Peninsula. 
Washington hopes to achieve this goal through mul-
tilateral diplomacy, backed by pressure as necessary. 
The recent progress toward U.N. sanctions against 
North Korea in response to its satellite test may be a 
helpful step in this direction.49 
As long as North Korea maintains nuclear weap-
ons, however, Washington must defend itself and its 
allies. In addition to U.S. nuclear and conventional 
capabilities, this defense includes limited regional 
and homeland ballistic missile defenses, including 
the currently discussed deployment of a THAAD 
battery to South Korea.50 It is important to stress 
once again, however, that these defenses are sufficient 
for dealing with the limited threat posed by North 
Korea, but that they could not meaningfully blunt a 
large-scale Russian or Chinese attack. Finally, given 
Pyongyang’s history of transferring nuclear and mil-
itary technology, the United States seeks to deter 
future sensitive military exports through a number 
of means, including its declaratory policy and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Another important U.S. priority in Asia concerns re-
assuring regional allies. The United States maintains 
longstanding, formal defense pacts with several states 
in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. When it comes to strate-
gic matters, however, the relationships with Japan and 
South Korea are most salient as these are the countries 
in immediate danger from the North Korean nuclear 
threat. Here, Washington’s goals are to assure Japan 
and South Korea that their security is adequately 
provided for through their alliance with the United 
States and also to dissuade these states from develop-
ing independent nuclear capabilities. This policy con-
tributes to regional stability because if it were not for 
U.S. security guarantees, these states would likely take 
unilateral steps to defend themselves, including possi-
bly building nuclear weapons, which could destabilize 
the region and provoke a regional arms race. 
To contribute to this reassurance goal, Washington 
maintains large military bases in Japan and South 
Korea. Further, as mentioned above, the United 
States deploys theater and homeland missile de-
fenses. In addition, it extends its strategic nuclear 
umbrella over the heads of its Asian allies. Unlike 
in Europe, where the United States maintains for-
ward-deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons, Wash-
ington long ago removed nuclear weapons from the 
territory of its Asian allies. Moreover, it cancelled 
its sea-based nuclear cruise missile program, which 
previously played a role in defense of those allies. 
The United States does, however, maintain U.S.-
based “deployable,” nuclear weapons that could be 
brought forward in a crisis on tactical fighter-bomb-
ers and heavy bombers. To increase the credibility 
of these forces, the United States takes a number of 
additional steps, such as using the forces to signal 
during crises and conducting joint exercises and 
strategic dialogues with allies. Finally, Washington 
actively works to dissuade allied nuclear prolifera-
49  Farnaz Fassihi, “U.S., China Agree to Sanction North Korea on Nuclear Program,” The Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2016.
50  Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Tells China Not to Intervene in Missile-Defense System Talks,” The New York Times, February 24, 2016.
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tion. This includes discouraging South Korea from 
developing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities 
for peaceful purposes.
With regard to China, the United States continues to 
seek a stable strategic relationship. While there are se-
rious concerns in Washington about the increasingly 
competitive nature of many aspects of Sino-U.S. in-
teractions, Washington’s overriding objective remains 
the maintenance of strategic deterrence and stability. 
The United States understands that China will take 
whatever steps necessary to maintain an assured re-
taliatory capability and Washington does not believe 
that U.S. programs, current or planned, would pose 
a threat to China’s nuclear deterrent. 
Washington does see potential dangers, however, as 
China expands and modernizes its nuclear arsenal. If 
Beijing were to greatly increase its strategic capabili-
ties, narrowing the gap, or even achieving parity with 
Washington, America’s allies in Asia might question 
the credibility of America’s extended nuclear deter-
rent. The United States, therefore, must also seek to 
maintain a quantitative and/or qualitative edge over 
China. The only stable strategic equilibrium going 
forward, therefore, may be one in which China pos-
sesses a secure, second-strike capability (and Wash-
ington does not seek to undermine that capability) 
while the United States maintains a quantitative nu-
clear advantage (that China does not contest).51 
Unlike in East Asia, the United States lacks formal 
allies and potential competitors in South Asia, but 
it does have strategic interests in the region. India 
and Pakistan, while not formal allies, are both 
friends of the United States. Washington does not 
feel threatened by these countries or their strategic 
capabilities. At the same time, Washington is con-
cerned about the strategic competition playing out 
between these two nations and wants to help prevent 
these South Asian powers from engaging in military 
conflict, especially one that could escalate to a nu-
clear exchange. In past crises, the United States has 
intervened diplomatically in an attempt to prevent 
disputes between these two powers from escalating 
and it is likely that Washington would act similarly 
in the future. 
In addition, the United States is also concerned 
about what appears to be a growing nuclear arms 
race in the subcontinent and would like to encour-
age strategic restraint, consistent with the credible 
minimum deterrent capabilities that the two coun-
tries espouse. Washington’s best means for facil-
itating restraint may be by encouraging high-level 
dialogue on these issues, including the adoption of 
additional confidence-building measures in the con-
ventional and nuclear areas.
South Asia also presents another set of strategic chal-
lenges for the United States. As stated above, Wash-
ington wants to prevent nuclear terrorism and it 
also fears possible “loose nukes” scenarios. Pakistani 
scientist A.Q. Khan transferred sensitive nuclear 
technology to other countries in the past, and the 
United States wants to ensure strong nuclear export 
controls to prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear 
technology to state or non-state actors in the future. 
In addition, the United States fears nuclear terror-
ism. Given that violent non-state groups operate in 
the region, Washington encourages adherence to the 
highest standards of nuclear security. 
Conclusion
In sum, America’s security environment has deterio-
rated in recent years and there has been some discus-
sion about strengthening U.S. and NATO nuclear 
posture to deal with the renewed Russian threat. At 
the broadest levels, however, U.S. strategic doctrine 
remains largely unchanged. As it applies to Asia, the 
United States seeks to: defend against and roll back 
North Korea’s nuclear capability; assure regional 
allies; maintain and strengthen strategic stability 
with China; and prevent conflict and encourage 
strategic restraint in South Asia. 
51  For more on this argument, see James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
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Annex E. Backgrounder: Nuclear 
Forces of China, India, Pakistan, 
and the United States
The following background material was prepared by 
James Tyson, Strategic Chain Project Coordinator, 
Brookings Institution, based on open sources. 
China’s Nuclear Forces
The following provides an overview of the size, force 
structure, and modernization plans for China’s nu-
clear forces. It also includes an account of nucle-
ar-related capabilities, including missile defense, 
space programs, and cyber capabilities.
Size of the force
China’s nuclear forces, though small, are growing 
in number and variety. It is estimated that China 
possesses approximately 260 nuclear warheads—an 
increase of 10 warheads from 201352—which can be 
delivered via land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, 
and nuclear powered submarines. Unlike the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal, which is divided among branches of 
the military, China’s entire nuclear triad is report-
edly under the control of the People’s Liberation 
Army Rocket Force (PLARF)—formerly the Second 
Artillery.53
China fields a range of Dongfeng (DF)-series 
land-based ballistic missiles, which make up ap-
proximately two-thirds of its total arsenal. Of the 
DF-series missiles, only the DF-5 can carry more 
than one warhead, via a multiple independent-
ly-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV).54 It’s estimated 
that weight constraints prevent this new missile, 
the DF-5B, from carrying more than two or three 
warheads.55 China’s long range and intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles, the DF-4, DF-5 and DF-31, 
have ranges of 5,500 km to 13,000-plus km.56 Its 
intermediate-range ballistic missile, the DF-3A, has 
a range of 3,000 km and its DF-15 and DF-21 short 
and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) have 
ranges of 600 km and 2,150 km, respectively. In-
formation on the locations of China’s nuclear mis-
siles is scarce. An estimated 44 of China’s long-range 
missiles, which can carry a total of 64 warheads, are 
capable of reaching the continental United States.57
Until recently, China possessed only a nuclear dyad 
of ICBMs and nuclear-capable aircraft. But, in 
December 2015, U.S. military officials reportedly 
confirmed that the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) had deployed a nuclear ballistic missile sub-
marine on a deterrent patrol.58 Following the patrol 
by the Type-094 Jin-class SSBN, China is now 
judged to possess an operational at-sea second-strike 
capability.59 By 2015 China had three Jin-class 
submarines, each of which can carry 12 subma-
rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and may 
field a total of five to eight by 2020.55, 56 China pos-
sesses two types of SLBMs, the JL-1 and JL-2, with 
ranges of 1,000-plus km and 7,000-plus km, respec-
tively. The JL-1 was designed for China’s Type-092 
Xia-class submarine, which is not considered opera-
52  Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2013, p. 80, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/6/79.full.
pdf+html. 
53  Shannon Tiezzi, “The New Military Force in Charge of China’s Nuclear Weapons,” The Diplomat, January 5, 2016, http://thediplomat.
com/2016/01/the-new-military-force-in-charge-of-chinas-nuclear-weapons/. 
54  Hans Kristensen, “Pentagon Report: China Deploys MIRV Missile,” Federation of American Scientists, May 11, 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/
security/2015/05/china-mirv/.
55  David Wright, “China and MIRVed Warheads,” Union of Concerned Scientists, May 20, 2015, http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/china-and-
mirved-warheads? 
56  Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, p. 78, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf+html. 
57 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 80.
58  Benjamin D. Baker, “China Deploys First Nuclear Deterrence Patrol,” The Diplomat, December 19, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-
deploys-first-nuclear-deterrence-patrol/. 
59  Bill Gertz, “China conducts JL-2 sub missile test,” Washington Times, February 18, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/18/
inside-the-ring-china-tests-nuclear-missile-for-su/?page=all.
60  Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “US upgrades assessment of China’s Type 094 SSBN fleet,” IHS Jane’s, April 19, 2015, https://caravantomidnight.com/u-s-
upgrades-assessment-of-chinas-type-094-ssbn-fleet/. 
61 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 81.
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tional. Hence, experts view the JL-2, which is under 
development and was tested as recently as 2015,62 as 
the PLAN’s future SLBM.
China also has two cruise missiles that may be nu-
clear-capable, the CJ-10 and CJ-20.63 The former, 
a land-attack cruise missile, has an estimated range 
of 1,500 km.64 The latter, thought to be an air-
launched cruise missile, is still under development.65 
According to U.S. estimates from 2013, these cruise 
missiles may be deployed as early as 2018.66 It is 
thought to have a range of approximately 2,200 km, 
and will likely be carried by the H-6 bomber.67
Nuclear-related capabilities
China is pursuing missile defense capabilities at vari-
ous ranges. It has purchased four to six Russian S-400 
systems, and expects to receive them by 2017.68 The 
S-400’s interceptors can engage threats at ranges of 
up to 400 km,69 including aircraft, cruise missiles, 
and short and medium-range ballistic missiles. 70
While China has not yet decided to deploy strategic 
ballistic missile defenses, it has explored BMD track-
ing and interception technologies for five decades71 
and Chinese development of BMD is ongoing.72 
State-run media has claimed several anti-ballistic 
missile tests, including in 2010, 2013, and 201473—
though some of these tests may actually have been 
anti-satellite tests.74 According to experts, China’s 
program is sufficiently mature that it does have the 
option to more aggressively pursue its own ballistic 
missile defense capability.75
China has tested anti-satellite capabilities on several 
occasions, most notably in 2007, when it destroyed 
a defunct, orbiting satellite with a missile and gen-
erated extensive space debris.76 More recently, China 
has tested its SC-19 and DN-2 missiles against sub-
orbital targets, launching from its Korla test range in 
Xinjiang Province.77 A new weapon, the DN-3, may 
be capable of intercepting targets at higher orbits.78
In June 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Defense 
seemed to acknowledge reports that it had tested a 
hypersonic missile delivery vehicle. The Ministry of 
Defense statement said that “scheduled scientific re-
search…is not targeted at any country.”79 The hyper-
sonic glide vehicle in question, designated Wu-14, is 
believed to be capable of carrying a nuclear or con-
62 Bill Gertz, “China conducts JL-2 sub missile test”.
63 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 82.
64 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 78.
65 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 83.
66 Global Security, “DH-10,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/lacm.htm. 
67 Global Security, “DH-10”.
68  Franz-Stefan Gady, “China to Receive Russia’s S-400 Missile Defense Systems in 12-18 Months,” The Diplomat, November 17, 2015, http://
thediplomat.com/2015/11/china-to-receive-russias-s-400-missile-defense-systems-in-12-18-months/.
69  Dave Majumdar, “Get Ready: Russia’s Lethal S-400 Air Defense System Is Headed to Syria,” The National Interest, November 25, 2015, http://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/payback-russias-lethal-s-400-air-defense-system-headed-syria-14446.
70  Sputnik News, “Russia’s S-400 Missile Defense System Has No Equal Globally,” November 11, 2015, http://sputniknews.com/
military/20151111/1029903504/russia-s400-missile-defense-weaponry.html.
71  Bruce MacDonald, “Chinese Strategic Missile Defense: Will It Happen, and What Would It Mean?,” Arms Control Association, November 2015, 
https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_11/Features/Chinese-Strategic-Missile-Defense-Will-It-Happen-and-What-Would-It-Mean.
72  Bruce Macdonald, “Understanding the Dragon Shield: Likelihood and Implications of Chinese Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense,” September 
2015, p3, https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DragonShieldreport_FINAL.pdf. 
73  Zachary Keck, “China Conducts Third Anti-Missile Test,” The Diplomat, July 24, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-conducts-third-
anti-missile-test/.
74  Franz-Stefan Gady,  “Revealed: China Tests Secret Missile Capable of Hitting US Satellites,” The Diplomat, November 11, 2015, http://thediplomat.
com/2015/11/revealed-china-tests-secret-missile-capable-of-hitting-us-satellites/
75  MacDonald, “Understanding the Dragon Shield,” p. 36.
76  Marc Kaufman and Dafna Linzer, “China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” The Washington Post, January 19, 2007, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html.
77  Bill Gertz, “China Tests Anti-Satellite Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, November 9, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-
tests-anti-satellite-missile/.
78  Ibid.
79  Zachary Keck, “Why America Should Fear China’s Hypersonic Nuclear Missile,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
why-america-should-fear-chinas-hypersonic-nuclear-missile-13115.
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ventional warhead. It can travel at Mach 10 and is 
reportedly highly maneuverable, making it capable 
of evading U.S. missile defenses.80 Most of its recent 
tests were deemed successful, but there is no public 
timeline for its entry into service.81
China’s cyber capabilities are extensive, and include 
offensive capabilities.82 China set up its first special-
ized cyber-focused unit in 2010, and is now work-
ing to create a central cyber warfare command.83 In 
2015, the U.S. and China began negotiations on a 
cyber arms control agreement in which both parties 
would pledge not to be the first to use cyber weap-
ons to damage each other’s critical infrastructure in 
peacetime.84
Modernization
China is reportedly developing a new road-mo-
bile ICBM, the DF-41, which may be capable of 
carrying multiple warheads.85 In one of the recent 
tests, in December 2015, a canisterized DF-41 
was reportedly launched from a rail car in western 
China. China is replacing its ICBMs, including the 
liquid-fueled, silo-based DF-5A missile, with newer, 
mobile, solid-fueled missiles, such as the DF-31A.86
China is working on a new class of SSBN, the Type-
096. This new, longer-range Tang-class submarine is 
still in the design stages,87 but some estimates in-
dicate that it may be capable of carrying up to 24 
SLBMs.88
Recent media reports in Chinese publications have 
raised the possibility of a new Chinese long-range 
bomber. Articles in Chinese media have emphasized 
China’s need for a stealthy bomber capable of pen-
etrating enemy air defenses and striking targets at 
beyond medium ranges. According to China Daily, 
the bomber would have a minimum range of 8,000 
km without refueling, and a payload of at least 10 
tons.89 This information hews closely to previously 
reported details of a Chinese subsonic long-range 
strike bomber, designated H-20.90 But a Chinese 
expert stressed that it would take time for China to 
develop a suitable airframe and engine for such an 
aircraft.91
India’s Nuclear Forces
The following provides an overview of the size, force 
structure, and modernization plans for India’s nu-
clear forces. It also includes an account of nucle-
ar-related capabilities, including missile defense, 
space programs, and cyber capabilities.
Size of the force
India’s nuclear deterrent consists of around 100-120 
warheads,92 of which approximately 56 are housed 
80 Ibid.
81  Kyle Mizokami, “China Succcessfully Tests Hypersonic Weapon System,” April 28, 2016, http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/
a20604/china-successfully-tests-hypersonic-weapon-system/.
82  Elise Viebeck, “Powerful Chinese Cyber Weapon Attacked US Coding Site,” April 10, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/238423-
powerful-chinese-cyber-weapon-attacked-us-coding-site.
83  “Central Cyber Warfare Command for PLA,” The Straits Times, October 24, 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/central-cyber-warfare-
command-for-pla. 
84  David Sanger, “U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/asia/us-and-
china-seek-arms-deal-for-cyberspace.html.
85 Hans Kristensen, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 80.
86  Nicolas Giacometti, “China’s Nuclear Modernization and the End of Nuclear Opacity,” The Diplomat, April 10, 2014, http://thediplomat.
com/2014/04/chinas-nuclear-modernization-and-the-end-of-nuclear-opacity/.
87  Has Kristensen, “Is China Planning to Build More Missile Submarines,” Federation of American Scientists, April 23, 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/
security/2015/04/china-subs/.
88  Skypek, Thomas, “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent in 2020: Four Alternative Futures for China’s SSBN Fleet,” CSIS, October 2011, p110,  
http://chinapower.csis.org/ssbn/.
89  Franz-Stefan Gady, “China Wants to Develop a New Long-Range Strategic Bomber,” The Diplomat, July 13, 2015 http://thediplomat.
com/2015/07/china-wants-to-develop-a-new-long-range-strategic-bomber/.
90  Jason Lomberg, “China Developing Subsonic Stealth Bomber,” September 24, 2014, http://www.ecnmag.com/blog/2014/09/china-developing-
subsonic-stealth-bomber.
91  “China Needs Long Range Strategic Bomber: State Media,” AFP, July 7, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/china-needs-long-range-strategic-bomber-
state-media-084622579.html.
92 Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/. 
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in land-based ballistic missiles, approximately 48 
in gravity bombs, and 14 in sea-based ballistic mis-
siles.93 India is currently expanding its arsenal at a 
rate of approximately five warheads per year.94 Its 
nuclear weapons are under the control of the Nu-
clear Command Authority95 and Strategic Forces 
Command.96
While India is developing land and sea-based97 de-
livery platforms for its nuclear weapons, its two to 
three squadrons of Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS/
IB fighter-bombers remain at the core of its nu-
clear strike force, with a range that extends deep 
into Pakistan and China.98 India’s two Mirage 2000 
squadrons, of which one is likely assigned a second-
ary nuclear strike mission, are based at Maharajpur 
Air Force Station at Gwalior. Ambala,99 Jamnagar,100 
and Gorakhpur101 air bases are home to India’s six 
squadrons of Jaguar IS/IB fighters, two of which 
may be assigned a secondary nuclear strike mis-
sion.102 India’s operational land-based ballistic mis-
siles are the short-range Prithvi-2 and Agni-1, the 
medium-range Agni-2, and the intermediate-range 
Agni-3.103 India is also developing and testing the 
longer-range Agni-4 and Agni-5. The nuclear or con-
ventionally-armed Prithvi-2 has a range of 250-350 
km.104 The road-mobile Agni-1 is also conventional 
or nuclear-capable, with a range of approximately 
700 km. The Agni-1 is thought to be oriented to-
wards Pakistan, with most launchers deployed in 
western India. The medium-range, rail-mobile 
Agni-2 has a range of approximately 2,000 km. 
Fewer than 10 launchers are stationed in northern 
India, likely targeting western, central, and southern 
China. The intermediate-range, rail-mobile Agni-3 
can deliver a nuclear warhead at ranges exceeding 
3,200 km. In 2007, an Indian army spokesman said 
that it was capable of striking Shanghai, but to do so 
the missile would have to be deployed in the extreme 
northeastern regions of India.105 
To complement its fighter-bombers and ballistic 
missiles, India is developing a sea-based nuclear 
weapons capability consisting of indigenous nucle-
ar-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 
and a ship-launched ballistic missile. Its first SSBN, 
the Arihant, embarked on sea trials in 2014, and in 
February 2016, was undergoing its final tests in the 
Bay of Bengal before entering service.106 The Arihant 
will eventually carry the K-15 submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM), which has a range of 700 
km.107 
  93  Hans Kristensen,  “Indian nuclear forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2015, p79, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/5/77.full.
pdf+html.
  94  Ashley Tellis, “China, India, And Pakistan – Growing Nuclear Capacities With No End in Sight,” Testimony for the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/25/china-india-and-pakistan-growing-
nuclear-capabilities-with-no-end-in-sight.
  95  Kerry Boyd, “India Establishes Formal Nuclear Command Structure,” Arms Control Today, January 2003, https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2003_01-02/india_janfeb03. 
  96  Rajat Pandit, “Nuke Command Set Up, Button in PM’s hand,” The Times of India, January 4, 2003, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
Nuke-command-set-up-button-in-PMs-hand/articleshow/33382162.cms?referral=PM. 
  97  “What Lurks Beneath,” The Economist, February 6, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21690107-nuclear-arms-race-sea-what-lurks-
beneath.
  98 Hans Kristensen, “Indian nuclear forces, 2015,”  p. 78.
  99  “Air Force’s Jaguar Fighter Jet Crashes in Haryana; Pilot Ejects Safely,” March 5, 2015, http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/air-forces-jaguar-fighter-
jet-crashes-near-panipat-in-haryana-pilot-ejects-safely-744490.
100  Pranjal Bhuyanl, “Jaguars Fly Out of Pune Skies for Good,” The Times of India, February 13, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/pune/
Jaguars-fly-out-of-Pune-skies-for-good/articleshow/2777887.cms.
101  Ajai Shukla, “Facing Dwindling Numbers, Jaguar Upgrade Crucial for Indian Air Force,” Business Standard, March 27, 2015 http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-policy/facing-dwindling-numbers-jaguar-upgrade-crucial-for-indian-air-force-115032700053_1.html.
102  Hans Kristensen, “Indian nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 78.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid p. 80.
106  Samuel Osborne, “INS Arihant: India Nears Completion of Nuclear Submarine ‘Slayer of Enemies’ – So What Does It Mean for the World?” The 
Independent, February 27, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/india-nears-completion-of-nuclear-submarine-named-slayer-of-
enemies-a6899881.html. 
107 Hans Kristensen, “Indian nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 81.
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Nuclear-related capabilities
India is currently working to develop missile de-
fense capabilities at various ranges.108 New Delhi is 
negotiating purchase of the Russian S-400 air de-
fense system, which is capable of intercepting short 
and medium-range ballistic missiles, and cruise mis-
siles.109 India’s Defense Research and Development 
Organization (DRDO) has also recently begun to 
test indigenous endo and exo-atmospheric missile 
defense systems—designated Advanced Air Defense 
(AAD)110 and Prithvi Air Defense (PAD),111 respec-
tively. Experts estimate that a mature Indian BMD 
system is still at least a decade away.112
In 2012, DRDO chief V. K. Saraswat raised the 
possibility of Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) programs, 
which might incorporate the Agni-V.113 But other 
Indian defense scientists have stressed that such ca-
pabilities are only in the discussion phase.114
Modernization plans
India is in the midst of upgrading and extending the 
service life of its Mirage and Jaguar fighter-bomb-
ers.115 The Jaguar IS/IB upgrade program will likely 
be delayed beyond its original 2017-2018 dead-
line.116 India may also be searching for a new fight-
er-bomber to replace its aging fleet, and has officially 
confirmed the purchase of 36 Rafale aircraft from 
France to take up that role.117 
DRDO is currently developing the rail-mobile 
Agni-4 and Agni-5 missiles,118 which are intended for 
maximum ranges of 3,500-plus km and 5,000 km, 
respectively, and will be capable of striking China 
from more central deployment locations in India. The 
Agni-4 underwent a successful test launch in Novem-
ber 2015 and will undergo several additional induc-
tion tests before it enters service in the next two to 
three years.119 The Agni-5 was successfully launched 
from a canister in January 2015, and will reportedly 
be deployed after another two to three successful tests. 
According to an unnamed DRDO scientist, once the 
Agni-5 is operational, India may focus on developing 
multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles 
and more maneuverable warheads.120
In addition to the Arihant, India is currently build-
ing another ballistic missile submarine, the Aridha-
man,121 and plans to have four SSBNs in service 
by 2020.122 India is also developing a new SLBM 
108  Ankit Panda, “India Tests Supersonic Advanced Air Defense Missile,” The Diplomat, November 23, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/india-
tests-supersonic-advanced-air-defense-missile/.
109  Aditya Bhat, “India, Russia Negotiating Sale of S-400 Missiles to India: Russian Envoy,” International Business Times, February 12, 2016, http://
www.ibtimes.co.in/india-russia-negotiating-sale-s-400-missiles-india-russian-envoy-666728.
110  Ankit Panda, “India Tests Supersonic Advanced Air Defense Missile,” The Diplomat, November 23, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/india-
tests-supersonic-advanced-air-defense-missile/.
111  Hemant Kumar Rout, “Prithvi Defense Vehicle Fails to Intercept,” The New Indian Express, May 15, 2014, http://www.newindianexpress.com/
states/odisha/Prithvi-Defense-Vehicle-Fails-to-Intercept/2014/05/15/article2225945.ece.
112  Sushant Singh, “Interceptor Missile Tested 7 Times, DRDO’s Rajinikanth Moment Still Far,” The Indian Express, May 4, 2015, http://
indianexpress.com/article/explained/interceptor-missile-tested-7-times-drdos-rajinikanth-moment-still-far/. 
113  Rajat Pandit, “After Agni-V Launch, DRDO’s New Target is Anti-Satellite Weapons,” The Times of India, April 21, 2012, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/After-Agni-V-launch-DRDOs-new-target-is-anti-satellite-weapons/articleshow/12763074.cms.
114 Ibid.
115  Rajat Pandit, “Amid Stalled Fighter Projects, Upgraded Mirage Cheers IAF,” The Times of India, March 23, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/india/Amid-stalled-fighter-projects-upgraded-Mirage-cheers-IAF/articleshow/46657297.cms. 
116  Hans Kristensen, “Indian nuclear forces, 2015,” p.78.
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118  “India Successfully Test Fires Agni-V,” Ministry of Defense, January 20, 2014, http://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/English/dpi/press_release/Agni-4-21012014.pdf.
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121  Ankit Panda “India’s Next Warships and Submarines Will Have to be Built at Home,” The Diplomat, May 3, 2015, http://thediplomat.
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to succeed the K-15. Designated K-4, the new mis-
sile is currently undergoing initial testing and is in-
tended to have a range of 3,000-plus km.123
India is also developing a subsonic nuclear-capable 
cruise missile, the Nirbhay, with a range of 1,000 
km and designed for launch from land, air, or sea. 
In October 2015, the missile failed a flight test—its 
second failure in three attempts.124
Though it conducts offensive and defensive cyber 
operations,125 India lacks an integrated cyber com-
mand. The Modi government has prioritized cre-
ating such a body,126 which would oversee cyber 
offense and defense.127
Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces
The following provides an overview of the size, force 
structure, and modernization plans for Pakistan’s 
nuclear forces. It also includes an account of nucle-
ar-related capabilities, including missile defense and 
cyber capabilities.
Size of the force
Pakistan’s arsenal stands at 110 to 130 warheads.128 
Based on Pakistan’s production of fissile material, 
some experts have estimated that Pakistan may be 
building 20 nuclear warheads per year.129 Pakistan’s 
nuclear arsenal is under the control of the National 
Command Authority (NCA), with policies opera-
tionalized by the Strategic Plans Division.130
Pakistan has a relatively small number of nucle-
ar-capable delivery vehicles—many of which are du-
al-capable, and may thus be assigned conventional 
missions.131
Land-based ballistic missiles—six specific variants—
are the backbone of Pakistan’s nuclear forces, account-
ing for approximately 86 of its deployed warheads.132 
Its shortest range missile, the Hatf-9, has a range of 
just 60 km, and is apparently intended for battle-
field use.133 The solid-fueled and road-mobile Hatf-2, 
Hatf-3, and Hatf-4 short-range ballistic missiles have 
maximum ranges of 180 km, 290 kim, and 750 km, 
respectively.134 Pakistan also possesses medium-range 
ballistic missiles, the road-mobile, liquid-fueled 
Hatf-5 and the solid-fueled Hatf-6, with ranges of 
1,250 km and 1,500 km, respectively.135
Pakistan’s nuclear-capable aircraft include its F-16 
A/B fighter-bombers, and possibly its Mirage III 
and Mirage Vs.136 The F-16 A/Bs, purchased from 
the United States in the 1980s, are based at Mushaf 
Air Base, northwest of Lahore. The aircraft have 
a range of 1,600 km without drop tanks, and are 
most likely capable of carrying one nuclear gravity 
123  T.S. Subramanian, “Success on Debut for Undersea Launch of Missile,” The Hindu, May 8, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
success-on-debut-for-undersea-launch-of-missile/article5986757.ece. 
124  Rajat Pandit, “Nuclear-Capable Nirbhay Missile Bites the Dust for Second Time,” The Times of India, October 16, 2015, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/Nuclear-capable-Nirbhay-missile-bites-the-dust-for-second-time/articleshow/49417726.cms. 
125  Damian Paletta, Danny Yadron and Jennifer Valentino-Devries, “Cyberwar Ignites a New Arms Race,” The Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cyberwar-ignites-a-new-arms-race-1444611128.
126  Rajat Panditl, “Govt gets cracking on three new tri-Service commands,” The Times of India, August 20, 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/Govt-gets-cracking-on-three-new-tri-Service-commands/articleshow/48550424.cms.
127  Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Still Unsure on Need for Cyber Command,” DefenseNews, December 10, 2014, http://www.defensenews.com/story/
defense/international/asia-pacific/2014/12/10/india-still-unsure-on-need-for-cyber-command/20211759/.
128  Hans Kristensen,  “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2015, p. 67, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/
early/2015/10/06/0096340215611090.full.pdf+html.
129  Tim Craig, “Report: Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal Could Become the World’s Third-Biggest,” The Washington Post, August 27, 2015, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/report-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-could-become-the-worlds-third-biggest/2015/08/26/6098478a-4c0c-
11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4_story.html.
130  Robert Sherman, “National Command Authority,” Federation of the American Scientists, March 19, 2000, http://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/
agency/nca.htm.
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bomb each.137 The Mirage III and Mirage V aircraft 
may also be equipped to carry nuclear bombs, and 
a Mirage fighter was used to test the Hatf-8 nucle-
ar-capable air-launched cruise missile as recently as 
January 2016.138
Nuclear-related capabilities
Pakistan’s missile defense capability is currently lim-
ited to the FM-90 short-range air defense system, 
which it purchased from China, where it is desig-
nated HQ-7B. The system is an upgraded version of 
the HQ-7, which is, in turn, a copy of the French 
Crotale surface-to-air missile.139 Pakistani media re-
ports that the FM-90 is intended to engage cruise 
missiles, drones, air-to-ground missiles, and air-
craft140 at limited ranges.141 
In 2015, Pakistan reportedly began negotiating with 
China over purchasing Chinese HQ-9 and HQ-16 
missile defense systems.142 The HQ-9 is a long-
range, high-altitude surface-to-air missile system 
which is similar to the Russian S-300 system, and 
is designed to counter aircraft, cruise missiles, air-
to-ground missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles.143 
The HQ-16 is a medium-range surface-to-air missile 
defense system that is similar to Russia’s SA-11 or 
SA-17. 
Occasional reports have noted an extant Pakistani 
offensive cyber capability,144 but government state-
ments have focused on cybersecurity and developing 
norms of behavior in cyberspace for Pakistan and 
its neighbors. In 2013, Pakistan’s Senate Defense 
Committee proposed a seven-point plan to promote 
cybersecurity, which included establishing a cyber-
security task force, a national computer emergency 
response team, and an Inter-Services Cyber Com-
mand, which would coordinate “cyber security and 
cyber defense for the Pakistan Armed Forces.”145
Modernization
Pakistan is currently developing two additional nu-
clear-capable ballistic missiles—the short-range Sha-
heen-1A, and the medium-range Shaheen-3.146 The 
former is intended to have a range of approximately 
900 km, and the latter a range of 2,750 km. Both 
missiles were tested in December 2015, with posi-
tive results.147, 148 When operational, the Shaheen-3 
would be capable of targeting strategic locations 
throughout India.149
Pakistan is developing two nuclear-capable cruise 
missiles—the ground-launched Hatf-7, and the air-
launched Hatf-8. The Pakistani government claims 
that both have stealth and “terrain-hugging” capabil-
ities, as well as high accuracy and maneuverability.150
137  Ibid p. 4.
138  Mateen Haider, “Pakistan Successfully Tests Ra’ad Cruise Missile: ISPR,” Dawn, January 19, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/news/1234015.
139  “Pakistan Inducts Chinese SHORAD Missile Systems” Defense Update, May 11, 2015, http://defense-update.com/20150511_pakistan-inducts-
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140  Ibid.
141  Carlo Kopp and Martin Andrew, “Self Propelled Air Defense Systems,” Air Power Australia, September 2010, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-
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144  “Hackathon of Another Kind: A ‘Cyber War’ Between India and Pakistan,” Business Standard, September 28, 2015, http://www.business-standard.
com/article/current-affairs/hackathon-of-another-kind-a-cyber-war-between-india-and-pakistan-115092800835_1.html 
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149  Hans Kristensen, “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 6.
150 Ibid.
Th e ST raT eg i c ch a i n:  Linking Pakistan,  India,  China,  and the United States 
FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS   •   ar m S co n T ro l a n d no n-Pro l i f e raT i o n Se r i eS
55
The status of the Hatf-7 is unclear, as it was last 
tested in 2012.151 As noted above, the most recent 
test of the Hatf-8, in January 2016, was a success.152 
The Pakistan Air Force is upgrading its Mirage air-
craft with aerial refueling equipment, which would 
extend their range.153 In addition, Pakistan plans to 
use the JF-17 fighter, a joint Pakistan-China proj-
ect, to replace its aging nuclear-capable Mirage IIIs 
and Mirage Vs.154 Though the new aircraft will be 
equipped to deliver the Hatf-8 nuclear-capable air-
launched cruise missile, Pakistani experts have in-
dicated that there is uncertainty as to whether the 
JF-17 will have a nuclear strike role.
Reported efforts by Pakistan to pursue a subma-
rine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability 
are still in the early stages, though in 2012 Pakistan 
established a Naval Strategic Forces Command for 
deployment and management of a sea-based de-
terrent force.155 Islamabad recently finalized a deal 
to purchase eight submarines from Beijing, four 
of which will be produced in Pakistan, and four in 
China.156 Production could begin as early as 2016, 
but experts are still divided as to whether Pakistan’s 
warhead technology would allow deployment of 
nuclear weapons on sea-launched weapons.157 If Pa-
kistan does eventually deploy a nuclear-armed sub-
marine, a likely candidate for its armament is the 
Chinese CJ-10K nuclear-capable land attack cruise 
missile, which has a range of 1,500 km.158 Pakistan 
is also reportedly likely to create a sea-launched ver-
sion of the Hatf-7 cruise missile,159 which could be 
launched from a ship or submarine.160
U.S. Nuclear Forces 
The following provides an overview of the size, force 
structure, and modernization plans for U.S. nuclear 
forces. It also includes an account of nuclear-re-
lated capabilities, including missile defense, preci-
sion-guided conventional strike, space programs, 
and cyber capabilities.
Size of the force
As of March 2016, the U.S. nuclear stockpile consists 
of approximately 4,670 warheads. This number in-
cludes approximately 1,750 deployed strategic war-
heads (the New START deployed warhead number 
is lower, because deployed bombers are counted as 
only one warhead). The arsenal also includes 180 
deployed nonstrategic warheads, and 2,740 reserve 
warheads.161 The U.S. arsenal is under the control 
of the United States Strategic Command, while the 
actual weapons and warheads are held by U.S. Air 
Force and the U.S. Navy.
The U.S. “triad” of nuclear delivery systems is com-
prised of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), Trident II (D-5) ballistic missiles 
housed on Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs), and nuclear cruise missiles and gravity 
bombs carried by B-2 and B-52 nuclear-capable 
heavy bombers.162 The approximately 450 ICBMs, 
151  Salman Masood, “Pakistan Says it Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile,” The New York Times, June 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/world/
asia/pakistan-says-it-tested-nuclear-capable-missile.html
152  “Pakistan Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Babur Missile with 700km Range,” The Times of India, September 17, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/world/pakistan/Pakistan-test-fires-nuclear-capable-Babur-missile-with-700-km-range/articleshow/16432147.cms
153  Hans Kristensen, “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 4.
154  Dave Majumdar, “A ‘Crash Landing’: The Slow and Painful Death of India’s Air Force,” The National Interest, October 22, 2015, http://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/crash-landing-the-slow-painful-death-indias-air-force-14149.
155  Hans Kristensen, “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 9.
156  Usman Ansari, “Pakistan, China Finalize 8-Sub Construction Plan,” Defense News, October 11, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/
naval/submarines/2015/10/11/pakistan-china-finalize-8-sub-construction-plan/73634218/.
157  Franz Stefan-Gady, “Does Pakistan Have a Sea-Based Second-Strike Capability?” The Diplomat, March 13, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/
does-pakistan-have-a-sea-based-second-strike-capability/.
158 Ibid.
159  Usman Ansari, “Pakistan, China Finalize 8-Sub Construction Plan,” Defense News, October 11, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/
naval/submarines/2015/10/11/pakistan-china-finalize-8-sub-construction-plan/73634218/.
160 CSIS Missile Threat, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan.
161  Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/
status-world-nuclear-forces/.
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housed in silos in Montana, North Dakota, and Wy-
oming, are each armed with a single warhead.163 The 
U.S. maintains 14 SSBNs, eight in the Pacific and 
six in the Atlantic,164 12 of which are operational at 
any given time.165 Each could originally carry 24 Tri-
dent II missiles; under New START, the U.S. Navy 
is deactivating four missile tubes on each submarine. 
The submarines carry a total of approximately 1,000 
warheads. U.S. nuclear-capable bombers (20 B-2 
bombers and 76 B-52 bombers, are assigned approx-
imately 500 warheads)166 are based domestically. The 
around 180 U.S. non-strategic B61 gravity bombs 
are based at six installations in five European coun-
tries, but remain under the control of U.S. person-
nel.167 U.S., Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and 
possibly Turkish air forces are tasked with nuclear 
strike missions using those weapons.168
With 12 available SSBNs, the Navy maintains “con-
tinuous at-sea deterrence” with four to five sub-
marines on station at any given time.169 Over 60 
percent of SSBN deterrent patrols occur in the Pa-
cific.170 Currently, each SSBN conducts two or three 
deterrent patrols each year, for a total of around 30 
patrols. This is a decline of more than 50 percent 
from 1999, when SSBNs conducted 64 patrols.171
In recent years, the U.S. has chosen Andersen Air 
Force Base in Guam for a “continuous bomber 
presence” program that includes B-1,172 B-2,173 and 
B-52174 bombers. Unlike the B-2 and B-52, the B-1 
can carry out only conventional missions.175
Modernization plans
The U.S. is in the early stages of a 25-year nuclear 
forces modernization program that experts estimate 
will cost over $700 billion. 
Minuteman III ICBMs, which have been in service 
since 1970, have been receiving upgrades to their 
propellant, propulsion system, and reentry vehicle 
and are expected to remain deployed until 2030. 
A follow-on missile is slated to be developed at an 
estimated cost of $62 billion, for deployment in 
2030, and would be operationally deployed through 
2070.176 There is a small possibility that cost con-
siderations would lead the U.S. Air Force to again 
extend the life of the Minuteman III, which an Air 
Force-funded RAND study said was a considerably 
cheaper option.177
The SSBN(X) program is intended to replace the 
Ohio-class SSBNs, with the first boat entering ser-
vice in 2031. The estimated lifecycle cost of the pro-
162  Amy Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments and Issues,” September 27, 2016, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
RL33640.pdf.
163  Eryn Macdonald, “The End of MIRVs for U.S. ICBMs,” June 27, 2014, http://allthingsnuclear.org/emacdonald/the-end-of-mirvs-for-u-s-icbms. 
164  Department of the Navy, “Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines –SSBN,” http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4100&tid=200&ct=4. 
165  Hans Kristensen, “U.S. nuclear forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2015, p. 113, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.full.
pdf+html.
166  Amy Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments and Issues,” September 27, 2016, pg.8, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
RL33640.pdf. 
167  Hans Kristensen, “U.S. nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 116.
168  Amy Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” CRS, February 23, 2015, p18, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf.
169  Amy Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” November 3, 2015, p26 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/
RL33640.pdf.
170 Hans Kristensen, “U.S. nuclear forces, 2015,” p. 114.
171 Hans Kristensen, “Declining Deterrent Patrols Indicate Too Many SSBNs,” April 30, 2013, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2013/04/ssbnpatrols/. 
172  William Cole, “Fighter Jets Will Be Sent to Guam as Russia Gets Provocative,” January 12, 2016, http://www.military.com/daily-
news/2016/01/12/fighter-jets-will-be-sent-guam-russia-gets-provocative.html. 
173  Bill Gertz, “U.S. Deploys Three B-2 Bombers to Guam Amid Korea Tensions,” The Washington Free Beacon, August 25, 2015, http://freebeacon.
com/national-security/u-s-deploys-three-b-2-bombers-to-guam-amid-korea-tensions/. 
174  Luis Martinez, “U.S. B-52 Flyover of South Korea in Response to North Korean Nuclear Test,” ABC News, January 9, 2016, http://abcnews.
go.com/International/us-52-flyover-south-korea-response-north-korean/story?id=36192658. 
175 “B-1B Lancer Long-Range Strategic Bomber, United States of America,” http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/b-1b/.
176  Kingston Reif, “U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs,” December 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization.
177  Stephen Young, “The End of the New ICBM,” Defense One, February 18, 2014, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/02/end-new-
icbm/78986/.
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gram is $347 billion for a total of 12 boats.178 Twelve 
new SSBNs will replace 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, be-
cause the new SSBNs will have a reactor that does 
not require a lengthy refueling process. The Navy is 
currently working to upgrade its Trident II D5 mis-
siles, which are expected to last until 2042.
The new LRS-B/B-21 bomber program will replace 
the B-1 and B-52 bombers, at an estimated cost of 
$41.7 billion through 2024. Planned upgrades to 
the strategic bomber force will also include modern-
ization of the B61 gravity bomb for the B-2. The 
B61 will become the sole strategic or tactical grav-
ity bomb in the U.S. arsenal. The Pentagon is also 
developing a Long-Range Standoff Cruise Missile 
(LRSO) for the B-52, and possibly the Long Range 
Strike Bomber (LRS-B).179
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, once deployed in 
Asia, are no longer stationed in the region. The U.S. 
unilaterally removed the last of its nuclear artillery 
shells and B61 bombs from Korea in 1991.180 The 
TLAM-N nuclear cruise missile, once deployed on 
Navy surface ships and attack submarines, was re-
moved to storage in the early 1990s, and the war-
heads were retired in 2013, meaning that the Navy 
no longer possesses a sea-based tactical nuclear 
weapon.181 The United States is in the midst of a 
12-year, $8 billion program to extend the life of its 
B61 nuclear gravity bombs by consolidating existing 
B61 types into a new variant, the B61-12.182 U.S. 
officials have emphasized the importance of retain-
ing the ability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons 
to fulfill obligations to NATO and in the case of 
“regional contingencies.”183 
Nuclear-related capabilities
U.S. missile defenses currently consist of a ground-
based midcourse defense element deployed in Alaska 
and California, which was designed to defend against 
a limited ballistic missile attack by Iran or North 
Korea, and theater defense systems such as Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the Aegis 
BMD system, and the Patriot PAC-3, which are in-
tended to counter short to intermediate-range bal-
listic missiles. 
Japan and Taiwan already possess PAC-3 missile 
defense batteries, and South Korea has recently 
contracted Lockheed Martin to supply PAC-3 inter-
ceptors and launchers for its air and missile defense 
forces.184 Washington and Seoul recently announced 
formalization of talks regarding deployment of 
THAAD on South Korean territory.185 Japan186 is 
reportedly also considering purchasing THAAD 
systems, and is seeking to acquire the Aegis Ashore 
BMD system for deployment on its territory.187
According to official documents and statements, the 
U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) 
could be used to destroy or disable an adversary’s 
anti-satellite capabilities or for defense suppression, 
such as countering anti-access/area-denial capabili-
ties. 
178 Kingston Reif, “U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs,” December 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization. 
179 Kingston Reif, “U.S. Nuclear Modernization Programs,” December 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/USNuclearModernization. 
180  Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.- North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” October 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
dprkchron. 
181  Hans Kristensen, “US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” March 18, 2013 https://fas.org/blogs/
security/2013/03/tomahawk/. 
182 “B61,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b61.htm.
183 Amy Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” p16.
184  Jen Judson, “On Heels of Successful Tests, Lockheed Wins $1 Billion in PAC-3 Sales,” Defense News, December 14, 2015, http://www.
defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/12/14/heels-successful-tests-lockheed-wins-1-billion-pac-3-sales/77319320/. 
185  Anna Fifield, “South Korea, U.S., To Start Talks on Anti-Missile System,” The Washington Post, February 7, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/south-korea-united-states-to-start-talks-on-thaad-anti-missile-system/2016/02/07/1eaf2df8-9dc4-45e3-8ff1-d76a25673dbe_story.html. 
186  Andy Sharp, “Japan Mulls Thaad Missile Defense System Amid North Korea Threat,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2015-11-24/japan-mulls-thaad-missile-defense-system-amid-north-korea-threat. 
187  Megan Eckstein, “House Paves the Way for Japan to Buy Aegis Ashore; Adds Anti-Air Warfare to European Sites,” USNI News, May 18, 2015, 
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The United States is also developing space capabil-
ities, including systems that could potentially have 
anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. The current van-
guard is the Aegis BMD system and its SM-3 Block 
IIA interceptor, jointly developed by the United 
States and Japan. The missile was successfully flight-
tested in 2015 and is on track for deployment on sea 
and land in 2018. It is intended to defeat medium 
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,188 but it is 
also estimated that the SM-3 Block IIA will offer a 
robust, if latent, ASAT capability.189
The U.S. is also pursuing cyber weapons that are 
intended for deterrent effect. National Security 
Agency Director Admiral Mike Rogers has said 
that policymakers have reached a general consensus 
about defensive use of those weapons, and are now 
at a “tipping point” regarding deployment of cyber 
capabilities for “broader” applications.190 Agreement 
on offensive use of cyber weapons has proven more 
elusive, but the U.S. is developing such weapons.191 
While American offensive cyber war capabilities 
are not discussed publically, U.S. officials have ac-
knowledged that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has not 
been adequately assessed for vulnerability to cyber-
attack.192
188 Raytheon, “SM-3 Interceptor,” http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/sm-3/.
189 Laura Grego, “Aegis as ASAT,” April 26, 2012, http://allthingsnuclear.org/lgrego/aegis-as-asat. 
190  Damian Paletta, “NSA Chief Says U.S. at ‘Tipping Point’ on Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/nsa-chief-says-u-s-at-tipping-point-on-cyberweapons-1453404976. 
191  Danny Vinik, “America’s Secret Arsenal,” POLITICO, December 9, 2015, http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-
cyber-offense-strategy-000331. 
192  Samantha Pitz, “Cyber Vulnerabilities of Nuclear Weapons Are a Real National Security Threat,” June 30, 2015, http://nukesofhazardblog.com/
cyber-vulnerabilities-of-nuclear-weapons-are-a-real-national-security-threat/. 
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Annex F. Backgrounder: Existing 
Measures to Promote Stability in 
the “Strategic Chain”
Prepared by James Tyson, Strategic Chain Project 
Coordinator, Brookings Institution
The countries of the “Strategic Chain” have un-dertaken some measures to promote strategic 
stability and reduce strategic uncertainty. These in-
clude declarations, memorandums of understanding 
(MOUs), confidence- and security-building mea-
sures (CSBMs), and strategic dialogues. In addition, 
they are also signatories to several international agree-
ments and arrangements that contribute to strategic 
stability. The following paper provides a brief sum-
mary of those measures—multilateral, bilateral, and 
unilateral, as well as informal and formal—which are 
relevant to the “Strategic Chain.” It also provides a 
brief overview of the policies of the countries regard-
ing the potential use of nuclear weapons.
Multilateral Measures
Proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) 
China, India, Pakistan, and the United States have 
all indicated that they support a treaty limiting fis-
sile materials. The U.S., India, and China support a 
treaty that would ban new production of fissile ma-
terial for nuclear weapons, but not existing stocks of 
material. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the Con-
ference on Disarmament Zamir Akram said in 2014 
that while Pakistan does not oppose negotiating a 
treaty on fissile material it does not support “nego-
tiating a treaty that only aims at a cut-off in future 
production of fissile material, without addressing ex-
isting stockpiles,” and has been unprepared to allow 
consensus discussions on such a treaty.193 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
China and the U.S. signed the CTBT in 1996, but 
neither has ratified the treaty.194 The U.S. announced 
a unilateral moratorium on testing in 1992, just after 
its last nuclear test.195 China tested a nuclear device 
in July 1996, and declared a unilateral moratorium 
on testing immediately afterwards.196 India and Pa-
kistan have not signed the CTBT, but they declared 
and have maintained unilateral moratoria on testing 
since their last tests in May 1998.197
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Of the four countries the U.S. is a founder member 
of the MTCR, having helped establish it in 1987. In 
1992, China committed itself to abiding by MTCR 
guidelines.198 It applied for membership in 2004, 
but there is no consensus on allowing China to join. 
India voluntarily agreed to follow MTCR guidelines 
in 2008 and applied for full membership in 2015. 
After winning consensus of all MTCR members 
India formally joined the regime in June 2016.199
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The U.S. is a founding member of the NSG since 
1975, and China joined in 2004. India has expressed 
interest in joining the NSG since 2005, but has not 
been admitted. Pakistan also subsequently expressed 
193  “Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram,” Pakistan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, June 4, 2014, p. 2, http://fissilematerials.org/
library/pk14a.pdf. 
194  “The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers,” Arms Control Association, March 2015, https://www.armscontrol.
org/factsheets/ctbtsig. 
195  “Not Going Back: 20 Years Since the Last U.S. Nuclear Test,” The Arms Control Association, September 20, 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org/
issuebriefs/No-Going-Back-20-Years-Since-the-Last-US-Nuclear-Test%20; “Nuclear Disarmament United States,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 
18, 2015, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/united-states-nuclear-disarmament/. 
196  Seth Faison, “China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium,” The New York Times, July 30, 1996, http://www.nytimes.
com/1996/07/30/world/china-sets-off-nuclear-test-then-announces-moratorium.html. 
197  “Pakistan Announces Testing Moratorium, Seeks Talks With India,” Tribune News Services, June 12, 1998, http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/1998-06-12/news/9806120113_1_nuclear-escalation-india-and-pakistan-test-ban. 
198  Jack Mendelsohn, David Grahame, “Arms Control Chronology,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Winter 2002, p. 67, http://
carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/acc.pdf.
199  Kallol Bhattacherjee, “India Joins Missile Technology Control Regime. Top 5 Things to Know”, The Hindu, 27 June 2016, http://www.thehindu.
com/news/national/%E2%80%8BIndia-joins-Missile-Technology-Control-Regime.-Top-5-things-to-know/article14405165.ece and Kelsey 
Davenport, “India Joins Ballistic Missile Initiative”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_07/News/
India-Joins-Ballistic-Missile-Initiatives.
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interest in joining the NSG.200 
Other Multilateral Agreements
China, India, Pakistan and the U.S. are also signato-
ries to several other international agreements related 
to weapons of mass destruction. The status of their 
memberships is listed in the table below. 
Bilateral Measures
China-India
Border Defense Cooperation Agreement: Signed in 
October 2013, it aims to establish “mutual secu-
rity” through pledges by each side not to use or 
threaten to use force against the other;201 includes 
mechanisms for information sharing, joint disaster 
relief efforts, conflict resolution, and high-level mil-
itary-to-military contact.
Annual Defense Dialogue: Began in 2007, it has a 
200  Daniel Horner, “Pakistan, U.S. Said to Be Talking on NSG,” Arms Control Association, November 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/
ACT/2015_11/News/Pakistan-US-Said-to-Be-Talking-on-NSG.
201  “Border Defense Cooperation Agreement between India and China,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, 
October 23, 2013, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=100178. 
China India Pakistan U.S.
2016 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) (with the 2005 Amendment) X X X X
2007 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism X X X
2002 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) X X
2001 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management X X
1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) X X X X
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty X X
1996 Convention on Nuclear Safety X X X X
1996 Wassenaar Arrangement X
1987 Missile Technology Control Regime X X
1985 Australia Group X
1976 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space X X X X
1974 Nuclear Suppliers Group X X
1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) X X X X
1972 Seabed Treaty X
1971 Zangger Committee X X
1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) X X
1967 Outer Space Treaty X X X X
1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban Treaty) (PTBT) X
X X
1961 Antarctic Treaty X X X X
1925 Geneva Protocol X X X X
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broad agenda focused on strategic issues. The latest 
meetings were held in 2015.202 
Hand-in-Hand Military Exercises: MOU signed in 
2006 and exercises began in 2007 in China; it pro-
vides for military-to-military contact and joint ex-
ercises in counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, and search 
and rescue; it also includes high-level military en-
gagement.203 Most recent exercises were held in 
2015.204
Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China: Adopted in November 2006, 
it commits both to future discussions on WMD and 
proliferation.205
Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the 
Military Field: Adopted in November 1996, it com-
mits both countries to notify each other of military 
exercises, and also provided for some observation of 
troop movements by both sides.206 It also calls for 
major categories of armaments to be reduced, or lim-
ited, “in mutually agreed geographical zones along 
the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually 
agreed upon” including “surface-to-surface missiles.”
Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Stability in 
the Region in the Vicinity of the Actual Control Line: 
Signed in September 1993, aims to avoid use of force 
on the contested border by limiting troop buildup, 
providing advance notification of exercises, and re-
specting the actual line of control.207
China-Pakistan
Defense Cooperation Agreement: Signed in 2008, it 
further strengthens defense cooperation between the 
Pakistani and Chinese militaries in further pursuit 
of joint strategic goals.208
Agreement on Cooperation in the Nuclear Field: 
Signed in 1986, it provides for transfer of nuclear 
technology including reactor design; cooperation is 
ongoing.209
Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation: 
Signed in 1976, it provided for close cooperation on 
a broad range of issues, including atomic energy.210
China-U.S.
U.S.-China Space Hotline: Established in Novem-
ber 2015, to allow for notification of potential 
approaches or collisions in space, and space-based 
tests.211
Agreements on Cybersecurity: Agreed upon in 2015, 
during heads-of-state meeting. China and the U.S. 
will consult, share information on malicious cyber 
activities, refrain from conducting or knowingly 
supporting cyber-enabled theft of intellectual prop-
erty, promote appropriate norms of state behavior in 
202  “7th Annual Defense and Security Dialogue between India and China held in Beijing,” Embassy of India, Beijing, April 10, 2015, http://www.
indianembassy.org.cn/newsDetails.aspx?NewsId=595. 
203  Jagannath P. Panda, “China-India Joint Military Drill: Time for a Review,” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, September 2, 2013, http://
www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinaIndiaJointMilitaryDrill_jppanda_020913. 
204  Franz-Stefan Gady, “China and India Hold Joint Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-
and-india-hold-joint-military-exercise/. 
205  “Joint Declaration by the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 21, 
2006, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6363/Joint+Declaration+by+the+Republic+of+India+an. 
206  “Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China 
Border Areas,” United Nations Peacemaker, November 29, 1996, http://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindiaconfidenceagreement96. 
207  “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,” United Nations 
Peacemaker, September 7, 1993, http://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindia-borderagreement93. 
208  “Pakistan, China agree to further strengthen defense cooperation,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan, September 28, 2008, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cepk/eng/xnyfgk/t515498.htm. 
209  “Sino-Pak Nuclear Accord,” Pakistan Horizon, 1986, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394229 and “Nuclear Power in Pakistan,” World Nuclear 
Association, April 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/pakistan.aspx. 
210  “Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between China and Pakistan,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan, March 23, 2013, 
http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/scientechcooperation/t191006.htm. 
211  Jamie Condliffe, “The U.S. Now Has a Space Hotline With China,” Gizmodo, November 23, 2015, http://gizmodo.com/the-u-s-now-has-a-space-
hotline-with-china-1744153537. 
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cyberspace, and establish a high-level joint dialogue 
on fighting cybercrime and related issues.212
MOU on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Mari-
time Encounters: Signed in 2014, the MOU includes 
codes of conduct for sea-to-sea and air-to-air en-
counters, including annual assessments, exchange 
of information regarding issues that arise during 
encounters, and ad-hoc consultations on questions 
regarding encounters.213
MOU on Notification of Major Military Activities: 
Signed in 2014, the MOU provides for exchange 
of information regarding major military exercises 
and observation of those exercises, as well as infor-
mation on defense strategy and policies via briefings 
and publications. It also provides a formal channel 
for meetings and discussions of substantive defense 
information.214
U.S.-China Military Hotline: Established in Novem-
ber 2007, it aims to help the countries “avoid misun-
derstanding during moments of crisis.”215
U.S.–China Nuclear Hotline: Established in April 
1998, the hotline aims to provide a dedicated chan-
nel between the governments of the two countries. 
Nuclear cooperation agreement: Entered into force in 
1985, the countries agreed to permit implementa-
tion in 1997.216
India-Pakistan
Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Re-
lating to Nuclear Weapons: Signed in 2007 and ex-
tended for an additional 5 years in 2012. Both sides 
agreed to take measures to improve the security of 
their nuclear weapons and notify each other of nu-
clear accidents. Should an accident occur, both sides 
commit to work to prevent their actions from being 
misinterpreted.217
Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Bal-
listic Missiles: Signed in November 2005, it provides 
for 72 hours advance notice of ballistic missile flight 
tests, and also sets clear geographic boundaries and 
trajectory limitations for those tests.218
Expert-level talks on nuclear CBMs: Beginning in 
December 2004 the talks are held periodically and 
focus on promoting strategic stability and reducing 
nuclear risk. The latest talks were held in 2012.219
India-Pakistan Nuclear Hotline: Established in June 
2004, the hotline between the Pakistan and India 
foreign ministries aims to “reduce the threat of acci-
dental nuclear war.”220
212  John Rollins, “U.S.–China Cyber Agreement,” Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2015, p. 1, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.
pdf; “FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the United States,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, September 25, 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.
213  “Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters,” Department of Defense, November 
10, 2014, pp. 1-3, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf. 
214  “Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism,” 
U.S. Department of Defense, November 4, 2014, pp. 5, 7-8, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/141112_
MemorandumOfUnderstandingOnNotification.pdf.
215  Edward Cody, “China and U.S. To Establish Military Hotline,” Washington Post, November 6, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/11/05/AR2007110500102.html. 
216  Jack Mendelsohn, David Grahame, “Arms Control Chronology,” p. 65.
217  “India and Pakistan extend agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons,” Ministry of External Affairs, 
Government of India, February 21, 2012, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/18860/India+and+Pakistan+extend+agreement+ 
on+Reducing+the+Risk+from+Accidents+Relating+to+Nuclear+Weapons; Baqir Sajjad Syed “Accord on reducing risk of nuclear accidents 
extended,” Dawn, February 22, 2012, http://www.dawn.com/news/697322/accord-on-reducing-risk-of-nuclear-accidents-extended. 
218  Erin Creegan, “India, Pakistan Sign Missile Notification Pact,” Arms Control Today, November 1, 2005, https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2005_11/NOV-IndiaPak. 
219  “Joint Statement, India-Pakistan Expert-Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 20, 2004, http://
www.nti.org/media/pdfs/26_ea_india.pdf?_=1316627913; “India, Pakistan hold talks on Nuclear Confidence Building Measures in Islamabad,” 
ANI News, December 27, 2012, https://in.news.yahoo.com/india-pakistan-hold-talks-nuclear-confidence-building-measures-143048619.html. 
220  John Lancaster, “India, Pakistan to Set Up Hotline,” Washington Post, June 21, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55542-
2004Jun20.html.
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Missile Test Notification Agreement: Established in 
January 2004, agreed to a formal mechanism for no-
tification regarding missile flight tests.221
Lahore Declaration: Signed in February 1999. Both 
sides pledged to hold talks on nuclear concepts and 
doctrines in an effort to prevent conflict, and also to 
immediately take steps to reduce the risk of acciden-
tal or unauthorized nuclear use.222
Prime Ministers’ Hotline: Established in 1997, for the 
purpose of crisis management.223
Pakistan-India Composite Dialogue Process: Inaugu-
rated in 1997, at the ministerial level; designed to 
move the two countries towards reconciliation on 
all issues, includes discussion of strategic issues and 
CBMs.224
Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons: Concluded in New Delhi in 
1992, it prohibits India and Pakistan from develop-
ing, producing, otherwise acquiring or using chem-
ical weapons, or rendering assistance to those who 
would do so.225
Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations: Rat-
ified in August 1992, it stipulates that Indian and 
Pakistani combat aircraft will not fly within ten ki-
lometers of each other’s airspace, while establishing 
a mechanism for prior permission for overflights.226
Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, 
Manoeuvres and Troop Movements: Signed in 1991, it 
establishes deadlines for advanced notice of military 
exercises and troop movements to prevent misun-
derstanding and crisis. 
India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement: Signed in Jan-
uary 1988. Both sides agree to refrain from under-
taking any action aimed at causing destruction or 
damage to any nuclear installation or facility in each 
country. The Agreement also provides for annual ex-
change of information on number and location of 
nuclear sites in each country.227 
India-U.S.
U.S.-India Hotline: Established in 2015 between 
heads of state and national security advisors, not 
necessarily as a crisis management venue, but to 
“co-ordinate approaches to solving real problems.”228
U.S.-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue: Begun 
in 2015, it aims to further cooperation on strategic 
objectives including nuclear nonproliferation, re-
gional security, cyber issues, and space security.229
U.S.-India Strategic Security Dialogue: Inaugurated 
in 2010, it is meant to foster strategic cooperation 
on a broad range of issues, including nuclear and 
defense issues, regional security, arms control and 
non-proliferation.230 The most recent meeting was 
held in 2016.
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Nuclear cooperation agreement: Signed in 2008, the 
U.S.-India 123 agreement provides for full civil nu-
clear cooperation between the two countries. India 
accepted IAEA safeguards as part of the agreement.231
Pakistan-U.S.
U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue: Inaugurated in 
2009, as a framework for annual ministerial level 
talks. It has a broad agenda, which includes nuclear 
weapons and strategic issues;232 it also includes a 
Pakistan-U.S. Security, Strategic Stability, and Non-
proliferation (SSS&NP) Working Group.233 The 
most recent meetings were held in 2016.234
Policies on the Potential Use of Nuclear 
Weapons
China
Beijing adopted a unilateral no first use (NFU) 
policy in 1964, and reiterated in its 2015 Defense 
White Paper that it would strike with nuclear weap-
ons only in response to a nuclear attack on China.235 
“The Science of Military Strategy,” a 2013 publica-
tion of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, 
presents the following specific criteria for nuclear 
use. “1. China will not use nuclear weapons to attack 
or threaten non-nuclear states; 2. China will not use 
nuclear weapons to respond to conventional attacks; 
and 3. China will use nuclear weapons only after it 
has confirmed an incoming nuclear attack.” 236 
“The Science of Military Strategy” also sets out three 
operational rules for China’s nuclear second-strike 
capability. First, a retaliatory attack by China would 
be limited, partially to allow for additional retaliatory 
strikes. Second, a retaliatory attack would target pop-
ulation centers, and not military capabilities. Third, 
China’s objective in launching a retaliatory strike 
would be to compel an adversary to abandon future 
plans to attack China with nuclear weapons.237
Though China’s nuclear arsenal is under the oper-
ational control of the People’s Liberation Army via 
its General Staff Directorate (GSD), experts believe 
that final release authority rests with the Central 
Military Commission and its chairman—a position 
usually held by the General Secretary of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP), currently President 
Xi Jinping.238 
India
The most recent official document outlining India’s 
nuclear posture, released by New Delhi in 2003, re-
affirms India’s unilateral NFU policy, announced in 
1999 in its first draft nuclear doctrine.239 It states 
that India will only use its nuclear weapons to re-
taliate against a nuclear attack on India or against 
Indian forces wherever they are deployed, with the 
possible exception of a “major attack” with chemical 
or biological weapons, in which case India retains 
the option of a nuclear response.240
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In its 2003 document, New Delhi stressed that 
India will maintain a “credible minimum deterrent,” 
which it defines as the ability to retaliate to a first 
strike with a massive retaliatory response designed to 
“inflict unacceptable damage.”241
India’s nuclear arsenal is under military stewardship via 
its Strategic Forces Command. However, the country’s 
nuclear policy is formulated by its Nuclear Command 
Authority, which is comprised of a decision-making 
body, the Political Council, and an implementation 
body, the Executive Council.242 The decision to launch 
a nuclear strike can only be made by the Political Coun-
cil, which is chaired by the prime minister.243
Pakistan
Islamabad has not released a nuclear doctrine or 
guidelines for possible nuclear use. However, the 
Pakistani concept of deterrence is focused on dis-
couraging Indian aggression in conventional as well 
as nuclear domains.244 In 1999, Foreign Minister 
Abdul Sattar said “Minimum nuclear deterrence will 
remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy. 
The minimum cannot be quantified in static num-
bers…But we shall not engage in any nuclear com-
petition or arms race.”245
In its official statements, Islamabad has left open the 
possibility of nuclear first-use against nuclear-armed 
states. It has avoided publicizing its “red lines” for nu-
clear use, ostensibly to create strategic doubt in New 
Delhi regarding the consequences of launching a con-
ventional or nuclear attack.246 In 2015, Defense Min-
ister Khawaja Asif expressed a readiness to use nuclear 
weapons if the survival of the state is at stake.247 
During the 2001-2002 military standoff with India, 
Lt. General Khalid Kidwai pronounced the most 
specific thresholds for Islamabad’s use of nuclear 
weapons including: a “geographic” threshold de-
fined as India having conquered a significant por-
tion of its territory; a “military” threshold, defined 
as India having destroyed a significant portion of 
Pakistan’s armed forces; an “economic” threshold, 
defined as India successfully employing a strategy of 
economic strangulation against Pakistan; and “do-
mestic” threshold, defined as India successfully in-
citing internal unrest in Pakistan.248 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are overseen by a tripartite 
body consisting of: the National Command Author-
ity (NCA), a 10-member group chaired by the pres-
ident, which is responsible for formulating policy, 
and deploying and coordinating forces; the Strategic 
Plans Division, made up of 50-70 officers from the 
military services, which carries out the day-to-day 
management of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, including 
implementing the NCA’s policies and safeguarding 
nuclear weapons and nuclear sites; and the Services’ 
Strategic Forces Command, which is responsible for 
the tactical control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons de-
livery systems. A decision to launch a nuclear strike 
can only be made by a consensus vote in the NCA, 
with the chairman casting the final vote.249
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United States
The 2013 White House factsheet on the U.S. nu-
clear posture reaffirms the language in the 2010 Nu-
clear Posture Review (NPR), which states that the 
“fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which 
will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to 
deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, 
and partners.”250 According to the factsheet, the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal serves to convince potential adver-
saries that the consequences of a nuclear attack on 
the United States, or its allies or partners, would 
far outweigh any potential benefits of such a strike. 
The NPR stresses that the United States “would 
only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme 
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the 
United States or its allies and partners,” and that it is 
in the U.S. and global interest to ensure that nuclear 
weapons are never used.251
In the NPR, the Defense Department provides a 
strengthened “negative security assurance” (NSA). It 
declares that that the United States “will not use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in 
compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation ob-
ligations,” with the caveat that it “reserves the right 
to make any adjustment in the assurance that may 
be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of 
the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to 
counter that threat.”252
The U.S. nuclear arsenal is overseen by the Defense 
Department’s Strategic Command. Only the presi-
dent can direct the use of nuclear weapons.253 
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Few problems pose greater challenges to U.S. na-
tional security than controlling, reducing and countering 
the proliferation of nuclear arms. The Brookings Arms 
Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative brings the In-
stitution’s multidisciplinary strengths to bear on the crit-
ical challenges of arms control and non-proliferation. 
Housed in the Center for 21st Century Security and In-
telligence in the Brookings Foreign Policy program, the 
initiative addresses global arms control and proliferation 
challenges, as well as the central negotiations between the 
United States and Russia.
Brookings Senior Fellow Steven Pifer directs the initia-
tive, joined by Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn. Brookings 
President Strobe Talbott is actively involved in the ini-
tiative, which also draws on the expertise of a number 
of other Brookings experts.
Research by Brookings experts in the Arms Control and 
Non-Proliferation Initiative focuses on several clusters:
• nuclear arms reductions, including U.S.-Rus-
sian nuclear arms reductions, reductions of 
third-country nuclear forces and the challenges 
of moving to a non-nuclear world;
• U.S. nuclear deterrence policy in the 21st cen-
tury;
• nuclear non-proliferation challenges, includ-
ing ratification of the Comprehensive Nucle-
ar-Test-Ban Treaty and entry into force, a fissile 
materials cut-off treaty, strengthening the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
nuclear security, civil nuclear energy cooperation, 
regional security (Middle East, Northeast Asia, 
South Asia), the North Korea nuclear challenge 
and negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program.
The initiative supports a dialogue led by former Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott, and former 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on U.S.-Russian 
cooperation on nuclear arms reductions and non-pro-
liferation, which has produced joint recommendations 
that are shared with senior U.S. and Russian officials. The 
initiative also sponsors the Brookings Arms Control and 
Non-Proliferation Roundtable Series and public events 
aimed at discussing the key arms control and non-pro-
liferation challenges of the day. The initiative produces 
research and policy recommendations on these issues, 
including the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Prolif-
eration Series papers.
This is the 14th paper in that series. Previous papers are 
listed below; all may be downloaded at: http://www.
brookings.edu/about/projects/arms-control-nonprolifer-
ation/arms-control-series
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